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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ANGELA BYERS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Supreme Court No. 20000782-SC
Priority No. 15

CREATIVE CORNER, INC. AND LYN
PELTON,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, and Utah Code Anno. 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Does an employee state a cause of action for public policy
wrongful termination when she is terminated because of her sex,
where the employer has fewer than 15 employees and the employee
thus has no right to bring his claim before the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division because that agency lacks jurisdiction?
This issue was resolved on a Motion to Dismiss by the trial

1

court.

The standard of review is a review for correctness.

The

trial court is affirmed only if the plaintiff could not recover
under the facts alleged.

Straley

v.

Halliday,

997 P. 2d 336 (Utah

Ct. A.P.. 2000).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Peterson
Retherford

v. Browning,

832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)

v. AT&T, 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992)

Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended) 42USC 2000e
UT Exec Order March 17, 1993 - Gov. Leavitt;
UT Exec Order June 30, 198 9 - Gov. Bangerter;
UT Exec Order July 25, 1986 - Gov. Bangerter;
UT Exec Order May 28, 1985 - Gov. Bangerter;
UT Exec Order January 12, 1982 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order July 17, 1980 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order May 4, 1979 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order October 1, 1977 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order December 6, 1973 - Gov.

Rampton;

UT Exec Order October 1, 1965 - Gov. Rampton.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Angela Byers brought suit after she was fired by
the appellees.

At the time she was fired Defendant Pelton said

that Byers was terminated because she was pregnant and unable to
2

lift.

Byers specifically discussed lifting with her doctor and

was able to lift all items she had been required to lift during
her employment with Defendant Creative Corner, Inc.
terminated because she was pregnant.

Byers was

At the time Byers was

terminated Appellees employed fewer than 15 employees.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Byers filed her complaint alleging wrongful termination in
violation of a clear and substantial public policy.

Appellees

filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), Utah R. Civ.
P., which was granted.

Byers filed a Motion for a New Trial

pursuant to Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P.
Rule 59 motion.

The trial court denied the

Byers appealed.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY
This matter was dismissed by the trial court on a Motion to
Dismiss.
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
This matter was dismissed on a Motion to Dismiss.

All the

complaint's well pled facts are deemed admitted for the purpose
of such a motion.
Hosp.,

St. Benedict's

Dev.

811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).

Co.

v. St.

Benedict's

The facts stated in the

complaint, and thus deemed admitted, include:

3

2.
Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., is a Utah
Corporation in good standing doing business in Salt Lake
County.
(Record at 1.)
3.
Defendant Lyn Pelton is an officer of Defendant
Creative Corner, Inc., and the person who made all relevant
decisions and took all relevant actions alleged herein.
(Record at 1.)
4.
All actions alleged herein took place in Salt
Lake County and venue and jurisdiction are appropriate
in Salt Lake County. (Record at 1-2.)
5.
The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant
Creative Corner, Inc. at a rate of $11.00 per hour plus
a $200.00 per month car allowance. (Record at 2.)
6.
The Plaintiff was terminated on the 15th day
of October, 1999. (Record at 2.)
7.
Defendant Pelt on said that Plaintiff was
terminated because she was pregnant and unable to lift.
(Record at 2.)
8.
Plaintiff specifically discussed lifting with her
doctor and was able to lift all items she had been required
to lift during her employment with Creative Corner, Inc.
(Record at 2.)
9.
Plaintiff was terminated because she was pregnant.
(Record at 2.)
10. At the time Plaintiff was terminated Defendants
employed fewer than 15 employees. (Record at 2.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
and other federal statutes and regulations and Executive Order of
Utah Governors provide a clear and substantial public policy

4

against termination of an employee in Utah because of sex.

The

trial court also erred in its memorandum decision on Byers's
motion for a new trial when it held that Byers could not list
additional legal citations supporting her claims in her
memoranda.
ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFF'S TERMINATION VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY
Appellees do not contest the essential factual allegations
of Byers's complaint, i.e., Byers was terminated by Lyn Pelton,
the president of Creative Corner because she was pregnant.

At

all relevant times Creative Corner had fewer than 15 employees.
The trial court held that these facts do not state a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b) (6) .
Byers claim would have been pre-empted and she would have
been allowed to proceed with her sex discrimination claim under
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, UCA 34A-5-101 et seq. or Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if Creative Corner had 15 or
more employees.

Since Creative Corner had fewer than 15

employees it is not an "employer" under the UADA.1

x

Because

The term '"employee1 means any person applying with or
employed by an employer." Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-102 (6) . The
term "'employer1 means . . . every . . . person employing 15 or
more employees within the state . . .." Utah Code Ann. §34a-55

Creative Corner is not an "employer," Byers is not an "employee"
under the Act.

Because the parties are not "employers" or

"employees" under the Act, there is no jurisdiction for either to
seek relief or to be required to respond to claims raised under
the Act and the UADA does not pre-empt Byers's claims.
A.
RETHERFORD DOES NOT PRE-EMPT BYER'S CLAIMS.
In its memorandum decision the trial court accepted
appellees argument that the UADA pre-empts Byers's claims and
relied on the analysis of Retherford
1992) .

Actually reading Retherford

pre-empt Byers's claims.
offer alternative relief.
Retherford

v.

AT&T, 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah

shows why the UADA does not

To pre-empt a claim, a statute must
The UADA offers no relief to Byers.

analyzes both Utah and Federal statutes in its pre-

emption discussion.
In Retherford,

at 968-969, the court analyzed the Labor

Management Relations Act (LMRA) which pre-empts various labor
claims because those claims may be addressed under collective
bargaining agreements.
The justification for this expansive view of section
3 01 preemption is the ease with which an aggrieved
employee otherwise could turn a suit for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement into a state tort or

102 (7) .
6

contract claim, thereby obtaining a state law holding
that might result in an inconsistent interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
That pre-emption is justified because the employee has relief
available under a collective bargaining agreement.

Other Federal

statutes may pre-empt other types of claims when relief is
available under those statutes.
Retherford

also addressed pre-emption by Utah state

statutes. At 965, the court discussed pre-emption under the
Worker's Compensation Act.
emption was

u

The key to whether there was pre-

. . . that the Workers' Compensation Act provided

the exclusive remedy . . . "

Id.

(Emphasis added.)

The Workers'

Compensation Act pre-empts claims of injured workers when it
provides a remedy for those claims through an administrative
K

process.
Finally, Retherford
Retherford,

discussed pre-emption by the UADA.

In

the Utah Supreme Court did not hold that the UADA

pre-empted all discrimination claims as the trial court suggests.
Instead it said

u

. . . w e conclude that taken, as a whole, the

version of the UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's firing
defined retaliation as discrimination and provided the exclusive
remedy for this type of discrimination."
added.)

Id.

at 962.

(Emphasis

As with both the LMRA and the Workers' Compensation Act,

7

the UADA pre-empts those claims for which it provides remedies to
claimants.
Other courts have used this same analysis in holding that
statutes like the UADA do not pre-empt discrimination claims
against small employers.
Inc.,

In Kramer

v.

Windsor

P$rk

Nursing

Home,

943 F. Supp. 844, (S.D. Ohio 1996), the court applied

Collins

v. Rizkana,

652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995) which acknowledged

the type of cause of action Byers filed.

The Kramer

court

responded to the pre-emption argument there, ". . . despite
O.R.C.S4112, the plaintiff in Collins

had no adequate remedy

since her employer was exempt from coverage by the statute.
[Citation omitted.]

The court did not believe that the

legislature meant for small business to have a 'license to
sexually harass/discriminate against their employees with
impunity.'"
Because Creative Corner is not an "employer" and because
Byers is not an "employee" under the UADA, that Act provides
Byers no remedy.

Because the Act provides no remedy, it does not

pre-empt her wrongful termination claim.
B.
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

8

In Peterson

v. Browning,

832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), this

Court held that a cause of action exists for wrongful termination
where an employee has been terminated in violation of a clear and
substantial public policy.
appear to limit Peterson

The Trial Court's position would

v. Browning

to its facts and hold that

the only clear and substantial public policies Utah recognizes
are those where an employee is fired for refusing to commit a
felony.
In Fox v. MCI Communs.

Corp.,

931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997),

this court held:
An at-will employee may overcome that presumption
by demonstrating that (1) there is an implied or
express agreement that the employment may be terminated
only for cause or upon satisfaction of another
agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation
restricts the right of an employer to terminate an
employee under certain conditions; or (3) the
termination of employment constitutes a violation of a
clear and substantial public policy. (Emphasis added.)
The policy is to prohibit discrimination within the State,
not merely to prohibit discrimination among employers with more
than 15 employees.

Other states have examined this same issue in

light of anti-discrimination acts, which also have jurisdictional
limits based on the number of employees, and held that
discrimination statutes do describe clear and substantial public
policy.
Molesworth

See Bennett
v.

Brandon,

v. Hardy,

784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990);

672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996); Kerrigan
9

v.

Magnum Entertainment
v. Rizkana,

Inc.,

804 F.Supp. 733 (D.Md. 1992);

652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995); £o£>erts v. Dudley,

P.2d 901 (Wash. 2000); Williamson

v. Greene,

Collins
993

490 S.E.2d 23 (W.Va.

1997) .
Retherford

provides the analysis for the inquiry as to

whether a public policy is clear and substantial.

Retherford

at

note 9.
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently
"clear and substantial" to support a cause of action for
discharge in violation of public policy, one must examine
the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it
affects the public as a whole. The very words "clear and
substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As
the majority of this court recognized in Peterson,
all
statements made in a statute are not expressions of public
policy. Many statutes merely regulate conduct between
private individuals or "'impose requirements whose
fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy
concerns. 1 " [Citations omitted.]
The following questions are relevant to determining
whether a statute embodies a clear and substantial public
policy. First, one must ask whether the policy in question
is one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed
to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether the
public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and
weighty that we should place the policy beyond the reach of
contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge that
parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal
bargaining power.
These two questions are both answered affirmatively in the case
of sex discrimination.
The policy prohibiting sex discrimination is one of
overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties

10

only.

The Policy against age discrimination is clear and

substantial on numbers alone.

There are more than 11 million

people employed by employers with too few employees to be covered
by the Act, Rivers

v.

Roadway

Express

Inc.,

S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274, (1994) Note 6.

511 U.S. 298, 114
Congress felt so

strongly about sex discrimination that it directed the Attorney
General of the United States to file suit to enforce Title VII 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6.

It also imposed punitive damages as a penalty

against employers who violate that Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The fact that Title VII has jurisdictional requirements
based on the number of employees does not mean the public policy
is merely to prohibit discrimination by those employers with 15
or more employees.
Molesworth

That argument was rejected by the court in

v. Brandon,

672 P.2d 608 (Md. 1996).

There the court

examined a wrongful termination claim brought by another woman
who claimed she was terminated because of her sex by an employer
with fewer than the required number of employees.

The

Molesworth

court noted that the legislative history of Title VII indicated
that the reason for the 15 employee requirement for cases
submitted to EEOC was that including all employers would create a
significant backlog for EEOC, Id.

at 614.

Title VII reflects a clear and substantial public policy
against discrimination based on sex.
11

c
OTHER FEDERAL LAW ALSO PROVIDES A
CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY
Title VII is not alone as a federal statutory basis for the
clear and substantial public policy against termination because
of sex.

At 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) congress prohibited discrimination

in compensation based on sex, regardless of the number of
employees, so long as the employer meets the other requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

It goes without saying that if

an employer may not discriminate in the amount of compensation it
cannot discriminate in whether to pay any compensation at all,
i.e., whether to fire on the basis of sex.
42 U.S.C. §5057 makes it illegal to for an employer,
regardless of size, to discriminate based on sex among certain
volunteers, i.e., people who do not get paid.

If clear and

substantial public policy prevents sex discrimination among
volunteers clearly there is such a policy preventing the
termination, based on sex, from employment upon which a woman
relies for her livelihood.
This Court has analyzed government regulations in
determining whether a public policy is clear and substantial.
See Ryan
1998).

v.

Dan's

Food

Stores,

Inc.,

972 P.2d 395, 406 (Utah

Specific regulations of the federal government show a
12

clear and substantial public policy against sex discrimination,
regardless of the size of the employer.

Businesses who contract

with the Federal Railroad Administration2, the Federal Highway
Administration3, the Federal Communications Commission4
specifically, and the government generally5 may not discriminate
based on sex no matter how few employees they have.

In analyzing

regulations and statutes we must remember that the Peterson
Browning,

v.

did not create a cause of action for the violation of

individual statutes or regulations.

It merely held that the

statutes or regulations must be analyzed to see whether their
policy is clear and substantial.

If there is a clear and

substantial public policy against sex discrimination for small
firms who contract with the federal government to perform
janitorial services the policy remains clear and substantial
against sex discrimination by small firms who contract with the
state or a private firm to perform those same janitorial
services.

If there is a clear and substantial public policy

against sex discrimination by small firms who perform janitorial

2

49 CFR §265.7(a)(1)(i)

3

23 CFR §230.113

4

47 CFR §73.2080

5

41 CFR §60-1.4
13

services the policy remains clear and substantial against sex
discrimination by small firms who do anything else.
For many years neither congress nor the President of the
United States were prohibited in any fashion from discriminating
against their employees on the basis of sex.

As of 1996 both of

these employers are required to treat women employees no
differently than they treat men, including in firing decisions.
See 2 U.S.C. §1311, 3 U.S.C. §411.

When both of these employers

who have previously been able to do as they wish are now
restricted in their ability to fire a woman because of her sex it
is clear that the national public policy is clearly and
substantially against allowing an employer, of any size, to fire
a woman because of her sex.
D
PUBLIC POLICY REFLECTED IN UTAH EXECUTIVE ORDERS IS
CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION
In addition to the federal law cited above Byers asked the
trial court to consider related executive orders of Utah's
governors.

These include: UT Exec Order March 17, 1993 - Gov.

Leavitt; UT Exec Order June 30, 198 9 - Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec
Order July 25, 1986 - Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec Order May 28, 1985
- Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec Order January 12, 1982 - Gov. Matheson;
UT Exec Order July 17, 198 0 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec Order May 4,
14

1979 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec Order October 1, 1977 - Gov.
Matheson; UT Exec Order December 6, 1973 - Gov. Rampton; UT Exec
Order October 1, 1965 - Gov. Rampton.

In these executive orders

the then sitting governors of Utah described the rights Byers
seeks to vindicate here.

Those rights were not described in

terms of government versus private employment or by the number of
employees an employer has.

For example Governor Bangerter's

Executive Order of July 25, 1986;
. . . the basic rights of all the people of this nation
are the rights to seek a livelihood, opportunity for
advancement and the respect of our society based solely
on the individual's ability and capacity. To judge an
individual, expressly or through implication, by
his/her race, color, sex, religious creed, national
origin, age or handicap, is repugnant to every American
ideal and a distortion of our standards of human
freedom and worth. [Emphasis added]
Clearly Governor Bangerter did not believe that the public policy
of the state of Utah limited basic employment rights to those
women employed by large employers.
In his Executive Order of March 17, 1993 Governor Leavitt
directed, "by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
laws of this state, [I] do hereby prohibit sexual harassment,
which is a form of sex discrimination, in any and every workplace
in which state employees and employees of public and higher
education are required to conduct business."

Obviously state

employees of agencies like the Workers Compensation Division of
15

the Utah Labor Commission6, the Utah Occupational Safety and
Health Administration7, and Work Force Services8, and other
entities are required to conduct business in every business of
the state.

Appellees' business is covered by the March 17, 1993

Executive Order.
As the governors of all citizens of Utah governors Leavitt,
Bangerter, Matheson and Rampton have issued executive orders
which delineate a clear and substantial public policy for each of
those citizens.

In doing so they have not drawn artificial lines

between large and small employers.

The clear and substantial

public policy they describe applies to all employees, and
employers, these parties included.
E
BURTON DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS ACTION
In Burton v. Exam Center,

387 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2000 UT IS

(Utah 2000) this court examined the plaintiff's age
discrimination case under the UADA and determined held that
statute did not provide a clear and substantial public policy
against age discrimination.

6
7
8

There the court specifically said

Utah Code Anno. 34A-2-802

Utah Code Anno. 34A-6-104

Utah Code Anno. 35A-1-104
16

its decision did not preclude an examination of other statutes to
determine whether there was a clear and substantial public policy
against sex, race, religious or disability discrimination.
Burton at 2000 UT 18 Hl7.

The court's major emphasis was on the

UADA's simplified and expedited resolution procedure.
In this matter Byers asks the court to hold that a clear and
substantial public policy against termination on the basis of sex
in Utah is found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as
amended) as well as in other federal law and Utah Executive
Orders.

The Burton analysis does not apply to this case.

While

sex discrimination claims brought under Title VII are
investigated by the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division
(UALD), they, unlike UADA claims, are not heard in the UALD
venue.

If a negotiated resolution is not reached within the UALD

a Notice of Right to Sue is issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the claimant may then become a
plaintiff in a law suit brought in state or federal court.

In

short, a Title VII sex discrimination claim does not have the
benefit of the expedited administrative procedures a UADA claim
does and the Burton

analysis does not apply to Title VII claims.

Further, the legislative history of Title VII shows that the
purpose for excluding small employers was to reduce the case load
of the EEOC and not to provide some alternative to litigation as
17

the court found in Burton.

In short, the Burton

analysis does

not apply to Title VII and Title VII provides a clear and
substantial public policy against termination because of sex.
II
PELTON IS PERSONALLY LIABLE IN TORT
In Utah, the wrongful termination of an employee in
violation of public policy is a tort.
P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992).
was terminated by Pelton.

Peterson

v. Browning,

832

Appellees don't dispute that Byers

A corporate officer, an agent, is not

shielded from liability for a tort committed on behalf of her
principal, the corporation.
Utah courts have cited with approval the Restatement
(Second) Agency,9 and American Jurisprudence, Second, on Agency,1
and Corporations11.

Each of these respected treatises describes

the law which makes Pelton liable for her tortious actions in
illegally terminating Byers.
The Restatement:
343. General Rule

9

Gildea

10

v. Guardian

Carlie

ll

SII

v.

Title

Morgan,

Megadiamond,

Co.,

970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998)

922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996)

Inc.

v. American

969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998)
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Superabrasives

Corp.,

An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the
command of the principal or on account of the principal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the
principal, or a privilege held by him for the
protection of the principal's interests, or where the
principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of
care to the person harmed. Restatement (Second) Agency,
§343.
The Restatement, again:
344. Liability for Directed Conduct or Consequences
An agent is subject to liability, as he would be for
his own personal conduct, for the consequences of
another's conduct which results from his directions if,
with knowledge of the circumstances, he intends the
conduct, or its consequences, except where the agent or
the one acting has a privilege or immunity not
available to the other. Restatement (Second) Agency,
§344.
American Jurisprudence, Second:
. . . an employee who tortuously causes injury to a
third person may be held personally liable to that
person regardless of whether he or she committed the
tort while acting within the scope of employment,
because of the employee's liability is based on
personal wrongdoing independent of the employment
relationship." 27 Am.Jur. 2d, Employment Relations,
§488.
American Jurisprudence, Second, again:
If . . . a director or officer commits or participates
in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also
by or for the corporation, he is liable to third
persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what
liability attaches to the corporation for the tort. A
contrary rule would enable a director or officer of a
corporation to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape
liability behind the shield of his representative
19

character, even thought the corporation might be
insolvent or irresponsible. 18B Am.Jur. 2d,
Corporations, §1877
The treatise law is that Pelton is liable for her tort in
wrongfully firing Byers.
Other courts have likewise found corporate officers liable
in situations similar to that before the court.
AFBIC Development

Corp.,

In Dillon

v.

597 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1979) the

individual was held liable under the Federal Fair Housing Act
where he made factual misrepresentations while acting in his
capacity as vice president of the corporate defendant.
v. Houston,

In Tash

74 Mich. App. 566, 524 N.W.2d 579, 581 (1977) summary

judgment for the individual defendants was denied in a tortious
interference with contract case where the individual was acting
on behalf a union.

In Fiol

v.

Doellstedt,

50 Cal.App. 4th 1318,

58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 315 (1996) the court declined to dismiss
claims against a corporate representative who personally
discriminated against an employee under the Fair Employment and
Housing Act.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED CITED CASES
In its memorandum decision the trial court declined to
consider citations to statutes, regulations and executive orders
20

other than those cited in the complaint on the grounds that they
were

u

outside the pleadings."

The trial court erred.

The trial court's theory is evidently based on its
perception of the principal that a court considering a Rule
12(b) (6) Utah R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss may only consider the
well plead facts alleged in the complaint.

In this matter the

facts deal with the employment of the Byers and the appellees'
termination of the Byers as stated above. The allegation that
those facts state a claim under Utah law is a legal conclusion as
are the allegations that various statutes, regulations and/or
executive orders establish a clear and substantial public policy
forming the basis for the cause of action.

State

v.

McBride,

94 0

P. 2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (the interpretation of a statute is
a question of law.)
The trial court's interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) is wrong
because though a court considering a motion to dismiss is
required to consider only the facts within the pleadings it may
look outside the pleadings for matters which may be judicially
noticed.
Software

Moore's Federal Procedure, §12.34 [2]; Lovelace
Spectrum

Inc.,

In Roy Ludlow Inv.

v.

78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996).

Co. v. Salt

Lake County,

4 99 P. 2d 283

(Utah 1972) this court held "the court may take judicial notice
of the laws of this State, past and present, and this is so
21

regardless of whether they are referred to in the pleadings or
the pretrial order or not."

The trial court could have, and

should have, taken judicial notice of law cited in the memoranda
the proposition that the well pled facts state a cause of action.
CONCLUSION
Angela Byers was fired because of her sex.

There is a clear

and substantial public policy against that firing found in Title
VII as well as other federal statutes.

There is a clear and

substantial public policy against that firing found in the
Executive Orders of Utah's governors.

This court should allow

Angela Byers rights to be vindicated by reversing the trial
court's erroneous decision and sending the matter back for trial
on the merits.
DATED this

;

day of

s<7/i/'C/{c C^^/

, 2001.

ROBERT H. WILDE
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDA

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRYERS, ANGELA
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM
DECISION

vs.
Case No. 990911231
CREATIVE CORNER INC., ET AL
Defendants.

Judge: Tyrone E. Medley
Date: 08/18/2000

This matter came before the Court upon Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59.
Having received and considered memoranda in support and opposition to the Motion, the Court
hereby DENIES the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Plaintiff, Angela Bryers, was an at-will employee of the Defendant, Creative Comer Inc.
2. On October 15, 1999, the Plaintiff alleges she was terminated because she was pregnant.
3. At the time Plaintiff was terminated, the Defendant employed four employees.
4. On November 5, 1999, the Plaintiff sued her former employer Creative Corner, and its
President Lyn Pelton, claiming "wrongful termination in violation of public policy" as set forth
in Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. This was the
Plaintiffs sole cause of action.
5. On December 9, 1999, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Plaintiffs
cause of action was preempted by the exclusive remedy provision found in the Utah
Discrimination Act (herein UADA)(Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to 8)(1988 as amended 1989).
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States, Inc.. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). Second, that
even if the claim was not preempted, there was not a viable cause of action because the
Defendant is are not an "employer" as defined under the UADA. (U.C.A. 34A-5-102(8)(a)(iv)).
Finally, the Defendants argued that the holding in Burton v. Exam Cntr. Indus. 2000 UT 18
(Utah 2000), which affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant, in a suit where the
plaintiff alleged that his firing by a small employer violated public policy against age
discrimination, and gave him rise to a claim for tortious wrongful termination, is dispositive of
this case.
6. In response, the Plaintiff argued that her termination violated clear public policy against sex
discrimination and that wrongful termination of an employee in violation of public policy is a

tort. The Plaintiff also filed a Supplemental Memorandum providing the court with a list of 156
federal codes, 5 Utah statutes, and 10 Executive Orders. Although the Plaintiff provided no legal
analysis of how these statutes and regulations support her claim, she asked the court to consider
these provisions in finding a public policy exception for her claim.
8. On February 14, 1999, this court heard Oral Arguments on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and took the matter under advisement.
9. On March 30, 1999 this court signed an Order granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
This court dismissed the Plaintiffs complaint because it was not convinced that the Plaintiff had
identified a clear and substantial public policy against wrongful termination of employment on
account of sex by a small employer.
10. A week later the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59.
RULING
a. Rule 59
This trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one of
the circumstances specified in subdivision (a) of Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moon Lake Elec. Assn.' v. Ultra Systems W. Constructors, Inc.. 767 P2d 125 (Ut. App. 1988).
Here the Plaintiff seeks relief under URCP 59 (a)(7), alleging that the trial court committed an
"error of law" by not considering the federal codes, case statutes and executive orders the
Plaintiff provided in her Supplemental Memorandum to find a "public policy exception" for the
Plaintiffs claim.
In her Memorandum Opposing the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff cited
Molesworth v. Brandon. 672 A. 2d 608 (1996). In that case the Court of Appeals of Maryland
had to decide whether a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of a female
employee based on sex discrimination could be made against an employer with less than 15
employees. Maryland's Anti-Discrimination Act also exempts employers with less than 15
employees. However, that court sustained the plaintiffs right to sue her employer on the basis of
that "section 14 is one of at least thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional
amendment in Maryland that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances."
Molesworth at 632.
In an attempt to mirror Molesworth. the Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Memorandum
with an attachment listing 156 federal codes, 5 Utah statutes and 22 Utah regulations which

prohibit sex discrimination under various circumstances. The Plaintiff stated that the list was
provided "as additional sources of the public policy against sex discrimination, in addition to the
UADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act..." Supplemental Memorandum Authority p.2.
However, the Plaintiff provided no copies of these to the Court, nor any legal analysis which
explains how the latter provisions provide a clear and substantial public policy against sex
discrimination in the state of Utah.
In her Rule 59 Motion the Plaintiff provided additional statutes and executive orders it
would like this court to "analyze" as well. Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion p.6. However, these latter
statutes and executive orders are outside the pleadings, could not have been considered by this
court in its ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and cannot be considered now to find
an error of law in the previous proceeding. Therefore this Court will not consider the additional
statutes and executive orders in this decision.
For the first time, in her Rule 59 Motion, the Plaintiff also argues that the Burton
decision does not apply to Title VII actions. However, on page one of her Supplemental
Memorandum the Plaintiff stated: "Burton addresses virtually all of the issues addressed in this
matter. The distinguishing factor is that Burton is a case based on age-discrimination, while this
action is based on sex discrimination." This Court may not consider a legal theory first
mentioned in a post-trial motion, as a basis for a finding of an "error of law." Estate of Justhein
824 P.2d 432, 434. Therefore this Court will not address this allegation either. The only issue
this court will review is whether the court committed an error of law by not finding a clear and
substantial policy exception for sex discrimination by small employers based on the list of codes,
statutes and regulations attached by the Plaintiff in her Supplemental Memorandum.
b. Rule 12 (b)(6)
When ruling on a Motion to Dismiss under URCP 12 (b)(6), this Court may only consider
the allegations made in the Complaint. Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P2d 622, 623
(Utah 1990). In her complaint the Plaintiff only cites Title VII and the UADA as the basis of her
claim. Under the Colman decision, this Court did not have the burden of finding, reviewing and
analyzing the numerous list of codes, statutes and regulations attached to the Plaintiffs
Supplemental Authority to reach a decision on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Furthermore, while analyzing Title VII and the UADA, this court is guided by the rule

that in absence of an ambiguity, a statute should be construed according to its plain language.
Johnson v. State Retirement Office, 755 P.2d 161. This is because the best indication of
legislative intent is the statute's plain language. Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 679
P.2d903,906(Utahl984).
1. Title Vllofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII considers it an unlawful employment practice for "an employer to fail or refuse
to hire or discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 U.S.C.S.§ 2000e-2. However,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce, who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." See 42 U.S.C.S. §200e et. seq.
The Defendant, Creative Corners does not meet this definition of "employer;" therefore the
Defendant is exempted from Title VH.
2. UADA
The UADA clearly states that "an employer may not refuse to hire, promote, discharge,
demote or terminate any person ...because of (D) pregnancy; childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions." See U.C.A. 34A-5-106 (l)(a)(I)(D). However the UADA applies only to
"employer(s)" as defined under the Act. The UADA defines "employer" as:
(I) the state;
(ii) any political subdivision;
(iii) a board, commission ...or agent of the state;
(iv) a person employing 15 or more employees within the state for each working day in
each of 20 calendar weeks or more in the current or preceding calendar year."
SeeU.CA. 34A-5-102 (8)(a).
Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, the Defendant also does not fall under the UADA's definitions of
"employer." Therefore the Defendant is also not regulated by the UADA. Furthermore, the
UADA also provides that "the procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination based on...sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth,
or pregnancy related conditions..." See U.C.A. 34A-5-107(15). By its plain language the UADA
provides the only remedy available for the Plaintiffs claim. Nevertheless, Utah recognizes a

public policy exception to the at-will doctrine which does not insulate an employer from liability
where the employee is fired in a manner or for a reason that contravenes clear and substantial
public policy. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 165 (Utah 1991). Therefore this
court will provide a historical review of this public policy exception below.
c. Public Policy Exception
Generally actions within the public policy exception involve termination of employment
for 1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, 2) performing a public obligation, or 3)
exercising a legal right or privilege. Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1992). In
trying to explain the "public policy exception" the Utah Supreme Court has tried to identify
proper sources of "public policy." In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., the court said, "public
policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied in legislative enactments...Not every
legislative enactment, of course, embodies public policy; only those which protect the public or
promote public interest qualify." 771 P2d 1033,1043 (Utah 1989). The court in Berube
explained that the legislature is not the only source of public policy; "judicial decisions can also
enunciate substantial principles of public policy in areas which the legislature has not treated."
Id. The court also warned that:
"actions for wrongful termination based on this exception must involve substantial
and important public policies. To this end we will construe public policies narrowly
and will generally utilize those based on prior legislative pronouncements or judicial
decisions, applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental
that there can be virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the
public good." IcL
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently clear and substantial to support a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the Utah Supreme Court has
suggested that trial courts examine the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it
affects the public as a whole. "The following questions are relevant in determining whether a
statute embodies a clear and substantial public policy:
1) whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public, as
opposed to only the parties only; and
2) whether the public interest is so strong, and the policy so clear and weighty that we
should place the policy beyond the reach of contract."
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States. Inc.. 844 P.2d 949, 966 (Utah 1992).

This court finds that question one can be answered in the affirmative under the circumstances of
this case. Clearly the wrongful termination of pregnant women by any employer is a question of
overarching importance to the public, and society as a whole. However, at this time, this court
cannot answer question two in the affirmative for the reasons set forth below.
In Peterson v. Browning, the Utah Supreme Court held that when an employee is
discharged in violation of a public policy exception he has a tort action against the employer. 832
P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). The court admitted that due to the open-ended nature of the "public
policy exception" the identification of clear and substantial public policies require case-by-case
development." Id. at 1282. Again the court reiterated that "to provide a basis for an action under
the public policy exception, a violation of a state or federal law must contravene the clear and
substantial public policy of the state of Utah." Id. 1283. But this time the court added that
"[ajlthough many state and federal laws will reflect Utah public policy, and may in fact, provide
a source of public policy, a plaintiff must establish the connection between the law violated
and the public policies of Utah." IcL Here the Plaintiff has not met this burden.
In her complaint the Plaintiff cites Title VII and the UADA as the basis for her claim of
"wrongful termination against public policy." The Defendants argued in their Motion to Dismiss
that the UADA preempts the plaintiffs common law cause of action. This was the same
argument made by the defendants in Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States, Inc., 844
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). The latter case involved an appeal from a grant of summary judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint. The plaintiff had sued her employer alleging among other
things that AT&T fired her in retaliation for complaining of being sexually harassed by her coworkers, and that such a discharge violated Utah public policy barring reprisals for sexual
harassment reports. On this issue, the Utah Supreme Court held that the UADA provided the
exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs claim of discharge in violation of public policy. Retherford
at 954.
The Retherford court began its analysis of this issue by looking at the statute itself.
U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(15) reads, "the procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation,
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy- related conditions, age, relation, national origin, or
handicap." The court concluded that the plain text of the statute preempted common law causes

of action for retaliation in complaints of employment discrimination. The court said," as a
matter of statutory construction, we find that the version of the UADA at the time of
Retherford's firing was the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against an employee who
complained of sexual harassment." Retherford at 962.
The Utah Supreme Court then reviewed whether Retherford's tort and contract claims also
came within the scope of the UADA's preemptive effect. The court admitted that "we have yet to
propound a generic test for determining when a statutory cause of action functions as the
exclusive remedy for the wrong... [therefore] we have looked to law outside our jurisdiction [and]
have adopted a test that inquires whether the statutory scheme supplies an indispensable element
of the tort claim." Id at 962-963. The court went on to explain that "the indispensable element
test relies neither on timing nor conduct to determine preemption. Instead under this test,
preemption depends on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim, not the
nature of the defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that injury."
Id at 965-966.
Applying this test, the court again looked to the language of the UADA to determine the
type of injuries the UADA is designed to address. From the plain language of the UADA the
Retherford court concluded that "the legislature intended the UADA to address all manner of
employment discrimination against any member of the specified protected groups." Id at
966. The court also stated that in order for Retherford to prove the tort of wrongful termination
in violation of public policy, Retherford would need to show that AT&T discharged her in a
manner or for reason that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy of the state of Utah, a
public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or statutes." Id at 966. (citing Peterson 832 P.2d at
1281; Berube 771 P.2d at 1051). The court concluded:
"the only possible source in Utah's statues or constitution for a clear and substantial
public policy allegedly violated by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's prohibition
of retaliation for good faith complaints of employment discrimination...in absence of
this public policy declaration, Retherford would be unable even to allege an action for
this tort...it is plain that the harm the UADA addresses is an indispensable element in
Retherford's tort cause of action; therefore the UADA must preempt this claim." Id.
Here, as in Retherford's case, one of the harms the UADA addresses, pregnancy, is also
an indispensable element in the Plaintiffs cause of action. This court following the Retherford

holding ruled that the UADA is also the exclusive remedy for the Plaintiffs cause of action. In
her Memorandum in Opposition, the Plaintiff argued that the Retherford holding does not apply
to her case because in Retherford the plaintiff had alternative relief under a collective bargaining
agreement and was also allowed to proceed with her claims for breach of implied contract,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent employment; while here the Plaintiff
would not have any alternative relief. However the holding in Retherford does not state that to
preempt a claim a statute must offer alternative relief; in fact the dismissal of Retherford's claim
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy was affirmed as discussed above.
Finally there is the case of Burton v. Exam Cntr. Indus., 2000'UT 18 (Utah 2000). In
Burton the plaintiff appealed from the grant of summary judgment to defendant employers in a
suit alleging a common law claim for tortious wrongful termination on the ground that firing the
plaintiff due to his age violated public policy. The plaintiff in Burton argued that because the
UADA covers only employers with 15 or more employees, he had no administrative remedy
through the UADA; therefore that the Utah Supreme Court should recognize a tort cause of action
for wrongful termination against public policy for small employers. Burton also relied on
Molesworth v. Brandon. 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996). But the Utah Supreme Court
declined this argument. It held:
"we can find no constitutional provision or other statute which declares a clear and
substantial public policy against age discrimination in employment practices...in
Molesworth the Maryland court found 'at least 34 statutes..etc' [here] there is no such
constitutional or statutory declaration of public policy in Utah against discrimination
on account of age in the termination of employment of employees by small
employers... We have found no case from other jurisdictions recognizing a public
policy against age discrimination by small employers in a statute such as our
UADA which expressly exempts small employers." Burton at 13-14.
The Burton holding cited some of the reasons why small employers should be exempt.
For example, "if a small employer were subjected to a tort action in the courts, he would have to
hire his own attorney, ...and damages could be awarded against him. The action could be
presumably brought within four years, not limited by the 180-day limitation." Burton at 17. The
court continued,
"As stated by the Jennings court 'it would be unreasonable to expect small employers
who are expressly exempted from the FEHA (California's Anti-Discrimination Act)
ban on age discrimination to nonetheless realize they that they must comply with the

law from which they are exempted ...we do not ascribe such a purpose to the
legislature/" Id.
Here the Plaintiff has provided an extensive list of codes, statutes and regulations in an
effort to establish that under Utah law there is a clear and substantial public policy against sex
discrimination. However the Utah statutes cited by the Plaintiff apply only to entities or
professions regulated by the state, not to small private employers. In Molesworth, the court also
recognized that "absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of public policy, there ordinarily is no
violation of public policy by an employer's discharging an at-will employee." Molesworth v.
Brandon. 341 Md. 621, 630 (Md. App. 1996) (citinz Watson v. Peoples Ins. Co.. 322 Md. 467,
478 (1991). However the plaintiff in Molesworth argued that her termination violated the public
policy announced in §14 of the Fair Employment Act, Maryland Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995
Supp) Art. 49B which states:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland, in the exercise
of its police power for the protection of the public safety...to assure all persons
equal opportunity in receiving employment...regardless of race, color, religion...
sex, age...and to that end to prohibit discrimination in employment by any person,
group, labor organization, organization, or ANY employer or his agents." Id. at 628.
The defendant, argued that §14 did not apply to employers with less than 15 employees. However
the Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed. The court explained,
" by its own language [§14] proscribes discrimination in employment by 'any
small employer/ If the term 'employer' in §14 were meant to refer only to employers
as defined in § 15(b), the term 'any' would be unnecessary... the language of the statute
indicates that the legislature intended to prohibit sex discrimination by 'any employer.'"
I d at 632.
Although the codes, statues and regulations provided by the Plaintiff prohibit
discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances, none indicate that the Utah legislature
intended to prohibit sex discrimination by "any employer." Without a statute with the express
language of Maryland's §14, it is difficult for this court to simply conclude that together these
provisions provide strong evidence of a legislative intent to create a clear and substantial public
policy against sex discrimination by any employer in Utah. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has failed
to "establish a connection between the law violated and the public policies of Utah." Peterson at
1283. In addition, the Retherford holding clearly established that the UADA provides the

exclusive remedy for a claim for "wrongful termination against public policy." Finally, in Burton
the Utah Supreme Court clearly declined to create a cause of action for small employers who
discriminate against employees based upon age, a specified group protected under the UADA.
CONCLUSION
It seems odd, repugnant and disheartening to have concluded that the State of Utah is a
place where a pregnant woman can be terminated from employment by a small employer because
of her pregnancy, and that she is precluded from maintaining a wrongful termination cause of
action under a public policy exception. The policy considerations which support the exemption of
small employers from the reach of the Title VII and the UADA seem'to pale in comparison to the
harm caused by maintaining discriminatory employment practices which wrongfully deny
economic opportunities, and reduce the quality of life for all of us. However, this court has its
limitations; it must follow the plain text of the statutes of this state, and the controlling precedent
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. Based on the case law and analysis provided above, this
court concludes that it did not commit an error of law by granting the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. Therefore the Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59 is DENIED. This
Memorandum Decision shall constitute the final order of this court in resolving the matters
referenced herein.

nJl
Jjddge Tyrone E. Medley
strict Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo

ANGELA BYERS,
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM

Plaintiff,
v.

CREATIVE CORNER, INC., and
LYN PELTON,
Case No. 990911231
Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendants.
-ooOoo-

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.for Failure to State a Claim came before the
Court on Monday, February 14, 2000 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. Plaintiff Angela
Byers was represented by her attorney of record, Robert Wilde, Esq. Defendants Creative
Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton were represented by their attorney of record, E. Paul Wood.
The Court, having reviewed the Memoranda submitted by Plaintiff and Defendants and
having considered oral argument on the matter herewith enters its Order as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim is granted. The Complaint and causes of action thereunder are dismissed.
DATED this

day of April, 2000.

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 27 day of March, 2000, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Robert H. Wilde
Blake A. Nakamura
Attorneys for Plaintiff
935 East South Union Ave., Suite D-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
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Section 2000e. Definitions
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For the purposes of this subchapter -

Health Law G

1

(a) The term ''person ' includes one or more individuals,
governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor|
unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts,
unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under
title 11, or receivers.
(b) The term ''employer'' means a person engaged in an industryaffecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States,
an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of
Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive
service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5 ) , or (2) a bona
fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26,
except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons
having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall
not be considered employers.
(c) The term ''employment agency'' means any person regularly
undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for
an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for
an employer and includes an agent of such a person.
(d) The term ''labor organization'' means a labor organization
engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such
an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any
agency, or employee representation committee, group, association,
or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any
conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint
council so engaged which is subordinate to a national or
international labor organization.
(e) A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an
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industry affecting commerce if (1) it maintains or operates a
hiring hall or hiring office which procures employees for an
employer or procures for employees opportunities to work for an
employer, or (2) the number of its members (or, where it is a
labor organization composed of other labor organizations or their
representatives, if the aggregate number of the members of such
other labor organization) is (A) twenty-five or more during the
first year after March 24, 1972, or (B) fifteen or more
thereafter, and such labor organization (1) is the certified representative of employees under the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29
U.S.C. 151 et s e q . ) , or the Railway Labor Act, as amended (45
U.S.C. 151 et s e q . ) ;
(2) although not certified, is a national or international
labor organization or a local labor organization recognized or
acting as the representative of employees of an employer or
employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce; or
(3) has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary
body which is representing or actively seeking to represent
employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or
(2); or
(4) has been chartered by a labor organization representing
or actively seeking to represent employees within the meaning
of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local or subordinate body
through which such employees may enjoy membership or become
affiliated with such labor organization; or
(5) is a conference, general committee, joint or system
board, or joint council subordinate to a national or
international labor organization, which includes a labor
organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce within
the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this
subsection.
(f) The term ''employee'' means an individual employed by an
employer, except that the term ''employee' 1 shall not include any
person elected to public office in any State or political
subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal
staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or
legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the
preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the
civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or
political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign
country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the
United States.
(g) The term ''commerce'' means trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several
States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or
within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United
States; or between points in the same State but through a point
outside thereof.
(h) The term ''industry affecting commerce'' means any
activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor
dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of
commerce and includes any activity or industry ''affecting
commerce'' within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. 401 et s e q . ) , and further
includes any governmental industry, business, or activity.
(i) The term ''State'' includes a State of the United States,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer
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Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.).
(j) The term ''religion'' includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business.
(k) The terms ''because of sex'' or ''on the basis of sex''
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this
title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection
shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance
benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where
medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided,
That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing
abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in
regard to abortion.
(1) The term ''complaining party'' means the Commission, the
Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or
proceeding under this subchapter.
(m) The term ''demonstrates'' means meets the burdens of
production and persuasion.
(n) The term ''respondent'' means an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining
program, including an on-the-job training program, or Federal
entity subject to section 2000e-16 of this title.
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Section 2000e-l. Applicability to foreign and religious employment
(a) Inapplicability of subchapter to certain aliens and employees
of religious entities
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to
the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
(b) Compliance with statute as violative of foreign law
It shall not be unlawful under section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this
title for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an employer),
labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining (including on-the-job training programs) to take any
action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an
employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with
such section would cause such employer (or such corporation), such
organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of
the foreign country in which such workplace is located.
(c) Control of corporation incorporated in foreign country
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of
incorporation is a foreign country, any practice prohibited by
section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title engaged in by such
corporation shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer.
(2) Sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 of this title shall not apply
with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is a
foreign person not controlled by an American employer.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination of whether
an employer controls a corporation shall be based on (A) the interrelation of operations;
(B) the common management;
(C) the centralized control of labor relations; and
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(D) the common ownership or financial control,
of the employer and the corporation.
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Section 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices
(a) Employer p r a c t i c e s
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) Employment agency practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment
agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for
employment any individual on the basis of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor
organization (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or
applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to
refer for employment any individual, in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an
applicant for employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section.
(d) Training programs
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer,
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labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including
on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide
apprenticeship or other training.
(e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of
religion, sex, or national origin; educational institutions
with personnel of particular religion
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or
refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to
classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any
individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual
in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for a school, college, university, or other educational institution
or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a
particular religion if such school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or
in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation,
association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school,
college, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a
particular religion.
(f) Members of Communist Party or Communist-action or
Communist-front organizations
As used in this subchapter, the phrase ''unlawful employment
practice 1 ' shall not be deemed to include any action or measure
taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management
committee, or employment agency with respect to an individual who
is a member of the Communist Party of the United Staters or of any
other organization required to register as a Communist:-action or
Communist-front organization by final order of the Subversive
Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 781 et s e q . ) .
(g) National security
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an
employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an
employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for
employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or
refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if (1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises
in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is
performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement
imposed in the interest of the national security of the United
States under any security program in effect pursuant to or
administered under any statute of the United States or any
Executive order of the President; and
(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill
that requirement.
(h) Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production;
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ability tests; compensation based on sex and authorized by
minimum wage provisions
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in
different locations, provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.
It shall not be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of
the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such
employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of
section 206(d) of title 29.
(i) Businesses or enterprises extending preferential treatment to
Indians
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business
or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any
publicly announced employment practice of such business or
enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any
individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation,
(j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing
number or percentage imbalance
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any
employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment
agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified
by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any
apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community,
State, section, or other area,
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact
is established under this subchapter only if (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
employment practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph
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(A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate
impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the
court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process
are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking
process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall
not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by
business necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall
be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with
respect to the concept of ''alternative employment practice''.
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by
business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of
intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a
rule barring the employment of an individual who currently and
knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in
schedules I and II of section 102 (6) of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession of a drug
taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional,
or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) or any other provision of
Federal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice
under this subchapter only if such rule is adopted or applied with
an intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(1) Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in
connection with the selection or referral of applicants or
candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of,
use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of,
employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in employment practices
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.
(n) Resolution of challenges to employment practices implementing
litigated or consent judgments or orders
(1) (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, cind except as
provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that implements
and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order
that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged
under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).
(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be
challenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil
rights laws (i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or
order described in subparagraph (A), had (I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order
sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or order
might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such
person and that an opportunity was available to present
objections to such judgment or order by a future date certain;
and

A

~ f <;

1/8/2001 5:12 PM

] ltle 42 : Chapter 21 : ^uoctiapter V] : section zuuue-z

(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such
judgment or order; or
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by
another person who had previously challenged the judgment or
order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual
situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or
fact.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to (A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of
parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in
the proceeding in which the parties intervened;
(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a
litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of members
of a class represented or sought to be represented in such
action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was
sought in such action by the Federal Government;
(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or
order on the ground that such judgment or order was obtained
through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was
entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due
process of law required by the Constitution.
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that
challenges an employment consent judgment or order described in
paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before
the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this
subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action pursuant to
section 1404 of title 28.

Previous

[Notes]

Next

Advertising Info - Awards - Disclaimer - Privacy - Company
Help & Information - Table of Contents - Comments - Add URL
Copyright © 1994-2000 FindLaw

5 of 5

1/R/9f>m <M0 P\/f

i ltle 42 : Chapter I i : ^uochapter Vi : lection zuuue-o

w

ULtJJ.// v d o C i u w . i p . j

>»Wl«i. v ~ O w w . .

MY FindLaw - Research Faster - Great Lawyer Jobs

Home

FindLaw | Cases & Codes | Consumer Center | Jobs | LawCrawler | Legal News | Small Business | Message Boards

Pre-Paid Legal Services®, Inc
Laws: Cases and Codes : U.S. Code : Title 42 : Section 2000e-3

Search

Title 42

E

• United States Code
0
TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99

Section 2000e-3. Other unlawful employment practices
(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or
participating in enforcement proceedings
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate 1
against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
(b) Printing or publication of notices or advertisements indicating
prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination; occupational qualification exception
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer,
labor organization, employment agency,
or joint
labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or
publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or
advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or
membership in or any classification or referral for employment by
such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or
referral for employment by such an employment agency, or relating
to admission to, or employment in, any program established to
provide apprenticeship or other training by such a joint
labor-management committee, indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, except that such a notice or advertisement
may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when
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religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification for employment.
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Section 2000e-4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(a) Creation; composition; political representation; appointment;
term; vacancies; Chairman and Vice Chairman; duties of
Chairman; appointment of personnel; compensation of personnel
There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which shall be composed of five
members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same
political party. Members of the Commission shall be appointed by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate for
a term of five years. Any individual chosen to fill a vacancy
shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom
he shall succeed, and all members of the Commission shall continue
to serve until their successors are appointed and qualified, except
that no such member of the Commission shall continue to serve (1)
for more than sixty days when the Congress is in session unless a
nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted to the
Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the
Senate in which such nomination was submitted.
The President shall
designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Commission, and
one member to serve as Vice Chairman. The Chairman shall be
responsible on behalf of the Commission for the administrative
operations of the Commission, and, except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, shall appoint, in accordance with the
provisions of title 5 governing appointments in the competitive
service, such officers, agents, attorneys, administrative law
judges, and employees as he deems necessary to assist it in the
performance of its functions and to fix their compensation in
accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of
chapter 53 of title 5, relating to classification and General
Schedule pay rates: Provided, That assignment, removal, and
compensation of administrative law judges shall be in accordance
with sections 3105, 3344, 5372, and 7521 of title 5.

Related Resoui

Health Law G
Health Articles
Document;
Health Discus

1 /C/Ofkfll <M/1 t>\A

1 itie 42 : Uiapter 21 : iuDcnapter v i : aecuon ZUUUC-H

(b) General Counsel; appointment; term; duties; representation by
attorneys and Attorney General
(1) There shall be a General Counsel of the Commission appointed
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
for a term of four years. The General Counsel shall have
responsibility for the conduct of litigation as provided in
sections 2000e-5 and 2000e-6 of this title. The General Counsel
shall have such other duties as the Commission may prescribe or as
may be provided by law and shall concur with the Chairman of the
Commission on the appointment and supervision of regional
attorneys.
The General Counsel of the Commission on the effective
date of this Act shall continue in such position and perform the
functions specified in this subsection until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
(2) Attorneys appointed under this section may, at the direction
of the Commission, appear for and represent the Commission in any
case in court, provided that the Attorney General shall conduct all
litigation to which the Commission is a party in the Supreme Court
pursuant to this subchapter.
(c) Exercise of powers during vacancy; quorum
A vacancy in the Commission shall not impair the right of the
remaining members to exercise all the powers of the Commission and
three members thereof shall constitute a quorum.
(d) Seal; judicial notice
The Commission shall have an official seal which shall be
judicially noticed.
(e) Reports to Congress and the President
The Commission shall at the close of each fiscal year report to
the Congress and to the President concerning the action it has
taken and the moneys it has disbursed.
It shall make such further
reports on the cause of and means of eliminating discrimination and
such recommendations for further legislation as may appear
desirable.
(f) Principal and other offices
The principal office of the Commission shall be in or near the
District of Columbia, but it may meet or exercise any or all its
powers at any other place. The Commission may establish such
regional or State offices as it deems necessary to accomplish the
purpose of this subchapter.
(g) Powers of Commission
The Commission shall have power (1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize
regional, State, local, and other agencies, both public and
private, and individuals;
(2) to pay to witnesses whose depositions are taken or who are
summoned before the Commission or any of its agents the same
witness and mileage fees as are paid to witnesses in the courts
of the United States;
(3) to furnish to persons subject to this subchapter such
technical assistance as they may request to further their
compliance with this subchapter or an order issued thereunder;
(4) upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees or
some of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose members or
some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in
effectuating the provisions of this subchapter, to assist in such
effectuation by conciliation or such other remedial action as is
provided by this subchapter;
(5) to make such technical studies as are appropriate to
effectuate the purposes and policies of this subchapter and to
make the results of such studies available to the public;
(6) to intervene in a civil action brought under section
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2000e-5 of this title by an aggrieved party against a respondent
other than a government, governmental agency or political
subdivision,
(h) Cooperation with other departments and agencies in performance
of educational or promotional activities; outreach activities

(1) The Commission

shall,

in any of its

educational

or

promotional activities, cooperate with other departments and
agencies in the performance of such educational and promotional
activities.
(2) In exercising its powers under this subchapter, the
Commission shall carry out educational and outreach activities
(including dissemination of information in languages other than
English) targeted to (A) individuals who historically have been victims of
employment discrimination and have not been equitably served by
the Commission; and
(B) individuals on whose behalf the Commission has authority to
enforce any other law prohibiting employment discrimination,
concerning rights and obligations under this subchapter or such
law, as the case may be.
(i) Personnel subject to political activity restrictions
All officers, agents, attorneys, and employees of the Commission
shall be subject to the provisions of section 7324 (FOOTNOTE 1) of
title 5, notwithstanding any exemption contained in such section.
(FOOTNOTE 1) See References in Text note below,
(j) Technical Assistance Training Institute
(1) The Commission shall establish a Technical Assistance
Training Institute, through which the Commission shall provide
technical assistance and training regarding the laws and
regulations enforced by the Commission.
(2)4 An employer or other entity covered under this subchapter
shall not be excused from compliance with the requirements of this
subchapter because of any failure to receive technical assistance
under this subsection.
(3) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this
subsection such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1992.
(k) EEOC Education, Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving
Fund
(1) There is hereby established in the Treasury of the United
States a revolving fund to be known as the ''EEOC Education,
Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving Fund'' (hereinafter in
this subsection referred to as the ''Fund'') and to pay the cost
(including administrative and personnel expenses) of providing
education, technical assistance, and training relating to laws
administered by the Commission. Monies in the Fund shall be
available without fiscal year limitation to the Commission for such
purposes.
(2)(A) The Commission shall charge fees in accordance with the
provisions of this paragraph to offset the costs of education,
technical assistance, and training provided with monies in the
Fund. Such fees for any education, technical assistance, or
training (i) shall be imposed on a uniform basis on persons and entities
receiving such education, assistance, or training,
(ii) shall not exceed the cost of providing such education,
assistance, and training, and
(iii) with respect to each person or entity receiving such
education, assistance, or training, shall bear a reasonable
relationship to the cost of providing such education, assistance,
or training to such person or entity.
(B) Fees received under subparagraph (A) shall be deposited in
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the Fund by the Commission.
(C) The Commission shall include in each report made under
subsection (e) of this section information with respect to the
operation of the Fund, including information, presented in the
aggregate, relating to (i) the number of persons and entities to which the Commission
provided education, technical assistance, or training with monies
in the Fund, in the fiscal year for which such report is
prepared,
(ii) the cost to the Commission to provide such education,
technical assistance, or training to such persons and entities,
and
(iii) the amount of any fees received by the Commission from
such persons and entities for such education, technical
assistance, or training.
(3) The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the portion of the
Fund not required to satisfy current expenditures from the Fund, as
determined by the Commission, in obligations of the United States
or obligations guaranteed as to principal by the United States.
Investment proceeds shall be deposited in the Fund.
(4) There is hereby transferred to the Fund $1,000,000 from the
Salaries and Expenses appropriation of the Commission.
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Section 2000e-5. Enforcement provisions
(a) Power of Commission to prevent unlawful employment practices
The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent
any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set|
forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title.
(b) Charges by persons aggrieved or member of Commission of
unlawful employment practices by employers, etc.; filing;
allegations; notice to respondent; contents of notice;
investigation by Commission; contents of charges; prohibition
on disclosure of charges; determination of reasonable cause;
conference, conciliation, and persuasion for elimination of
unlawful practices; prohibition on disclosure of informal
endeavors to end unlawful practices; use of evidence in
subsequent proceedings; penalties for disclosure of
information; time for determination of reasonable cause
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming
to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, has
engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall
serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on such
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee (hereinafter referred to as the
''respondent' 1 ) within ten days, and shall make an investigation
thereof.
Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and
shall contain such information and be in such form as the
Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the
Commission. If the Commission determines after such investigation
that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person
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claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action. In
determining whether reasonable cause exists, the Commission shall
accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by
State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or
local law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and (d)
of this section. If the Commission determines after such
investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done
during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public
by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence
in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the
persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in
violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. The Commission
shall make its determination on reasonable cause as promptly as
possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and
twenty days from the filing of the charge or, where applicable
under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, from the date upon
which the Commission is authorized to take action with respect to
the charge.
(c) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State
or local authority; time for filing charges with Commission;
commencement of proceedings
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring
in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State
or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged
and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant
or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no
charge may be filed under subsection (a) (FOOTNOTE 1) of this
section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days
after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law,
unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that
such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty
days during the first year after the effective date of such State
or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such
proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a
requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the
facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be
deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection
at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the
appropriate State or local authority.
(FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. Probably should be subsection
• ' (b) » ' .
(d) S t a t e o r l o c a l e n f o r c e m e n t p r o c e e d i n g s ; n o t i f i c a t i o n of S t a t e
or local authority; time for action on charges b y Commission
In t h e c a s e of a n y c h a r g e f i l e d b y a m e m b e r of t h e C o m m i s s i o n
a l l e g i n g a n u n l a w f u l e m p l o y m e n t p r a c t i c e o c c u r r i n g in a S t a t e o r
p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n of a S t a t e w h i c h h a s a S t a t e o r l o c a l l a w
prohibiting the practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a
S t a t e o r l o c a l a u t h o r i t y t o g r a n t o r seek r e l i e f f r o m s u c h p r a c t i c e
or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon
receiving notice thereof, the Commission shall, before taking any
action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or
local o f f i c i a l s a n d , u p o n r e q u e s t , a f f o r d t h e m a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e ,
b u t n o t less t h a n s i x t y d a y s (provided that s u c h s i x t y - d a y p e r i o d
shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first
y e a r a f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a y of such S t a t e o r local l a w ) , u n l e s s a
s h o r t e r p e r i o d is r e q u e s t e d , to a c t u n d e r such S t a t e o r local l a w
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to remedy the practice alleged.
(e) Time for filing charges; time for service of notice of charge
on respondent; filing of charge by Commission with State or
local agency; seniority system
(1) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be
served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten
days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment
practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially
instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority
to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof,
such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved
within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice
that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under
the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such
charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local
agency.
(2) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice
occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been adopted
for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this
subchapter (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent
on the face of the seniority provision), when the seniority system
is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority
system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of
the seniority system or provision of the system.
(f) Civil action by Commission, Attorney General, or person
aggrieved; preconditions; procedure; appointment of attorney;
payment of fees, costs, or security; intervention; stay of
Federal proceedings; action for appropriate temporary or
preliminary relief pending final disposition of charge;
jurisdiction and venue of United States courts; designation of
judge to hear and determine case; assignment of case for
hearing; expedition of case; appointment of master
(1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the
Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of
reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the
Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission
may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge.
In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable
to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable
to the Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and
shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil
action against such respondent in the appropriate United States
district court. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the
right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or
the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision.
If a charge filed with the
Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, is dismissed
by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from
the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of
reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is
later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this
section or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a
case involving a government, governmental agency, or political

1/8/2001 5:14 PM

i ltle 42 Chapter 11 . bubcnapter v i . section zuuue-j

l i U p . / / t a i w i u v v . i j j . i a i u i u » v . c ^ i . . w«,Oww . .w

subdivision, or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation
agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission,
or the Attorney General in a case involving a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the
person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such
notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named
in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if
such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person
whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful
employment practice. Upon application by the complainant and in
such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may
appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the
commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or
security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its
discretion, permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a
case involving a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon certification
that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the
court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more
than sixty days pending the termination of State or local
proceedings described in subsection (c) or (d) of this section or
further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.
(2) Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the
Commission concludes on the basis of a preliminary investigation
that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes
of this Act, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case
involving a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision, may bring an action for appropriate temporary or
preliminary relief pending final disposition of such charge. Any
temporary restraining order or other order granting preliminary or
temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It shall be the duty of a court
having jurisdiction over proceedings under this section to assign
cases for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause
such cases to be in every way expedited.
(3) Each United States district court and each United States
court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.
Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State
in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been
committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records
relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in
the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the
respondent is not found within any such district, such an action
may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent
has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406
of title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his
principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in
which the action might have been brought.
(4) It shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or
in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is
pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear
and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the district
is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the
district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall
certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his
absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a
district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the
case.
(5) It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this
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subsection to assign the case for hearing at the earliest
practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way
expedited.
If such judge has not scheduled the case for trial
within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined,
that judge may appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief;
accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on
judicial orders
(1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be,
responsible for the unlawful employment p r a c t i c e ) , or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to
the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay
otherwise allowable.
(2)(A) No order of the court shall require the admission or
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual
was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section
2000e-3(a) of this title.
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under
section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that
the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of
the impermissible motivating factor, the court (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as
provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment,
described in subparagraph (A).
(h) Provisions of chapter 6 of title 29 not applicable to civil
actions for prevention of unlawful practices
The provisions of chapter 6 of title 29 shall not apply with
respect to civil actions brought under this section,
(i) Proceedings by Commission to compel compliance with judicial
orders
In any case in which an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization fails to comply with an order of a court issued in a
civil action brought under this section, the Commission may
commence proceedings to compel compliance with such order,
(j) Appeals
Any civil action brought under this section and any proceedings
brought under subsection (i) of this section shall be subject to
appeal as provided in sections 1291 and 1292, title 28.
(k) Attorney's fee; liability of Commission and United States for
costs
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in
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its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
(including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission
and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a
private person.
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Section 2000e-6. Civil actions by the Attorney General
(a) C o m p l a i n t
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of
such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the
rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil
action in the appropriate district court of the United States by
filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence the
Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to
such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including
an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order or other order against the person or persons responsible for
such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full
enjoyment of the rights herein described.
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(b) Jurisdiction; three-judge district court for cases of general
public importance: hearing, determination, expedition of
action, review by Supreme Court; single judge district court:
hearing, determination, expedition of action
The district courts of the United States shall have and shall
exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this
section, and in any such proceeding the Attorney General may file
with the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges
be convened to hear and determine the case. Such request by the
Attorney General shall be accompanied by a certificate that, in his
opinion, the case is of general public importance. A copy of the
certificate and request for a three-judge court shall be
immediately furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the
circuit (or in his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the
circuit) in which the case is pending. Upon receipt of such
request it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the circuit or
the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate
immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one
shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district
judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear
and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so
designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest
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practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination
thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An
appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the
Supreme Court.
In the event the Attorney General fails to file such a request in
any such proceeding, it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the
district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the
case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district
to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the
district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief
judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may
be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or
in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a
district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the
case.
It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this
section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable
date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.
(c) Transfer of functions, etc., to Commission; effective date;
prerequisite to transfer; execution of functions by Commission
Effective two years after March 24, 1972, the functions of the
Attorney General under this section shall be transferred to the
Commission, together with such personnel, property, records, and
unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds
employed, used, held, available, or to be made available in
connection with such functions unless the President submits, and
neither House of Congress vetoes, a reorganization plan pursuant to
chapter 9 of title 5, inconsistent with the provisions of this
subsection. The Commission shall carry out such functions in
accordance with subsections (d) and (e) of this section.
(d) Transfer of functions, etc., not to affect suits commenced
pursuant to this section prior to date of transfer
Upon the transfer of functions provided for in subsection (c) of
this section, in all suits commenced pursuant to this section prior
to the date of such transfer, proceedings shall continue without
abatement, all court orders and decrees shall remain in effect, and
the Commission shall be substituted as a party for the United
States of America, the Attorney General, or the Acting Attorney
General, as appropriate.
(e) Investigation and action by Commission pursuant to filing of
charge of discrimination; procedure
Subsequent to March 24, 1972, the Commission shall have authority
to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of
discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of a person claiming
to be aggrieved or by a member of the Commission. All such actions
shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in
section 2000e-5 of this title.
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U.S. Code as of: 0J/05/99

Section 2000e-7. Effect on State laws

Related Resource

Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve|
any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment
provided by any present or future law of any State or political
subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to|
require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter.
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U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99

Section 2000e-8. Investigations
(a) Examination and copying of evidence related to unlawful
employment practices
In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under
section 2000e-5 of this title, the Commission or its designated
representative shall at all reasonable times have access to, for
the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of
any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to
unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is
relevant to the charge under investigation.
(b) Cooperation with State and local agencies administering State
fair employment practices laws; participation in and
contribution to research and other projects; utilization of
services; payment in advance or reimbursement; agreements and
rescission of agreements
The Commission may cooperate with State and local agencies
charged with the administration of State fair employment practices
laws and, with the consent of such agencies, may, for the purpose
of carrying out its functions and duties under this subchapter and
within the limitation of funds appropriated specifically for such
purpose, engage in and contribute to the cost of research and other
projects of mutual interest undertaken by such agencies, and
utilize the services of such agencies and their employees, and,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, pay by advance or
reimbursement such agencies and their employees for services
rendered to assist the Commission in carrying out this subchapter.
In furtherance of such cooperative efforts, the Commission may
enter into written agreements with such State or local agencies and
such agreements may include provisions under which the Commission
shall refrain from processing a charge in any cases or class of
cases specified in such agreements or under which the Commission
shall relieve any person or class of persons in such State or
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locality from requirements imposed under this section. The
Commission shall rescind any such agreement whenever it determines
that the agreement no longer serves the interest of effective
enforcement of this subchapter.
(c) Execution, retention, and preservation of records; reports to
Commission; training program records; appropriate relief from
regulation or order for undue hardship; procedure for
exemption; judicial action to compel compliance
Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization subject
to this subchapter shall (1) make and keep such records relevant to
the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have
been or are being committed, (2) preserve such records for such
periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom as the Commission
shall prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as
reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for the enforcement of this
subchapter or the regulations or orders thereunder.
The Commission
shall, by regulation, require each employer, labor organization,
and joint labor-management committee subject to- this subchapter
which controls an apprenticeship or other training program to
maintain such records as are reasonably necessary to carry out the
purposes of this subchapter, including, but not limited to, a list
of applicants who wish to participate in such program, including
the chronological order in which applications were received, and to
furnish to the Commission upon request, a detailed description of
the manner in which persons are selected to participate in the
apprenticeship or other training program.
Any employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
which believes that the application to it of any regulation or
order issued under this section would result in undue hardship may
apply to the Commission for an exemption from the application of
such regulation or order, and, if such application for an exemption
is denied, bring a civil action in the United States district court
for the district where such records are kept.
If the Commission or
the court, as the case may be, finds that the application of the
regulation or order to the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization in question would impose an undue hardship, the
Commission or the court, as the case may be, may grant appropriate
relief.
If any person required to comply with the provisions of
this subsection fails or refuses to do so, the United States
district court for the district in which such person is found,
resides, or transacts business, shall, upon application of the
Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a
government, governmental agency or political subdivision, have
jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring him to
comply.
(d) Consultation and coordination between Commission and interested
State and Federal agencies in prescribing recordkeeping and
reporting requirements; availability of information furnished
pursuant to recordkeeping and reporting requirements;
conditions on availability
In prescribing requirements pursuant to subsection (c) of this
section, the Commission shall consult: with other interested State
and Federal agencies and shall endeavor to coordinate its
requirements with those adopted by such agencies. The Commission
shall furnish upon request and without cost to any State or local
agency charged with the administration of a fair employment
practice law information obtained pursuant to subsection (c) of
this section from any employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to the
jurisdiction of such agency.
Such information shall be furnished
on condition that it not be made public by the recipient agency

1/8/2001 5:16 PM
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prior to the institution of a proceeding under State or local law
involving such information. If this condition is violated by a
recipient agency, the Commission may decline to honor subsequent
requests pursuant to this subsection,
(e) Prohibited disclosures; penalties
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the
Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information
obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this
section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this
subchapter involving such information. Any officer or employee of
the Commission who shall make public in any manner whatever any
information in violation of this subsection shall be guilty, of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.
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For the purpose of all hearings and investigations conducted b-yi
the Commission or its duly authorized agents or agencies, section)
161 of title 29 shall apply.
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Section 2000e-10. Posting of notices; penalties
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(a) Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization, asj
the case may be, shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places
upon its premises where notices to employees, applicants for
employment, and members are customarily posted a notice to be
prepared or approved by the Commission setting forth excerpts, from]
or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this subchapter and
information pertinent to the filing of a complaint.
(b) A willful violation of this section shall be punishable by a
fine of not more than $100 for each separate offense.

Previous

TNotesI
Advertising Info - Awards - Disclaimer - Privacy - Company
Help & Information - Table of Contents - Comments - Add URL
Copyright © 1994-2000 FindLaw

Next

Health Law G
Health Articles
Document!
Health Discus

l itie 42 cnapter 11 buDcnapter V1 . beciion zuuue-11

•r

liiip./ wadtiav^

^Oill/

WiU>VC.>

MY FindLaw - Research Faster - Great Lawyer Jobs

Home

FindLaw | Cases & Codes | Consumer Center | Jobs | LawCrawler | Legal News | Small Business | Message Boards
L a w s : Cases and Codes : U.S. Code : T i t l e 42 : Section 2000e-11

Search

E

Title 42

• United States Code
° TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99
Section 2000e-ll. Veterans1 special rights or preference

Related Resoui

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal)
or modify any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating
special rights or preference for veterans.
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Section 2000e-12. Regulations; conformity of regulations with administrative
procedure provisions; reliance on interpretations and instructions of Commission
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(a) The Commission shall have authority from time to time to
issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry
out the provisions of this subchapter. Regulations issued under
this section shall be in conformity with the standards and
limitations of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5.
(b) In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful
employment practice, no person shall be subject to any liability or
punishment for or on account of (1) the commission by such person
of an unlawful employment practice if he pleads and proves that the
act or omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity
with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of
the Commission, or (2) the failure of such person to publish and
file any information required by any provision of this subchapter
if he pleads and proves that he failed to publish and file such
information in good faith, in conformity with the instructions of
the Commission issued under this subchapter regarding the filing of
such information.
Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar
to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that (A) after such
act or omission, such interpretation or opinion is modified or
rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or
of no legal effect, or (B) after publishing or filing the
description and annual reports, such publication or filing is
determined by judicial authority not to be in conformity with the
requirements of this subchapter.
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Section 2000e-13. Application to personnel of Commission of sections 111 and 1114
of title 18; punishment for violation of section 1114 of title 18
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The provisions of sections 111 and 1114, title 18, shall apply to|
officers, agents, and employees of the Commission in the
performance of their official duties. Notwithstanding the
provisions of sections 111 and 1114 of title 18, whoever in
violation of the provisions of section 1114 of such title kills a
person while engaged in or on account of the performance of his
official functions under this Act shall be punished by imprisonment
for any term of years or for life.

Previous

TNotesI
Advertising Info - Awards - Disclaimer - Privacy - Company
Help & Information - Table of Contents - Comments - Add URL
Copyright © 1994-2000 FindLaw

Next

Health Articles
Document;
Health Discus

1 itie 42 : Chapter i\ : bubcnapter Vi : section zuuue-w

•

ritrr^tw"

liUp.// caoCiavv .Jip.iiiiciiu.vv .vuiii, vw.^w

MY FindLaw - Research Faster - Great Lawyer Jobs

Home

FindLaw | Cases & Codes | Consumer Center | Jobs | LawCrawler | Legal News | Small Business | Message Boards

You Can Now!
Laws: Cases and Codes : U.S. Code : Title 42 : Section 2000e-14

Search

J3

Title 42

• United States Code
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
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Section 2000e-14. Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council;
establishment; composition; duties; report to President and Congress
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have the
responsibility for developing and implementing agreements, policies
and practices designed to maximize effort, promote efficiency, and
eliminate conflict, competition, duplication and inconsistency
I
among the operations, functions and jurisdictions of the various
departments, agencies and branches of the Federal Government
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of equal
employment opportunity legislation, orders, and policies. On or
before October 1 of each year, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall transmit to the President and to the Congress a
report of its activities, together with such recommendations for
legislative or administrative changes as it concludes are desirable
to further promote the purposes of this section.
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• United States Code
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS
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U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99

Section 2000e-15. Presidential conferences; acquaintance of leadership with
provisions for employment rights and obligations; plans for fair administration;
membership

The President shall, as soon as feasible after July 2, 1964,
convene one or more conferences for the purpose of enabling the
leaders of groups whose members will be affected by this subchapter!
to become familiar with the rights afforded and obligations imposed)
by its provisions, and for the purpose of making plans which will
result in the fair and effective administration of this subchapter
when all of its provisions become effective. The President shall
invite the participation in such conference or conferences of (1)
the members of the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity, (2) the members of the Commission on Civil Rights, (3)
representatives of State and local agencies engaged in furthering
equal employment opportunity, (4) representatives of private
agencies engaged in furthering equal employment opportunity, and
(5) representatives of employers, labor organizations, and
employment agencies who will be subject to this subchapter.
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Section 2000e-16. Employment by Federal Government
(a) Discriminatory practices prohibited; employees or applicants
for employment subject to coverage
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the
limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in
section 102 of title 5, in executive agencies as defined in section)
105 of title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment
who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States
Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of
the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the
competitive service, and in those units of the judicial branch of
the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service,
in the Smithsonian Institution, and in the Government Printing
Office, the General Accounting Office, and the Library of Congress
shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; enforcement powers;
issuance of rules, regulations, etc.; annual review and
approval of national and regional equal employment opportunity
plans; review and evaluation of equal employment opportunity
programs and publication of progress reports; consultations
with interested parties; compliance with rules, regulations,
etc.; contents of national and regional equal employment
opportunity plans; authority of Librarian of Congress
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission shall have authority to enforce
the provisions of subsection (a) of this section through
appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this section, and shall issue such rules, regulations, orders
and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out
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its responsibilities under this section.
Opportunity Commission shall -

The Equal Employment

(1) be responsible for the annual review and approval of a
national and regional equal employment opportunity plan which
each department and agency and each appropriate unit referred to
in subsection (a) of this section shall submit in order to
maintain an affirmative program of equal employment opportunity
for all such employees and applicants for employment;
(2) be responsible for the review and evaluation of the
operation of all agency equal employment opportunity programs,
periodically obtaining and publishing (on at least a semiannual
basis) progress reports from each such department, agency, or
unit; and
(3) consult with and solicit the recommendations of interested
individuals, groups, and organizations relating to equal
employment opportunity.
The head of each such department, agency, or unit shall comply with
such rules, regulations, orders, and instructions which shall
include a provision that an employee or applicant for employment
shall be notified of any final action taken on any complaint of
discrimination filed by him thereunder. The plan submitted by each
department, agency, and unit shall include, but not be limited to (1) provision for the establishment of training and education
programs designed to provide a maximum opportunity for employees
to advance so as to perform at their highest potential; and
(2) a description of the qualifications in terms of training
and experience relating to equal employment opportunity for the
principal and operating officials of each such department,
agency, or unit responsible for carrying out the equal employment
opportunity program and of the allocation of personnel and
resources proposed by such department, agency, or unit to carry
out its equal employment opportunity program.
With respect to employment in the Library of Congress, authorities
granted in this subsection to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall be exercised by the Librarian of Congress.
(c) Civil action by employee or applicant for employment for
redress of grievances; time for bringing of action; head of
department, agency, or unit as defendant
Within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a
department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this
section, or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon an
appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit
on a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding Executive orders,
or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial
charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission on appeal from a decision or
order of such department, agency, or unit until such time as final
action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee
or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition
of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his
complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5
of this title, in which civil action the head of the department,
agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.
(d) Section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title applicable to
civil actions
The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title,
as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder, and
the same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be
available as in cases involving nonpublic parties.. (FOOTNOTE 1)
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(FOOTNOTE 1) So in original,
(e) Government agency or official not relieved of responsibility to
assure nondiscrimination in employment or equal employment
opportunity
Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government agency
or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure
nondiscrimination in employment as required by the Constitution and
statutes or of its or his responsibilities under Executive Order
11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the Federal
Government.
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U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99

Section 2000e-17. Procedure for denial, withholding, termination, or suspension of
Government contract subsequent to acceptance by Government of affirmative
action plan of employer; time of acceptance of plan

No Government contract, or portion thereof, with any employer,
shall be denied, withheld, terminated, or suspended, by any agency
or officer of the United States under any equal employment
opportunity law or order, where such employer has an affirmative
action plan which has previously been accepted by the Government
for the same facility within the past twelve months without first
according such employer full hearing and adjudication under the
provisions of section 554 of title 5, and the following pertinent
sections: Provided, That if such employer has deviated
substantially from such previously agreed to affirmative action
plan, this section shall not apply: Provided further, That for the
purposes of this section an affirmative action plan shall be deemed
to have been accepted by the Government at the time the appropriate
compliance agency has accepted such plan unless within forty-five
days thereafter the Office of Federal Contract Compliance has
disapproved such plan.
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UT Exec Order March 17,1993 - Gov. Leavitt
EXECUTIVE ORDER
WHEREAS, sexual harassment has been defined to be unwanted behavior or
communication of a sexual nature which adversely affects a person's employment relationships
and/or creates a hostile working environment; and
WHEREAS, sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual statements, gestures, or physical
contacts which are objectionable to the recipient; and
WHEREAS, sexual harassment may involve intimidation by persons of either sex against
persons of the opposite or same sex; and
WHEREAS, the occurrence of sexual harassment undermines the integrity of the
workplace, destroys morale and offends social and legal standards of acceptable behavior; and
WHEREAS, this administration is committed to providing a workplace which is free
from sexual harassment, intimidation and reprisal of any kind;
NOW THEREFORE, I, Michael O. Leavitt, Governor of the State of Utah, by the
authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of this state, do hereby prohibit sexual
harassment, which is a form of sex discrimination, in any and every workplace in which state
employees and employees of public and higher education are required to conduct business.
IT IS ORDERED that the Department of Human Resource Management issue rules and
policies to ensure continued implement option of this order for employees of state government to
include a provision that sexual harassment awareness training and education be mandatory for all
directors, managers and supervisors in state government; and vigorously pursue the
implementation of appropriate rules and policies to include imposition of disciplinary actions;
education authorities are enjoined to do the same for their organizations.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Director of the Department of Human Resource
Management shall: provide state agencies with an appropriate education program for all
employees; provide guidelines on agency policy statements and complaint procedures; and
provide technical assistance to state and educational authorities when requested.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of each state department or agency, board
of education or institution of higher education shall: inform all employees of this order
forbidding sexual harassment in their respective departments; inform employees of their rights;
assure access to a complaint system for individuals within their departments consistent with rules
issued by the Department of Human Resource Management and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission guidelines; educate and provide structured training for all managers in
their responsibility for identifying sexual harassment and appropriately dealing with complaints
and solving related problems; and provide awareness programs for employees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and cause to be affixed the Great
Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of
March, 1993.
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , one ot the LEXIS Publishing™ companies All rights reserved

ATTEST:
Olene Walker
Lieutenant Governor

© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing7 companies. All rights reserved.
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UT Exec Order June 30,1989 - Gov. Bangerter
EXECUTIVE ORDER
WHEREAS, sexual harassment has been defined to be unwanted behavior or
communication of a sexual nature which adversely affects a person's employment relationships
and/or working environment; and
WHEREAS, sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual statements, gestures, or physical
contacts which are objectionable to the recipient; and
WHEREAS, sexual harassment may involve intimidation by persons of either sex against
persons of the opposite or same sex; and
WHEREAS, the occurrence of sexual harassment undermines the integrity of the
workplace, destroys morale and offends social and legal standards of acceptable behavior; and
WHEREAS, this administration is committed to providing a workplace which is free
from sexual harassment, intimidation and reprisal of any kind;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Norman H. Bangerter, Governor of the State of Utah, by the
authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of this state, do hereby prohibit sexual
harassment, which is a form of sex discrimination, in any and every workplace in which public
employees and employees of public and higher education are required to conduct business;
IT IS ORDERED that the Department of Human Resource Management issue rules and
policies to implement this order for employees of state government to include a provision that
sexual harassment awareness training and education be mandatory for all directors, managers and
supervisors in state government; and vigorously pursue the implementation of appropriate rules
and policies to include imposition of disciplinary actions; education authorities are enjoined to do
the same for their organizations.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Director of the Department of Human Resource
Management shall: provide state agencies with an appropriate education program for all
employees; provide guidelines on agency policy statements and complaint procedures; and
provide technical assistance to state and educational authorities when requested.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of each state department or agency, board
of education or institution of high education shall: inform all employees of this order forbidding
sexual harassment in their respective departments; inform employees of their rights; assure
access to a complaint system for individuals within their departments consistent with rules issued
by the Department of Human Resource Management and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidelines; educate and provide structured training for all managers in their
responsibility for identifying sexual harassment and appropriately dealing with complaints and
solving related problems; and provide awareness programs for employees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and cause to be affixed the Great
Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 30th day of June,
1989.
Norman H. Bangerter
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Governor
ATTEST:

W. Val Oveson
Lieutenant Governor
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UT Exec Order July 25,1986 - Gov. Bangerter
EXECUTIVE ORDER
WHEREAS, among the basic rights of all the people of this nation are the rights to seek a
livelihood, opportunity for advancement and the respect of our society based solely on the
individual's ability and capacity. To judge an individual, expressly or through implication, by
his/her race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age or handicap, is repugnant to every
American ideal and a distortion of our standards of human freedom and worth; and
WHEREAS, it is the duty of every American citizen to protect and promote the right of
all persons to find employment where their individual capacities lead them; and
WHEREAS, our units of government have a special responsibility of leadership in the
protection of individual rights and, we are sworn to not only uphold the letter of the laws as set
down by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Utah, and the statutes, but also
have an obligation to uphold and foster the guiding spirit of these laws; and
WHEREAS, the State of Utah recognizes its responsibility to guarantee the right of all
persons to utilize their abilities to the fullest and thus will take immediate and continuing
measures to strengthen our efforts in behalf of this objective:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Norman H. Bangerter, Governor of the State of Utah, by the
virtue of the power vested in my by the constitution and the laws of the State of Utah, do hereby
proclaim the following Code of Fair Practices to be the governing policy throughout every
department of the executive branch of government of the State of Utah:
Article I - Appointment, Assignment, and Promotion of State Personnel
No state agencies shall, in the recruitment, promotion and discharge of personnel,
discriminate against any individual on account of race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin,
age or handicap. No state agency shall have on its employment application forms, for the
purpose of unfair practices, any inquiry regarding race, color, sex, religious creed, national
origin, age or handicap, and no interview shall include any question pertaining to the above.
Article II - Promulgation of Non-Discriminatory Policies
All state agencies shall promulgate and affirmatively cany out a clear, written policy of
non-discrimination and fair practices and procedures and correct ctny which may contribute to the
possibility of discrimination. They shall include, in their continuing programs of orientation and
training, special emphasis on non-discriminatory practices and services.
Article HI - Training for Job Opportunities
All educational programs, vocational guidance counseling services and apprenticeship
and on-the-job training programs of the state shall be conducted to encourage the fullest
development of interest and aptitudes, without regard to race, color, sex, religious creed, national
origin, age, or handicap.
Article IV - State Services and Facilities
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Equal treatment of all persons without regard to race, color sex, religious creed, national
origin, age, or handicap, shall guaranteed by all state agencies in performing their services to the
public. Discriminatory practices will not be tolerated in any state facility.
Article V - Employment Services
All state agencies engaged in employment referral and placement services for private or
public employees shall fill job orders only on a non-discriminatory basis. They shall refuse any
job order which would discriminate against any person because of race, color, sex, religious
creed, national origin, age, or handicap whether such discrimination was either expressed or
implied by the job order and shall refer such prohibited requests to the Anti-Discrimination
Division of the Industrial Commission for investigation, conciliation and other appropriate
action.
Article VI - State Licensing and Regulatory Agencies
All state agencies receiving information or complaints of discrimination based on race,
color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap, shall promptly advice the
Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission. The Anti-Discrimination Division of
the Industrial Commission shall notify any state agency which has licensing or regulatory power
of the pendency of a proceeding. If, therefore, a party is found to have engaged in a
discriminatory practice, such state agency shall be notified and take appropriate action against
the respondent.
Article VII - Public Contracts
Every state contract for public works or for goods or services shall contain a clause
barring discrimination on account of race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age or
handicap, and such contractual provisions shall be fully and effectively enforced.
Article VIII - State Financial Assistance
All state agencies engaged in granting financial assistance or in making payment of any
public funds shall deny the same to any institution or organization engaged in discriminatory
practices based upon race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap.
Article IX - Other Governmental Bodies
All political subdivisions, schools, districts, and other instrumentalities of government are
requested to cooperate with this endeavor to eliminate any and all acts of discrimination within
the State of Utah.
Article X - Cooperation with the Anti-discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission
All state agencies, in accordance with provisions of the state's laws against
discrimination, shall cooperate fully with the Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial
Commission and duly comply with its requests and recommendations for effectuating the state's
policy against discrimination.
Article XI - Publication and Posting of this Code
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Copies of this code shall be distributed to all executive branches of the government,
political subdivision, boards, departments, commissions, school districts, and all other agencies
of the State of Utah, and shall be posted in prominent locations.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused to be affixed the
great Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 25th day
of July, 1986.
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

W. Val Oveson
Lt. Governor
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UT Exec Order May 28,1985 - Gov. Bangerter
EXECUTIVE ORDER
Amended
WHEREAS, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits discrimination
in United States employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin; and
WHEREAS, the Equal Pay Amendment of 1963 to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
guaranteed equal pay for equal work for persons of both sexes in United States employment; and
WHEREAS, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974
and 1978, prohibits discrimination in employment in the United States on the basis of an
individual's age; and
WHEREAS, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974 and 1978, prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of one's handicapped status; and
WHEREAS, Presidential Executive Orders since 1964, especially Executive Order
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375, have mandated the establishment of Affirmative
Action Programs by United States government agencies and their contractors in order to correct
past injustices and ensure further non-discrimination in employment practices; and
WHEREAS, Standards for a Merit System of Employment, promulgated by the United
States Office of Personnel Management stipulates the development of Affirmative Action
Programs in complying entities; and
WHEREAS, the Utah Fair Employment Practices Act (Anti-discrimination Act) of 1965,
as amended in 1975 and in 1979, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, color, sex, age, religion, ancestry or national origin, handicap; and
WHEREAS, the Utah State Personnel Management Act of 1979 ensures equal
employment opportunity for all members of our society through Affirmative Action; and
WHEREAS, a 1973 Executive Order mandated the formulation and implementation of
Affirmative Action programs within each agency of state government; and
WHEREAS, a 1977 and 1980 Executive Order further reinforced this commitment of
Affirmative Action to ensure that the workforce of Utah State Government represents all
protected groups at levels found in the labor force of the state; and
WHEREAS, fair and equal employment practices are inherent in strong merit personnel
system; and
WHEREAS, the Division of Personnel Management has developed Fair and Equal
Employment Opportunity Practices Standards as guidelines for (all) agencies/departments of
state government; and
WHEREAS, the Division of Personnel Management Advises and encourages
agencies/departments of state government to develop and make public supplemental internal
personnel policies and procedures to ensure fairness, equal opportunity, uniformity and
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consistency relative to employment practices;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Norman H, Bangerter, Governor of the State of Utah, by the
authority vested in me by the laws of this state, do hereby affirm that the State Division of
Personnel Management be responsible for instituting and maintaining continued affirmative
action for fair employment practices for the employees and perspective employees of the State of
Utah;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Director of the Division of Personnel
Management act affirmatively in the administration of the State Personnel Management System;
and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Fair Employment Review Committee* shall
continue to assist the Governor, the Director of the Division of Personnel Management and the
Fair Employment Practices Coordinator in the development and implementation of an effective
Fair and Equal Employment Opportunities Practices Program;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: This Executive Order supersede the Executive
Order issued on the 12th Day of January, 1982

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of
the State of Utah Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of May, 1985.
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
Created by Executive Order of 1977
Attest:

W. Val Oveson
Lt. Governor
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UT Exec Order January 12,1982 - Gov. Matheson
EXECUTIVE ORDER
AMENDED
WHEREAS, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits discrimination
in United States employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; and
WHEREAS, the Equal Pay Amendment of 1963 to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
guaranteed equal pay for equal work for persons of both sexes in United States employment; and
WHEREAS, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974
and 1978, prohibits discrimination in employment in the United States on the basis of an
individual's age; and
WHEREAS, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974 and 1978, prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of one's handicapped status; and
WHEREAS, Presidential Executive Orders since 1964, especially Executive Order
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375, have mandated the establishment of Affirmative
Action Programs by United States government agencies and their contractors in order to correct
past injustices and ensure further non-discrimination in employment practices; and
WHEREAS, Standards for a Merit System of Employment, promulgated by the United
States Office of Personnel Management stipulates the development of Affirmative Action
Programs in complying entities; and
WHEREAS, the Utah Fair Employment Practices Act (Anti-discrimination Act) of 1965,
as amended in 1975 and in 1979, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, color, sex, age, religion, ancestry, national origin, or handicap; and
WHEREAS, the Utah State Personnel Management Act of 1979 ensures equal
employment opportunity for all members of our society through Affirmative Action; and
WHEREAS, a 1973 Executive Order mandated the formulation and implementation of
Affirmative Action programs within each agency of state government; and
WHEREAS, a 1977 and 1980 Executive Order further reinforced this commitment of
Affirmative Action to ensure that the workforce of Utah State Government represents all
protected groups at levels found in the labor force of the state; and
WHEREAS, fair and equal employment practices are inherent in strong merit personnel
systems; and
WHEREAS, the Division of Personnel Management has developed Fair and Equal
Employment Opportunity Practices Standards as guidelines for (all) agencies/departments of
state government; and
WHEREAS, the Division of Personnel Management advises and encourages
agencies/departments of state government to develop and make public supplemental internal
personnel policies and procedures to ensure fairness, equal opportunity, uniformity, and
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consistency relative to employment practices;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State of Utah, by the
authority vested in me by the laws of this state, do hereby affirm that the State Division of
Personnel Management be responsible for instituting and maintaining continued affirmative
action for fair employment practices for the employees and prospective employees of the State of
Utah;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Director of the Division of Personnel
Management act affirmatively in the administration of the State Personnel Management System;
and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Affirmative Action Review Committee created
by my Executive Order of 1977 be changed in name to Fair Employment Review Committee.
The committee shall continue to assist the Governor, the Director of the Division of Personnel
Management, and the Fair Employment Practices Coordinator in the development and
implementation of an effective Fair and Equal Employment Opportunities Practices Program;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: This Executive Order supersede the Executive
Order issued on the 17th day of July, 1980.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of
the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of January,
1982.
Scott M. Matheson
GOVERNOR
ATTEST:

David S. Monson
LT. GOVERNOR
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UT Exec Order July 17,1980 - Gov. Matheson
EXECUTIVE ORDER
WHEREAS, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits discrimination
in United States employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; and
WHEREAS, the Equal Pay Amendment of 1963 to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
guaranteed equal pay for equal work for persons of both sexes in United States employment; and
WHEREAS, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974
and 1978, prohibits discrimination in employment in the United States on the basis of an
individual's age; and
WHEREAS, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974 and 1978, prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of one's handicapped status; and
WHEREAS, Presidential Executive Orders since 1964, especially Executive Order
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375, have mandated the establishment of Affirmative
Action Programs by United States government agencies and their contractors in order to correct
past injustices and ensure future non-discrimination in employment practices; and
WHEREAS, Standards for a Merit System of Employment, promulgated by the United
States Office of Personnel Management stipulates the development of Affirmative Action
Programs in complying entities; and
WHEREAS, the Utah Fair Employment Practices Act (Anti-discrimination Act) of 1965,
as amended in 1975 and in 1979, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, color, sex, age, religion, ancestry, national origin, or handicap; and
WHEREAS, the Utah State Personnel Management Act of 1979 ensures equal
employment opportunity for all members of our society through Affirmative Action; and
WHEREAS, a 1973 Executive Order mandated the formulation and implementation of
Affirmative Action programs within each agency of state government; and
WHEREAS, a 1977 Executive Order further reinforced this commitment of Affirmative
Action to ensure that the work force of Utah state government represents all protected groups at
levels found in the labor force of the state;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State of Utah, by the
authority vested in me by the laws of this state, do hereby affirm that the State Office of
Personnel Management be responsible for instituting and maintaining a continued policy of
Affirmative Action for the employees and prospective employees of the State of Utah;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Director of the Office of Personnel
Management act affirmatively in the administration of the State Personnel Management System;
and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Affirmative Action Review Committee created
by my Executive Order of 1977 continue to assist the Governor, the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, and the Affirmative Action Coordinator in the development of an
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effective Equal Employment Opportunity Affirmative Action Program;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: This Executive Order supersede the Executive
Order issued on the first day of October, 1977.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of
the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of July, 1980.
Scott M. Matheson
GOVERNOR
ATTEST:

David S. Monson
LT. GOVERNOR/SECRETARY OF STATE
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UT Exec Order May 4,1979 - Gov. Matheson
EXECUTIVE ORDER
WHEREAS, among the basic rights of all the people of this state are the rights to seek a
livelihood, opportunity for advancement, and the respect of our society based solely on the
individual's ability to accomplish work assignments, to judge an individual, expressly or through
implication, by his race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap is repugnant
to every American ideal and a distortion of our standards of human freedom and worth,
WHEREAS, it is the duty of every Utah citizen to protect and promote the right of all
persons to find employment where their individual capacities lead them, for, when freedom of
any kind is lost to one citizen, freedom will soon be lost for all citizens,
WHEREAS, our units of government must assume their citizen-granted role of leadership
in the protection of freedom for all citizens, for we are sworn to not only uphold the letter of the
law as set down by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Utah, and the
statutes, but also to uphold and foster the guiding spirit of these laws,
WHEREAS, the State of Utah recognizes its responsibility to guarantee the right of all
persons to utilize their abilities to the fullest and thus will take immediate and continuing
measures to strengthen our efforts in behalf of this objective,
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State of Utah, by virtue of
the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the State of Utah, do hereby
proclaim the following Code of Fair Practices to be the governing policy throughout every
department of the executive branch of government of the State of Utah:
ARTICLE I. APPOINTMENT, ASSIGNMENT, AND PROMOTION OF STATE
PERSONNEL
No state agency shall, in the recruitment, promotion, and discharge of personnel,
discriminate against any individual on account of race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin,
age, or handicap.
ARTICLE II. PROMULGATION OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES
All state agencies shall promulgate and affirmatively carry out a clear written policy of
nondiscrimination and fair practices. They shall regularly review their personnel practices and
procedures and correct any which may contribute to the possibility of discrimination. They shall
include in their continuing programs of orientation and training special emphasis on
nondiscriminatory practices and services.
ARTICLE III. TRAINING FOR JOB OPPORTUNITIES
All educational programs, vocational guidance counseling services, and all apprenticeship
and on-the-job training programs of the state shall be conducted to encourage the fullest
development of interest and aptitudes, without regard to race, color, sex, religious creed, national
origin, age, or handicap.
ARTICLE IV. STATE SERVICES AND FACILITIES

© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved.

2
Equal treatment of all persons without regard to race, color, sex, religious creed, national
origin, age, or handicap shall be guaranteed by all state agencies in performing their services to
the public. Discriminatory practices will not be tolerated in any state facility.
ARTICLE V. EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
All state agencies engaged in employment referral and placement services for private or
public employees shall fill job orders only on a nondiscriminatory basis. They shall refuse any
job order which would discriminate against any person because of race, color, sex, religious
creed, national origin, age, or handicap, whether such discrimination was either expressed or
implied by the job order.
ARTICLE VI. STATE LICENSING AND REGULATORY AGENCIES
All state agencies receiving information or complaints of discrimination based on race,
color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap shall promptly advise the
Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission. The Anti-Discrimination Division of
the Industrial Commission shall notify any of the state agencies which have licensing or
regulatory power of the pendency of a proceeding. If, therefore, a party is found to have engaged
in a discriminatory practice, such state agency shall be notified and take appropriate action
against the respondent.
ARTICLE VII. PUBLIC CONTRACTS
Every state contract for public works or for goods or services shall contain a clause
barring discrimination on account of race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or
handicap; and such contractual provisions shall be fully and effectively enforced.
ARTICLE VIII. STATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
All state agencies engaged in granting financial assistance or in making payment of any
public funds shall deny the same to any institution or organization engaged in discriminatory
practices based upon race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap.
ARTICLE IX. OTHER GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
All political subdivisions, schools, districts, and other instrumentalities of government are
requested to cooperate with this endeavor to eliminate any and all acts of discrimination within
the State of Utah.
ARTICLE X. COOPERATION WITH THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
All state agencies, in accordance with the provisions of the state's law against
discrimination, shall cooperate fully with the Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial
Commission and duly comply with its requests and recommendations for effectuating the state's
policy against discrimination.
ARTICLE XI. PUBLICATION AND POSTING OF THIS CODE
Copies of this code shall be distributed to all executive branches of government, political
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subdivision, boards, departments, commissions, school districts, and all other agencies of the
State of Utah, and shall be posted in prominent locations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused to be affixed the
Great Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 4th day of
May, 1979.
Scott M. Matheson
GOVERNOR
ATTEST:

SECRETARY OF STATE
David S. Monson
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UT Exec Order October 1,1977 - Gov. Matheson
EXECUTIVE ORDER
WHEREAS, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits discrimination
in the United States employment in the public sector on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin; and
WHEREAS, the Equal Pay Amendment of 1963, to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, guaranteed equal pay for equal work for persons of both sexes in United States
employment; and,
WHEREAS, the Age Discrimination Act of 1967, as amended in 1974, prohibits
discrimination in employment in the United States on the basis of an individual's age; and,
WHEREAS, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974, prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of one's handicapped status; and,
WHEREAS, Presidential Executive Orders since 1964, especially Executive Order
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375 have mandated the establishment of Affirmative
Action Programs with United States Government agencies and their contractors in order to
correct past injustices and insure future non-discrimination in employment practices; and,
WHEREAS, the United States Civil Service Commission requires that Affirmative
Action Plans be a part of the State Merit System; and,
WHEREAS, the Utah Fair Employment Practices Act (Anti-Discrimination Act) of 1965,
as amended in 1975, in Utah prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, creed,
color, sex, age, religion, ancestry or national origin; and,
WHEREAS, in 1973, the past administration set forth an Executive Order which
mandated the formulation and implementation of Affirmative Action Programs within each
agency of state government, and established within the Department of Finance, State Personnel
Office, the Division of Equal Employment Opportunity;
EXECUTIVE ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, BY THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME AS GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That the State Equal Employment
Opportunity Coordinator be responsible for instituting a continued policy of Affirmative Action
for the employees and perspective employees of the State of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That the State Personnel Director maintain Affirmative
Action in the administration of the State Merit System.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That each agency and department of state government
formulate an ongoing policy of nondiscrimination through continued efforts to implement
Affirmative Action Plans to achieve equal employment in state government for all citizens of
Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That an Affirmative Action Review Committee be created
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to assist the Coordinator of Equal Employment Opportunity, the State Personnel Director, and
the Governor in the development of an effective Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative
Action Program.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of
the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah this 1st day of October, 1977.
Scott M. Matheson
Governor
ATTEST:

David S. Monson
Secretary of State
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UT Exec Order December 6,1973 - Gov. Rampton
EXECUTIVE ORDER

WHEREAS, Article I of the Governor's Code of Fair Practices, October 1, 1965, provides
in part as follows:
"No state agency shall, in the recruitment, appointment, assignment, promotion, and
discharge of personnel, discriminate against any individual on account of race, color,
religious creed, ancestry, national origin or sex; and
WHEREAS, it has long been the policy of the State of Utah to provide equal opportunity
in its employment on the basis of merit; and
WHEREAS, it is recognized that it is the responsibility of the government of the State to
bring all segments of the population to full participation in the processes of government and to a
full share in the services of government; and
WHEREAS, it is recognized that it is in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness of the
operations of government that all citizens be allowed to make the greatest contributions of which
they are capable to their government:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Calvin L. Rampton, Governor of the State of Utah by virtue of
the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the State of Utah do hereby direct:
1. Each agency and department of state government to formulate and implement an
acceptable plan of Affirmative Action to achieve Equal Employment Opportunity in the State
Government for all citizens of Utah. Each agency plan shall cover recruitment, selection,
appointment, promotion, and other personnel procedures; agency functions in relation to job
structuring; and training plans to insure opportunities to improve skills needed at current job
levels and to develop potential for promotion.
2. There will be created in the State Personnel Division of the Department of Finance an
office of Equal Employment Opportunity that shall coordinate the State Equal
Employment Opportunity program and each agency shall furnish to that office for
approval in accordance with standards provided to the agencies, a copy of the agency's
plan of Affirmative Action, as well as such reports as shall be required. The State Office
of Equal Employment Opportunity shall issue to the agencies such regulations, standards,
and other guidance as may be necessary concerning the composition and implementation
of the Equal Employment Opportunity plans of Affirmative Action.
3. There will be created an advisory council to that office that shall monitor the State
Equal Employment Opportunity program and submit a report thereon to the Governor by
December 31st of each year. This council shall consist of seven members and shall draw
1 member from the Black Community, 1 member from the Chicano Community, 1
member from the Asian American Community, 1 member from the American Indian
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Community, 1 member from a women's organization, 1 member from the Public
Employee's Association, and a representative from or designee of a State Agency.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of
the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of December,
1973.
Calvin L. Rampton
Governor

ATTEST:

Clyde L. Miller
SECRETARY OF STATE
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UT Exec Order October 1,1965 - Gov. Rampton
EXECUTIVE ORDER
GOVERNOR'S CODE OF FAIR PRACTICES
PREAMBLE
Among the basic rights of all the people of this nation are the rights to seek a livelihood,
opportunity for advancement and the respect of our society based solely on the individual's
ability and capacity. To judge an individual, expressly or through implication, by his race,
religion or national origin, is repugnant to every American ideal and a distortion of our standards
of human freedom and worth.
It is the duty of every American citizen to protect and promote the right of all persons to
find employment where their individual capacities lead them. For, when freedom of any kind is
lost for one citizen, all freedom will soon be lost for all citizens.
Our units of government must assume their citizen-granted role of leadership in the
protection of freedom for all citizens, for we are sworn to not only uphold the letter of the laws as
set down by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Utah, and the statutes, but
also uphold and foster the guiding spirit of these laws.
The State of Utah recognizes its responsibility to guarantee the right of all persons to
utilize their abilities to the fullest and thus will take immediate and continuing measures to
strengthen our efforts in behalf of this objective.
As Governor of the State of Utah, I, Calvin L. Ramptou, now proclaim the following
Code of Fair Practices to be the governing policy throughout every department of the executive
branch of government of the State of Utah.
ARTICLE I -- APPOINTMENT, ASSIGNMENT AND PROMOTION OF STATE
PERSONNEL
No state agency shall, in the recruitment, appointment assignment, promotion and discharge
of personnel, discriminate against any individual on account of race, color, religious creed,
ancestry, national origin or sex. No state agency shall have on its employment application forms
any inquiry regarding race, color, religious creed, ancestry or national origin and no interview
shall include any question pertaining to the above.
ARTICLE II - PROMULGATION OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES
All state agencies shall promulgate and affirmatively carry out a clear, written policy of
non-discrimination and fair practices. They shall regularly review their personnel practices and
procedures and correct any which may contribute to the possibility of discrimination. They shall
include, in their continuing programs of orientation and training, special emphasis on
non-discriminatory practices and services
ARTICLE III - TRAINING FOR JOB OPPORTUNITIES
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All educational programs, vocational guidance counseling services, and all apprenticeship and
on-the-job training programs of the state shall be conducted to encourage the fullest development
of interests and aptitudes, without regard to race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin
or sex.
ARTICLE IV -STATE SERVICES AND FACILITIES
Equal treatment of all persons without regard to race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national
origin or sex, shall be guaranteed by all state agencies in performing their services to the public.
Discriminatory practices will not be tolerated in any state facility.
ARTICLE V - EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
All state agencies engaged in employment referral and placement services for private or
public employers shall fill job orders only on a non-discriminatory basis. They shall refuse any
job order which would discriminate against any person because of race, color, religious creed,
ancestry, national origin or sex-whether such discrimination was either expressed or implied by
the job order—and shall refer such prohibited requests to the Anti-Discrimination Division of the
Industrial Commission for investigation, conciliation, and other appropriate action.
ARTICLE VI - COOPERATION WITH THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
All state agencies, in accordance with the provisions of the state's laws against discrimination,
shall cooperate fully with the Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission and
duly comply with its requests and recommendations for effectuating the state's policy against
discrimination.
ARTICLE VII -- STATE LICENSING AND REGULATORY AGENCIES
All state agencies receiving information or complaints of discrimination based on race, color,
religious creed, ancestry, national origin or sex, shall promptly advise the Anti-Discrimination
Division of the Industrial Commission. The Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial
Commission shall notify any state agency which has licensing or regulatory power of the
pendency of a proceeding. If, thereafter, a party is found to have engaged in a discriminatory
practice, such state agency shall be notified and take appropriate action against the respondent.
ARTICLE VIII - PUBLIC CONTRACTS
Every state contract for public works or for goods or services shall contain a clause barring
discrimination on account of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin or sex, and
such contractual provisions shall be fully and effectively enforced.
ARTICLE IX - STATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
All state agencies engaged in granting financial assistance or in making payment of any
public funds shall deny the same to any institution or organization engaged in discriminatory
practices based upon race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin or sex.
ARTICLE X - OTHER GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
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3
All political subdivisions, schools, districts and other instrumentalities of government are
requested to cooperate with this endeavor to the end that any and all discrimination within the
State of Utah be eliminated.
ARTICLE XI - PUBLICATION AND POSTING OF THIS CODE
Copies of this code shall be distributed to all executive branches of the government, political
subdivisions, boards, departments, commissions, school districts and all other agencies of the
State of Utah, and shall be posted in prominent locations.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great
Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 1st day of
October, 1965.

Calvin L. Rampton
Governor

Attest:

Clyde L. Miller
Secretary of State
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Vern L. PETERSON, Plaintiff,
v.
BROWNING, a Utah corporation, and
David W. Rich, Defendants.
No. 900401.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 13, 1992.
Question was certified by the United
States District Court for the District of
Utah as to whether action for termination
of employment based upon public policy
exception to at-will employment doctrine
sounds in tort or contract. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) public
policy exception is recognized in state, and
(2) exception sounds in tort rather than
contract.
Question answered.
Howe, Associate CJ., filed a concurring opinion.
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring and
dissenting opinion in which Hall, CJ.,
joined.
1. Master and Servant e=»30(1.10)
Under public policy exception to at-will
employment doctrine, at-will doctrine will
not insulate employer from liability where
employee is fired in a manner or for a
reason that contravenes clear and substantial public policy. U.C.A.1953, 67-21-1 to
67-21-9.
2. Master and Servant $»30(1.10)
It is not purpose of public policy exception to at-will employment doctrine to eliminate employer discretion in discharging atwill employees or to impose requirement of
"good cause" for discharge of every employee.
3. Master and Servant <s=»30(1.10)
Public policy exception to at-will employment doctrine applies when statutory
language expressing public conscience is
clear and when affected interests of society
are substantial.

4. Master and Servant <s=»30(L10)
For purposes of public policy exception
to at-will employment doctrine, identification of clear and substantial public policies
will require case-by-case development
5. Master and Servant e=>30(1.10)
Violation of any federal or other
state's law does not automatically provide
basis for wrongful termination action
based on public policy exception to at-will
employment doctrine; rather, violation of
state or federal law must contravene clear
and substantial public policy of the state.
U.C.A.1953, 67-21-1 to 67-21-9.
6. Master and Servant <3=»30(1.10)
Falsifying tax and customs documents
contravened state public policy, for purposes of public policy exception to at-will
employment doctrine.
7. Master and Servant e=»35
Public policy exception to at-will employment doctrine sounds in tort rather
than contract; employer's obligation to refrain from discharging employee who refuses to commit criminal act does not depend upon any express or implied promise
arising from employment contract
David B. Havas, Michelle E. Heward,
Ogden, for Peterson.
William B. Bohling, David R. Money, Michael Patrick O'Brien, Sharon E. Sonnenreich, Salt Lake City, for Browning and
Rich.
DURHAM, Justice:
In 1987, Vern Peterson filed a complaint
in federal court against his former employer, Browning, and its personnel director,
alleging, among other things, constructive
termination in violation of Utah public policy. Peterson was a customs officer with
Browning. In support of his public policy
claim, Peterson alleges that he was terminated because of his refusal to falsify tax
documents in violation of Utah and Missouri law and customs documents in violation of federal law.
This matter has been certified from the
United States District Court for the Dis-
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trict of Utah pursuant to rule 41 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
question of law certified to this court for
consideration is:
Does an action for termination of employment based upon the public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for violation of or refusal to violate
federal, other state, or Utah law sound in
tort or contract?
On its face, the certified question appears
to be singular, but in effect it has two
parts: (1) Does the public policy exception
to Utah's employment-at-will doctrine encompass violations of federal law and the
laws of other states as well as violations of
Utah law? (2) Does that exception sound
in tort or contract? l
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
GENERALLY
[1] The public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine restricts an
employer's right to terminate an employee
for any reason. Burk v. K-Mart Corp.,
770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla.1989) (public policy
exception attempts to balance competing
interests of society, employee, and employer). Under the exception, the at-will doctrine will not insulate an employer from
liability where an employee is fired in a
manner or for a reason that contravenes a
clear and substantial public policy. Utah
recognizes the public policy exception to
the at-will doctrine. Hodges v. Gibson
Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 165 (Utah
1991); Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785
P.2d 1096, 1097 (Utah 1989).2
1. In its brief to this court, Browning raises two
additional issues: (1) whether Peterson's public
policy claim is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001 to 1461 (1985), and (2) whether there
are sufficient facts to put the claim within the
public policy exception. Peterson argues that
these issues were not raised by the federal judge
in his request for certification and that they are
issues properly decided by the trial court, not by
this court. We agree with Peterson. To address
these questions without a request to do so
would intrude upon the province of the federal
court.
2. The Utah Protection of Public Employees Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986 & Supp.

Actions falling within the public policy
exception typically involve termination of
employment for (1) refusing to commit an
illegal or wrongful act, (2) performing a
public obligation, or (3) exercising a legal
right or privilege. Jill S. Goldsmith, Note,
Employmen t-a t- Will—Employers
May
Not Discharge At-Will Employees for
Reasons that Violate Public Policy—Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,
1986 Ariz.St.LJ. 161, 166-67. Here, Peterson alleges that he was terminated for
refusing to commit an unlawful act. In a
number of cases, other courts have found
that the public policy exception applies in
similar circumstances. See, e.g., Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167,
164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980)
(employee discharged for refusing to engage in illegal price fixing); Petermann v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am.
Local 396, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959) (employee terminated for refusing to
commit perjury); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich.App. 489, 265
N.W.2d 385 (1978) (employee discharged
for declining to illegally manipulate statemandated pollution sampling results);
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 NJ.Super. 416,
390 A.2d 149 (1978) (employee terminated
for refusing to perform medical procedure
for which she was not licensed); Harless v.
First NaVl Bank, 162 W.Va. 116, 246
S.E.2d 270 (1978) (employee discharged for
refusing to violate consumer protection
law); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d
739 (9th Cir.1984), cert, dismissed, 469 U.S.
1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 309 (1985)
1991), protects public employees from discharge
for reporting "a violation of a law, or rule
promulgated under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or any recognized
entity of the United Stales," id. § 67-21-3(1), or
for participating "in an investigation, heanng,
inquiry, or other form of administrative review
held by [a] public body," id. § 67-21-3(2).
While the statute does not specifically limit the
rights of private employers or address the employer who directs an employee to engage in
unlawful conduct, it does reflect legislative approval of the basic proposition that it is against
the public policy of the state for employers to
discharge employees who seek to act within the
law.
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(employee discharged for refusing to participate in conspiracy to violate Sherman
Antitrust Act).
How a court defines "public policy" is a
determining factor in whether it will invoke
the public policy exception. Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370,
377, 710 P.2d 1025, 1032 (1985); Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 Harv.L.Rev.1931,1947 (1983)
[hereinafter Protecting Employees]. We
acknowledge that the term "public policy"
is open-ended, Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165, and
varies from court to court and from case to
case. See generally Protecting Employees at 1947-50 (discussing arbitrariness
with which courts define public policy).
We will not attempt here to define the full
scope of the term "public policy" for purposes of the exception to the at-will doctrine. At this point, it is sufficient to say
that declarations of public policy can be
found in our statutes and constitutions.
Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165-66; Berube v.
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043
(Utah 1989). This does not mean that all
statements made in a statute are expressions of public policy. "[M]any statutes
simply regulate conduct between private
individuals, or impose requirements whose
fulfillment does not implicate fundamental
public policy concerns." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 217, 765 P.2d 373, 379 (1988). A
number of courts have refused to recognize
a cause of action unless the public policy
allegedly violated is clear or substantial,
see, e.g., Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117
Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977) (refusing to
recognize public policy action where employees terminated for refusing to consent
to take psychological stress evaluation
test); Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 41
Colo.App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (refusing to recognize public policy action
based on broad, general language of nursing statute); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt 562,
409 A.2d 581 (1979) (refusing to recognize
action where employee was discharged
over leave time dispute); Ward v. FritoLay, Inc., 95 Wis.2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536
(1980) (refusing to recognize public policy

violation where employee was fired because relationship with co-worker was
causing dissension in work place), or clearly mandated, see Wagenseller, 147 Ariz, at
377, 710 P.2d at 1032; Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625, 631
(1982); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 1516, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981); Boyle v.
Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871
(Mo.Ct.App. 1985); Geary v. United States
Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174, 180
(1974); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.,
102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089
(1984).
[2-4] This court has indicated that it
will narrowly construe the public policies
on which a wrongful termination action
may be based. Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon &
Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483, 485 (Utah
1989); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043. It is not
the purpose of the exception to eliminate
employer discretion in discharging at-will
employees, Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165, or to
impose a requirement of "good cause" for
the discharge of every employee. Accordingly, we hold that the public policy exception applies in this state when the statutory
language expressing the public conscience
is clear and when the affected interests of
society are substantial. The identification
of clear and substantial public policies will
require case-by-case development.
SCOPE OF EXCEPTION: VIOLATIONS
OF FEDERAL LAW AND LAWS
OF OTHER STATES
We turn first to the question of whether
the public policy exception as recognized in
this state includes violations of federal law
and the laws of other states in addition to
violations of Utah law. In Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572
(D.Md.1982), a discharged employee alleged, among other things, that he was
terminated from his employment after he
threatened to expose violations of federal
tax laws. He claimed that the tendency of
the firing was to prevent disclosure of illegalities in contravention of federal policy.
In response, the employer argued that in
an action raising a state's public policy
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exception, an employee could not rely on
federal law as the source of the public
policy contravened. In concluding that federal law can be incorporated as the public
policy of a state, the court stated:
It is in no way offensive to state sovereignty to engraft federal public policy
within the civil law. If [the employer's]
arguments were to be adopted, this
Court would accept the proposition that
the [state], as a matter of public policy of
its own, should not be concerned with
serious violations of federal law
This Court cannot agree that the [state]
should close its eyes and, as a matter of
policy, not be concerned with violations
of federal law.
Id. at 578-79. A number of state courts
likewise have recognized that certain federal laws may properly form the basis for a
wrongful termination action under a state's
public policy exception. See Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 164
Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (state
action based on violation of federal price
fixing laws); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc.,
700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.Ct.App.1985) (state action based on violation of federal Food and
Drug Administration regulations); Sabine
Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d
733 (Tex. 1985) (state action based on violation of federal water pollution laws).
[5,6] We are not prepared to hold, however, that a violation of any federal or
other state's law automatically provides the
basis for a wrongful termination action
based on the Utah public policy exception.
Many ancient, anachronistic, and unenforced criminal sanctions remain on the
books of local, state, and national governments. Violations of such laws would not
necessarily violate Utah public policy. To
provide the basis for an action under the
public policy exception, a violation of a
state or federal law must contravene the
3. We note that discerning the public policy implications of federal law or the law of another
state may on occasion be difficult for Utah
courts. Application of the "clear and substantial" criteria defined above should, however,
minimize this problem.
4. By including violations of "a law, or rule
promulgated under the law of this state, a politi-

clear and substantial public policy of the
state of Utah. Although many state and
federal laws will reflect Utah public policy,
and may, in fact, provide a source of Utah
public policy, a plaintiff must establish the
connection between the law violated and
the public policies of Utah. That has been
done here.
In the present case, it is alleged that the
employer discharged the employee because
he would not falsify tax and customs documents. Such falsification involves serious
misconduct and is in all likelihood a felony.
See 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1988); Mo.Rev.Stat.
§ 150.260 (1986). "To hold that one's continued employment could be made contingent upon his commission of a felonious act
at the instance of his employer would be to
encourage criminal conduct upon the part
of both the employee and employer and
would serve to contaminate the honest administration of public affairs." Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27. Based on the information available to us, it appears that the
Utah public policy at issue is both clear and
substantial.
Persons who are terminated from their
employment because they refuse to engage
in illegal activities that implicate clear and
substantial Utah public policy considerations should be protected regardless of
whether the applicable law is that of Utah,
the federal government, or another state.3
The effect on the employee of having to
choose between keeping his job or following the law that governs him is the same
regardless of the origin of the law. Accordingly, we hold that an attempt to
coerce an employee to violate the state tax
law and federal customs statute at issue
contravenes the clear and substantial public policies of the state of Utah. Thus, a
discharge resulting from an employee's refusal to violate such laws is actionable under the public policy limitation.4
cal subdivision of this state or any recognized
entity of the United States," the Utah Protection
of Public Employees Act, Utah Code Ann. § 6721-3(1) (emphasis added), discussed supra note
2, reflects legislative approval of the basic proposition that the public policy of this state embraces the laws of other jurisdictions as well as
Utah law.
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CONTRACT VS TORT
CHARACTERIZATION
[7] The second issue before this court is
whether the public policy exception sounds
in tort or in contract Characterizing a
case as tort or contract orients the parties
to the requisite elements of proof, permits
anticipation of potential defenses, and defines the remedies available See William
L Mauk, Wrongful Discharge The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege,
21 Idaho L Rev 201, 208 (1985) [hereinafter
Mauk] Essentially, the standard of orientation m addressing this problem focuses
on the duty which has allegedly been
breached, asking whether that duty arises
from a promise set forth in the contract or
is one imposed by law, independent of contract Id at 209
Of those courts recognizing the public
policy exception to the at will doctrine, the
overwhelming majority adopt the tort theory 5 We agree with the majority and hold
that the exception sounds in tort 6 An
employer's obligation to refrain from dis
charging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon
any express or implied promise ansmg
from the employment contract Instead,
the tort cause of action arises out of the
contractual relationship See DCR Inc v
Peak Alarm Co, 663 P2d 433, 437 (Utah
1983) (burglar alarm company which
breached duty of due care liable in tort
even though relationship giving rise to
duty originated m service contract between
parties), see also Tameny, 164 Cal Rptr at
843-44, 610 P 2d at 1334, Malone v University of Kansas Medical Ctr, 220 Kan
371, 552 P 2d 885, 888 (Kan 1976), Burk v
K-Mart Corp, 770 P 2d 24, 28 (Okla 1989)
5. Only two states, Wisconsin and Arkansas, have
adopted the contract theory The Wisconsin
court was influenced largely by the fact that the
legislature in that state had prescribed contract
damages for other instances of wrongful termi
nation Brockmeyer v Dun & Bradstreet, 113
Wis 2d 561 335 N W 2d 834 (1983) Arkansas
adopted the contract theory but recognized that
in a proper case, the employee would have a
cause of action for the tort of "outrage " Ster
ling Drug, Inc v Oxford, 294 Ark 239, 743
S W 2 d 380 rehg denied, 294 Ark 239, 747
S W 2 d 579 (1988)

The employer's liability is based on "violation of a legal duty independently imposed
as a result of what the defendant undertook to do with relation to the [employee's]
interests" DCR Inc, 663 P2d at 437
(quoting Carl S Hawkins, Retaining Traditional Tort Liability in the Nonmedical
Professions, 1981 B Y U L Rev 33, 36)
Our holding that tort theory applies to
the public policy exception is not inconsistent with our decision in Beck v Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 701 P2d 795 (Utah
1985) In Beck, we held that a claim based
on a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing gives rise to a claim
for breach of contract Id at 798 Tort
damages m such a case can be obtained
only upon a showing of independently actionable tortious conduct See id at 800 n
3 Because the public policy exception is
imposed by law, the employment agreement is involved only because it forms the
basis of the relationship, the agreement is
tangential to the reason for discharge
This is not the case with regard to the
covenant of good faith and fair dealmg
"The covenant of good faith is read into
contracts in order to protect the express
covenants or promises of the contract, not
to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied to the contract's purpose " Foley v Interactive Data Corp,
47 Cal 3d 654, 254 Cal Rptr 211, 232, 765
P 2d 373, 394 (1988) The very nature of
the public policy exception, therefore, distinguishes it from the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing discussed in
Beck
Further, our holding that the public policy exception sounds m tort is consistent
with our adoption of the tort of intentional
6. The application of tort concepts in discharge
and other employment contexts is not revolu
tionary Tort theories have been applied, for
example, to actions raised by aggrieved employ
ees based on negligence, interference with con
tract, intentional infliction of emotional distress invasion of privacy and defamation
Mauk at 225 Similarly, employers have been
found liable in tort for failing to furnish a safe
work place or proper tools W Page Kceton, et
al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92,
at 663 (5th ed 1984) [hereinafter Keeton]
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interference with economic relations in
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom,
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). Under Leigh
Furniture, to recover damages for that
tort, "the plaintiff must prove (1) that the
defendant intentionally interfered with the
plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by
improper means, (3) causing injury to the
plaintiff/' Id. at 304. The improper-purpose alternative of the second part of the
test "is satisfied where the means used to
interfere with a party's economic relations
are contrary to law, such as violations of
statutes, regulations, or recognized common law rules. Such acts are illegal or
tortious in themselves and hence are clearly 'improper' means of interference." Id.
at 308. The discharge of an employee because of his failure to violate a clear and
substantial public policy is an "improper
purpose" under this definition. The imposition of tort damages is therefore entirely
appropriate and consistent. Accord W.
Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 130, at 1029-30 (5th
ed. 1984).
As discussed above, the duty at issue in
actions for wrongful termination in violation of public policy does not arise out of
the employment contract It is imposed by
law, and thus is properly conceptualized as
a tort. Significant consequences flow from
this conceptual approach, one of which is
the type of damages available. When a
contract theory is applied, compensation
may be limited to economic losses such as
back pay. Keeton § 130, at 1029 (citing
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113
Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983)). Moreover, concepts of foreseeability and mitigation apply. Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at
841. In contrast, "[a] tort theory will permit the recovery to transcend these limits
and may also serve to avoid limitations on
recovery that may be imposed by the collective bargaining agreement or other contract." Keeton § 130, at 1029. Most notably, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages under tort law.
In the case of the public policy exception,
potential punitive damages will exert a
valuable deterrent effect on employers who

might otherwise subject their employees to
a choice between violating the law or losing
their jobs. The employment-at-will doctrine does not grant an employer the privilege of subjecting its employees to the
risks of criminal liability. Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 872 (Mo.Ct
App.1985). The potential for the imposition
of punitive damages under the public policy
exception will, we believe, provide an incentive for employers to refrain from using
their unique economic position to coerce
employee conduct that contravenes clear
and substantial public policies. Moreover,
it will encourage employees to engage in
lawful conduct and report violations of the
law.
CONCLUSION
In response to the two-part question certified to this court, we hold that (1) the
public policy exception to Utah's employment-at-will doctrine encompasses violations of federal law and the laws of other
states as well as violations of Utah law if
those violations contravene the clear and
substantial public policies of Utah, and (2)
the exception sounds in tort.
STEWART, J., concurs.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
(concurring).
I concur. I write to underscore that the
public policy exception is to be applied narrowly and only when there exists a violation of a clear and substantial public policy.
Accordingly, I do not contemplate that the
exception will be frequently invoked or that
it should be of concern to employers who
are guided by honesty in their employment
relations.
To employers in this state who fear the
risk of being subjected to punitive damages
for a discharge in contravention of public
policy, I commend the following statement
in the opinion of the court in Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 878 (Mo.Ct.
App.1985):
The public policy exception is narrow
enough in its scope and application to be
no threat to employers who operate with-
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in the mandates of the law and clearly
established public policy as set out in the
duly adopted laws. Such employers will
never be troubled by the public policy
exception because their operations and
practices will not violate public policy.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring and
dissenting).
I concur with the majority's holding that
discharges in contravention of public policy
are actionable under Utah law and that
firing one for a refusal to violate state tax
and federal customs laws, if that is what
occurred here, would amount to such an
actionable discharge. However, I cannot
join without several reservations Justice
Durham's explanation of what may constitute public policy for the purposes of this
cause of action. I also dissent from the
majority's holding that discharge in the
violation-of-public-policy cause of action lies
in tort rather than contract.
I do not intend to disparage the ends
sought by the majority: to provide compensation for employees discharged in violation of public policy and to deter employers
from such firings. If the public policy of
this state is fixed firmly against conduct an
employer requires of an employee upon
pain of discharge for breach of contract,
the law should sanction neither the contract provision nor the discharge. However, while I agree with the majority's end,
I cannot agree with the means chosen to
achieve it.
The court today adopts a rather formless
tort cause of action as a means to separate
from the general body of contractual relations between employer and employee
those areas where public policy will not
permit contract law to operate. To me, this
tumor. The tool is capable of excising the
offending part, but it poses a considerable
risk of unpredictable collateral damage to
surrounding healthy tissue and a consequent impairment of the entire organ.
1. In this regard, I note that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has recently proposed a model Employment
Termination Act governing wrongful discharge.
It enlarges on an employer's traditional liability

The threat of this unintended injury is
particularly unfortunate because it is unnecessary. Recasting discharge in violation of public policy as a contract instead of
a tort cause of action would accomplish all
the positive consequences the majority desires—compensation of injured employees
and deterrence of employer misconduct—
without the risk of negative effects the
majority surely cannot intend but nonetheless invites. Indeed, returning to my
earlier analogy, while the tort action is a
cleaver, the contract action is a scalpel. I
favor the scalpel, with the knowledge that
the larger knife of tort will always be
available in cases where an egregiously
injured employee can prove an independent
tort, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress. When selecting from available tools to craft new rules that will affect
the relationship between every Utah employer and every Utah employee, we should
proceed with special delicacy lest we demonstrate that the fashioning of these rules
is a task too subtle for our skills and one
better performed by others.1
Before discussing the merits, a brief
overview of the discharge-in-violation-ofpublic-policy area is appropriate. The watershed Utah employment-at-will decision is
Befube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d
1033 (Utah 1989). In Berube, we held that
the employment-at-will doctrine in Utah
amounts only to a rebuttable presumption
that the contractual relationship between
the parties contemplates that the employer
may discharge the employee at any time.
Id. at 1044 (opinion of Durham, J., joined
by Stewart, J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); id. at 1050
(Howe, J,, concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.).
The lead opinion in Berube, written by Justice D\yrt*Wfc ^ral y*radl w&ty by SusAkg.
Stewart, assayed the three categories of
so-called "exceptions'1 to the employmentat-will doctrine that courts around the
country have fashioned. We adopted only
the "implied-in-fact" exception. Id. at 1049
bat limits available remedies. James N. Dertouzos & Lynn A. Karoly, Labor-Market Responses
to Employer Liability ix n. 2 (The RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1992).
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(opinion of Durham, J., joined by Stewart,
J.); id at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); id at 1050 (Howe, J.,
concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.). Since
then, we have decided a number of cases
under that exception, attempting to flesh
out some of its contours. See, e.g., Arnold
v. B.J. Titan Servs. Co., 783 P.2d 541 (Utah
1989); Lowe v. Sorensen Research Co., 779
P.2d 668 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. Ford,
Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483
(Utah 1989).
In addition to the implied-in-fact exception applied in Berube and its progeny, a
majority of the Berube court indicated in
dictum that it would also recognize a "public policy" exception to the employment-atwill doctrine, although a majority of the
members of the court did not agree on the
precise scope of that exception. Compare
Berube, 111 P.2d at 1042-43 (Durham, J ,
joined by Stewart, J.) with 111 P.2d at 1051
(Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result).
Two years after Berube, we again had
the opportunity to determine the contours
of the public policy exception. See Hodges
v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah
1991). However, a majority of the court
again did not address the question. In
Hodges, the jury based its verdict for the
plaintiff alternatively on a finding of malicious prosecution and a finding of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. Justice Stewart, writing the lead opinion and
joined only by Justice Durham, discussed in
dictum some aspects of the public policy
exception to the at-will presumption, including the sources of relevant public policy.
His views followed generally those Justice
Durham expressed in Berube. Id. at 16566. However, a majority of the court
joined only the portion of the lead opinion
2. For the sake of clarity, I note that although
this rule has been called one of the exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine, it is in reality a
public policy limitation on all discharges. As a
majority of the court in Berube viewed it, and as
I presume the majority in this case would agree,
the doctrine barring discharges in violation of
public policy does not depend analytically on
whether the at will presumption would otherwise apply to the specific facts of the case, i.e.,
whether there was an express or implied contract limiting the employer's discretion to dis-

that affirmed the malicious prosecution
verdict, finding that ground sufficient to
support the judgment without recourse to
the theory of discharge in violation of public policy. Id. at 168 (Howe, J., concurring), at 168 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in
the result, joined by Hall, C.J.).
The case before us today requires that
we finally decide several issues regarding
the public policy limitation on discharge.2
First, we must determine whether the
sources of the relevant actionable public
policies encompass those relied on by plaintiff. Second, we must fix the character of
the cause of action. 1 generally agree with
Justice Durham's treatment of the sources
issue and will dispense quickly with my
suggestions for a more exact and helpful
definition. I will then address her characterization of the action as a tort, a course
with which I profoundly disagree, and elaborate on my arguments for the equally
effective, less hazardous, and more precise
remedy of contract.
The first issue Justice Durham discusses
is the source of the relevant public policies
for the "public policy" limitation on discharge. Although she declines to attempt
"to define the full scope of the term 'public
policy/ " she does state that "declarations
of public policy can be found in our statutes and constitutions." Acknowledging
that we have said that the public policy
limitation on discharge should be construed
narrowly, her opinion holds that the requisite public policy is present when "the statutory language expressing the public conscience is clear and when the interests of
society which are at stake are substantial."
She concludes that falsifying tax and customs documents would amount to a violacharge. Rather, the public policy limitation
should apply to all employment contracts and
should preclude the employer from discharging
any employee in a manner or for reasons that
directly contravene public policy. The employee operating under an express contract should
not be in a less advantageous position than the
employee who is at will. Berube, 771 P.2d at
1043 n. 10 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.);
id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the
result).

1288

Utah

832 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

tion of a "clear" and "substantial" public
policy.
I agree with Justice Durham's requirement that any public policy that limits discharge for breach of the employment contract must be clear and substantial. I also
agree that Peterson may have alleged such
a policy here. However, for the guidance
of the bench and bar in future cases, 1
would expand on what "substantial"
means, and I would explain why we conclude that the policies here meet that test.
Both the cases Justice Durham cites and
many others she does not cite state in
rather conclusory terms, mirrored in Justice Durham's opinion, that for a violation
of public policy to be actionable, that policy
must be "substantial" or "fundamental."
For analytic purposes, I find that the following statement of the California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765
P.2d 373 (1988), gives some texture to the
elusive concept of "substantiality":
Even where, as here, a statutory touchstone has been asserted, we must still
inquire whether the discharge is against
public policy and affects a duty which
inures to the benefit of the public at
large rather than to a particular employer or employee. For example, many statutes simply regulate conduct between
private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.
Regardless of whether the existence of a
statutory or constitutional link is required under Tameny [v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1980) ], disparagement
of a basic public policy must be alleged
47 Cal.3d at 669, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 217, 765
P.2d at 379 (emphasis in original).
In other words, one must ask: Is the
policy in question one that is of sufficient
importance to the public, as opposed to the
parties only, that it should constitute an
uncompromising bar to discharge? Is it a
policy that a court would not permit the
parties to derogate by express contract?
These are the effects of making a policy

one that qualifies for the public policy limitation on discharge, and therefore, these
are the factors that should determine the
substantiality of any policy violated by a
discharge. See Foley, 47 Cal.3d at 670 n.
12, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 218 n. 12, 765 P.2d at
380 n. 12.
Following the Foley mode of analysis, I
conclude that we would not permit an employer to contract expressly with an employee to falsify state tax documentation or
evade customs restrictions. Deliberate falsification of information to avoid taxes
strikes at the core of the public revenueraising function and offends our basic public policy notions of fairness in taxation—
that all persons similarly situated with respect to the tax laws should pay their
share. It is a clear violation of Utah law to
falsify a tax return or supporting records.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b) (1990). I
therefore have no trouble finding that a
violation of Missouri's analogous tax law
would offend a substantial Utah public policy. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 150.260 (1986).
Similarly, it is a clear violation of federal
law to evade customs restrictions through
false statements. 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1988).
I am therefore equally comfortable with
the majority's holding that an evasion of
federal customs laws would also violate a
substantial Utah public policy.
Having dispensed with my clarification
of the sources of actionable public policies,
I turn to my major and fundamental point
of disagreement with Justice Durham's
opinion. The certified question asks us to
decide whether the cause of action for offending the public policy limitation on discharge should sound in tort or in contract.
She opts for tort. I would opt for contract.
She favors tort because it invokes the spectre of punitive damages to deter employers
from discharges in contravention of public
policy. I see contract damages as sufficient to make an employee whole in the
ordinary case, but would permit the discharged employee to seek any of the traditional tort remedies if he or she could prove
an independent tort. This two-layered
course of recovery would preserve the deterrent effects of tort while limiting its
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potential for unintended harm. It would
guarantee contract damages to all employees discharged in violation of public policy,
regardless of the mental state of their employers, something a tort cause of action
cannot provide. For those discharged employees who can prove an independent, intentional tort, such as infliction of emotional distress, this two-layered remedy would
protect their access to tort damages, including punitives if warranted.
We
thought this two-layered remedy sufficient
to compensate and to deter the injured and
the injurer, respectively, in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800
& n. 3 (Utah 1985). See also Hodges v.
Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163-64
(Utah 1991) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined
by Durham, J.); id. at 168 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d at 1033, 1046
(opinion of Durham, J., joined by Stewart,
J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring
in the result). Absent a showing that this
two-layered approach has proven inadequate, I would apply it here.
I now address in order Justice Durham's
several arguments for adopting the tort
approach. First, she observes that a majority of courts have taken the tort route.
I see little persuasive weight in the bandwagon argument. In fact, we rejected it in
Beck. There, we adopted a contract approach to the problem of an insurer's not
fulfilling the nonwaivable public policy obligation that we read into a first-party insurance contract. In so doing, we recognized
that the majority of courts considering the
issue had couched the cause of action in
tort Beck, 701 P.2d at 798-99. However,
we thought that approach analytically
flawed and the resulting remedy too crude.
Id. at 799-801. We noted that despite
some rather wooden platitudes to the contrary, in appropriate cases the contract
damages could include foreseeable consequential harms and should result in both
compensation and deterrence. Id. at 799,
3.

I note that the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") disallows any contract provision that
is found "unconscionable." Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-302 (1990). Certainly, any such provision is made unenforceable because it violates
public policy. I find no reasoned distinction

801-02. We kept tort in reserve for those
cases where the plaintiff could prove an
independent cause of action arising out of
the same facts upon which the breach of
contract claim was grounded. Id. at 800 n.
3. Nothing to date has shown this twolayered approach to be inadequate or has
challenged its superiority to the tort-only
remedy available in other jurisdictions.
Absent such a showing, I would adopt a
two-layered remedy here, regardless of
what other courts have done in the public
policy area.
Justice Durham next points to the fact
that in several cases this court has relied
on tort to remedy public policy violations.
E.g., DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663
P.2d 433, 437 (Utah 1983); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,
304 (Utah 1982). She notes that in both
cases, the parties' underlying relationship
arose from contract, as did the relationship
in Beck. My response is that those cases
provide little guidance in deciding the issue
before us. Neither addressed in any detail
the policy issues for choosing between tort
and contract, and both were decided before
Beck made clear that plaintiffs could obtain
a more generous remedy for breach of
certain contractual provisions than might
appear available upon first thought.
Without criticizing those particular decisions, I note that in recent years, courts
have lacked clear guiding principles by
which to determine whether a new cause of
action should lie in tort or contract 3 In my
view, the remedy for a breach of a contract
provision, whether express or implied, ordinarily should be in contract, unless there is
a sound reason for providing otherwise.
And in deciding whether such a sound reason exists, we should be guided by pragmatic consideration of the strengths and
weaknesses of the respective remedies in
light of the environment in which they are
to operate. Viewed in this light, our decibetween the public policy which underlies the
covenant Beck implied in a first-party insurance
contract or the unconscionability provision in
the U.C.C.—both of which are vindicated by
only contract remedies—and that which underlies DCR and Leigh Furniture.
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sions in DCR and Leigh Furniture may or
may not have been correct in adopting tort
as the primary remedy for breach of an
implied limitation on the conduct of a party
to a contract. The propriety of choosing a
tort remedy over contract depends on practical factors. This determination should focus on such variables as the frequency of
the conduct in question in the relevant community, the likelihood of the actions' being
done without malice, and the scope and
variety of economic arrangements affected
by the resulting law. To whatever conclusion such an analysis would lead in the
cases of DCR and Leigh Furniture, it
would tell little about the issue that confronts us today. We must analyze this
case in its own context.
Justice Durham's final reason for adopting the tort approach seems to be the one
on which she places the most weight. She
states, "The principal reason for the application of a tort theory to the public policy
exception is the availability of damages."
The issue of damages has two aspects.
First, Justice Durham expresses concern
that contract damages might be limited to
back pay and might be further restricted
by contractual provisions. Second, she
states:
The potential for the imposition of punitive damages under the public policy exception will, we believe, provide an incentive for employers to refrain from using
their unique economic position with regard to an employee to coerce conduct
which contravenes clear and substantial
public policies. Moreover, it will encourage employees to engage in lawful conduct and report violations of the law.
The first of these justifications—concern
about the limited damages available for
breach of an employment agreement and
about possible contractual restrictions on
damages—has little weight in Utah after
Beck and Berube.
In Beck, we noted that other states have
selected tort as the remedy for breaches of
covenants implied into first-party insurance
contracts as a matter of public policy, in
part because they believed that contract
remedies were inadequate to make the in-

jured party whole. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798.
Another justification was that, because the
insurer could predict the amount of damages, there was little disincentive to wilful
breach of the covenant. Id. at 799. These
are essentially the same arguments to
which Justice Durham alludes.
Our response in Beck was not to make
such an action lie in tort, but to make it
clear that consequential damages could be
available for a breach of that particular
type of contractual provision and that independent tort actions were not barred. As
to consequential damages, we stated that
whether they were foreseeable depended
on the nature of the contract and the expectations of the parties. But we suggested that in the first-party insurance context,
traditional notions of limited contractual
damages were inappropriate and that "a
broad range of recoverable damages was
conceivable," including attorney fees and
mental anguish. Id. at 802. On the deterrence point, we observed that our ruling
did not bar tort recovery, including punitive
damages in appropriate cases. We noted
that the acts constituting a breach of contract "may also result in breaches of duty
that are independent of the contract and
may give rise to causes of action in tort."
Id. at 800 n. 3.
Beck 's two-layered remedy already has
entered the wrongful discharge arena. In
Berube, we held that a claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of the express or
implied terms of an employment agreement
did not sound in tort, as some courts have
held, but in contract However, lest it be
argued that the remedy available to the
employee would be inadequate, and also
because of the unique nature of the relationship between employers and employees,
we adopted the Beck damage standard.
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1050.
In Beck, we also addressed the concern
that future insurers might attempt to draft
contractual provisions that would deprive
the insured of the benefit of the covenant
we there implied into the agreement as a
matter of law. This parallels Justice Durham's concern here that employers might
contractually limit the employees' remedies
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for discharges in violation of public policy.
Our response in Beck was to state, "The
duty to perform the contract in good faith
cannot, by definition, be waived by either
party to the agreement." Beck, 701 P2d
at 801 n 4. A similar observation plainly
would be appropriate with respect to the
public policy limitation on discharge.
In conclusion, concerns about inadequate
recovery and contractual limitations on the
right of action are answerable without resort to a tort cause of action.
The second reason Justice Durham advances for preferring tort damages to contract is that punitive damages are available
in tort and will deter employers from coercing employees into conduct "which contravenes clear and substantial public policies."
I think that in routine cases, the less drastic Beck remedy, which expands on traditional notions of available contract damages, will achieve deterrence similar to that
achieved in the first-party insurance area
governed by Beck and in the implied-m-fact
contract area governed by Berube. In extreme cases, we can achieve further deterrence by not denying employees general
damages and punitive damages where the
employer has committed an independent
tort.
We have two recent examples of Utah
cases where tort actions were joined with
Beck -type contract claims and resulted in
awards of general and punitive damages
In Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811
4. Although here we deal only with a certified
question and therefore make no factual determi
nations. I note that on the present state of the
pleadings and the record, this case does not
appear to be one where an action for an mde
pendent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress would lie Peterson's is not a
classic example of wrongful discharge in viola
tion of public policy He does not claim that
his employer forced him to choose between
violating the customs laws and losing his job
Indeed, Peterson admits that his employer was
"a stickler for adherence to customs practices "
His theory of recovery is more attenuated
He contends that his punctilious adherence to
the customs laws alienated his underlings and
superiors because of the extra time and effort
required to comply with import regulations
He alleges further that his refusal to falsify
Missouri tax documents angered at least one of
his peers at Browning's home office in Morgan,

P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), a fired employee
brought both wrongful discharge and malicious prosecution claims. She recovered on
both claims, and we affirmed the tort judgment, including the punitive damage
award Id. at 163. In Crookston v Ftre
Insurance Exchange, 817 P 2d 789 (Utah
1991), the plaintiffs claimed a breach of a
Beck covenant in their first-party insurance
contract. They recovered under both the
covenant theory and a fraud theory.
Again, we affirmed the judgment on the
tort claim
Based on our experience to date, then,
there is no ground for the suggestion that
Beck's and Berube 's two-layered contract/tort approach will fail to deter employer misconduct. In fact, where an employer discharges an employee for refusing
to violate a statute and the employer
knows the conduct demanded is unlawful,
it should not be difficult to craft a tort
complaint that can withstand a motion to
dismiss.4 Cf Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156-61
Consequently, the two-layered approach I
propose would be just as effective as the
majority's tort remedy in compensating injured employees and deterring egregious
misconduct on the part of their employers
My two-layered contract/tort remedy
would also avoid many of the inevitable
negative consequences that the majority
cannot intend but unfortunately invites I
particularly fear the consequences of a
vague, ill-defmed tort remedy because the
Utah, giving rise to the perception that Peterson
was uncooperative and something less than a
team player The combined result was a wide
spread belief that Peterson was a difficult per
son and an inflexible and unpopular manager,
who was incapable of raising employee morale
It is Peterson's argument that this perception,
fueled either in whole or in part by his adher
ence to the law, led to his constructive termi
nation Without more, this pleading falls short
of demonstrating intentional infliction of emotional distress, which requires that the defen
dant intended to inflict distress through out
rageous and intolerable conduct that offends
the generally accepted standards of decency and
morality Samms v Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289,
293, 358 P2d 344, 347 (1961)
Of course, all this is not to say that Peterson
may not be able to amend his pleadings to state
an independent tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress
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employment relationship is one of the most
common contractual relationships in society, and certainly one central to the working
of the economy This court has never suggested that in its recent forays into limiting
the 19th-century doctrine of employment
at will, it is attempting to bar contract law
from providing the norms that govern the
employment relationship Specifically, m
adopting the public policy limitation on discharge, we intend to limit the scope of
permissible contracting only where it
trenches on a "clear and substantial" public policy, a policy so crucial that we will
not permit parties to contract for its viola
tion Because we do not wish to chill permissible contracting between employers
and employees, we should hone the legal
rules we adopt so that the consequences
worked by the resulting cause of action are
the consequences we anticipate and desire 5
Our need for caution is heightened when
we consider that even our clearest and
best-crafted rules often have results we do
not expect We write our decisions m the
abstract, using a supposed set of facts m
our attempt to draw a careful line between
the permissible and the impermissible
Once they leave our chambers, however,
our rules operate m the real world of inexactitude and compromise, where judges and
juries are not always consistent on questions of either liability or damages, where
only a small percentage of cases actually
go to trial, where parties settle cases on
evaluations of relative degrees of risk, and
where people and institutions attempt to
predict risk and often plan their actions so
as to avoid any substantial possibility of
suit As a consequence, the fine, bright
5

A just released study by The RAND Institute
for Civil Justice documents the collateral conse
quences of recent nationwide changes in the
employment at will doctrine
These conse
quences include a decline in the aggregate em
ployment level in states adopting modifications
in the employment at will doctrine The seven
ty of this decline appears to vary depending on
the type of damages available for various
wrongful discharge causes of action For exam
pie, when tort damages are available, the de
cline in the equilibrium employment level is
much greater than when only contract remedies
are used While this study does not settle defin
ltively the collateral consequences of judicial

line we think we have drawn between the
good and the bad becomes, in practice, a
broad, unclear swath, encompassing both
conduct that clearly runs afoul of the standard we intended and conduct that we had
no intention of prohibiting and might, in
fact, want to encourage
Such is the danger here A candid appraisal of the likely effects of the majon
ty's tort rule suggests that its collateral
negative consequences are far greater than
necessary to accomplish our objective
These negative consequences flow from
both the definition of the prohibited con
duct and the open-ended damages available
in tort We may not be able to prevent
entirely these consequences at this stage in
the law's development, but we can limit
them by adopting a two-layered con
tract/tort approach as we did in Beck and
Berube
First, some negative collateral consequences flowing from the definition of dis
charges in violation of public policy are
attributable to the vagueness of the prohi
bition The majority offers little help in
identifying actionable public policies It
does not even state whether the source of
such policies must be in criminal or civil
statutes or the constitution or whether
such policies may be found in the civil
common law Similarly, the definitions of
"clear" and "substantial" are elusive Other than as suggested earlier in this opinion,
I am not sure we can give much more
specificity at this time without imprudently
limiting our freedom to detail the scope of
the rule in the context of future cases as
we become more sophisticated about the
relevant issues Nonetheless, there can be
modification of employment at will doctrines or
whether they are beneficial it does suggest that
the cost of these collateral consequences "dwarf
the direct legal expenses associated with this
new litigation," including costs of jury awards,
settlements, and attorney fees." James N Der
touzos & Lynn A Karoly, Labor-Market Re
sponses to Employer Liability xni, xiv (The
RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1992) I do not
suggest that these collateral consequences are
bad, but only that they are not intended, much
less understood, consequences of our changing
the law For that reason, we should proceed
cautiously lest we do more harm than good
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no question that the uncertainty caused by
this indeterminate definition of applicable
public policy will induce the cautious employer to avoid conduct that is plainly permissible. And discharged employees will
press claims that are outside the scope of
that which we ultimately will find to be
prohibited.
Although such uncertainty is the price
we pay for the incremental evolution of the
common law, the indeterminacy inherent in
a vague prohibition on discharges in violation of public policy is magnified immeasurably when, as the majority holds here, a
tort remedy is the sole avenue for redress.
First, the very nature of the tort is unclear.
I assume the employer must act intentionally, though the majority never says so
explicitly. But must the employer know
that the conduct it demands violates public
policy, or is it enough that the employer
intentionally but innocently requires conduct that turns out to violate such a policy?
No matter which path the majority takes,
the result reveals the inadequacy and the
crudeness of its sole reliance on a tort
remedy. If the employer must know that
the conduct it demands violates public policy, then a discharged employee who cannot
make that showing is left without any remedy because his or her claim for relief lies
only in intentional tort. On the other hand,
if the majority attempts to avoid this flaw
in the protections offered by its tort remedy by deciding that the employer need not
be conscious of the fact that the demanded
act violates public policy, then it would
impose a far more draconian tort liability
upon the employer than is necessary to
achieve its objectives of compensation and
deterrence. An employer who acts in good
faith but inadvertently violates public policy by a discharge should not be exposed to
a claim for punitive damages.
In contrast, if the approach I suggest
were adopted, a contract remedy would be
available to the employee discharged in violation of public policy regardless of the
state of mind of the breaching party. As
we noted in Beck, "[EJven an inadvertent
breach of [the implied covenant] can substantially harm the insured and warrants a

remedy." Beck, 701 P.2d at 800. The
same can be said of an employee discharged in good faith but in violation of
some public policy unknown to the employer. On the other hand, the employer who
acts wilfully, with full knowledge that the
conduct required violated a clear and substantial public policy, will almost certainly
be liable, not only in contract, but also for
one of the already established torts, as in
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d
151 (Utah 1991). In sum, a two-layered
contract/tort approach has the virtue of
better defining the scope of the public policy limitation.
The second type of unnecessary negative
consequences flowing from an exclusively
tort remedy is a consequence of the openended damages available for tort. The possibility of both special and general damages as well as punitives increases the uncertainty for the employer attempting to
appraise its risk and adjust its conduct to
avoid that liability. As noted above, in
appropriate cases, an employer may be unable to estimate readily Beck contract damages at the time of breach. Beck, 701 P.2d
at 801. Given the unique nature of the
particular contractual relationship involved,
that uncertainty is appropriate. But that
indeterminacy pales in comparison with an
attempt to estimate even general tort damages, much less the likelihood and amount
of any punitive damages. By following the
exclusive tort approach, we leave the conscientious employer largely at sea, not only
as to determining the propriety of its future conduct, but also as to the consequences of a misstep in its appraisal. As a
result, we inevitably will discourage a
broad variety of conduct that we in no way
have suggested is improper.
There has been no showing that we need
to risk this much collateral negative harm
to accomplish our purpose. The two-layered contract/tort remedy would increase
the certainty of the available damages,
thus decreasing the indeterminacy of the
law and reducing the breadth of the unintended swath our decision will cut in this
sensitive area. Such increased certainty
would mean that the law in operation
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would conform more closely to the law as
we intended it
At the same time, the contract remedy
has advantages over the tort m that by
adopting it, we leave fewer unanswered
questions as to the scope of the prohibited
conduct and we provide both a better array
of remedies for the harms suffered by employees and more specific deterrents for
the wrongs consciously committed by em
ployers
For the reasons stated, and perhaps stated again, I would reject the tort approach
of Justice Durham and follow the path
taken m Berube I would hold that a claim
for a discharge in violation of public policy
lies m contract
HALL, C J , concurs in the dissenting
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J

NUCOR CORPORATION, NUCOR
STEEL—UTAH DIVISION,
Petitioner,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>800

Taxation <s=»493.8
The Administrative Procedures Act
governs judicial review of the Tax Commis
sion's decision interpreting statutory law,
and correction of error standard governs
such review, unless the legislature has
granted agency discretion m interpreting
and administering statute
U C A 1953,
63~-46b-l to 63-46b-22, 63-46b-16(4)(d),
(4Xh)(i)
2 Taxation <S=>1319
The proper standard of review of Tax
Commission's decision regarding scope of
sales and use tax exemption, as a matter of
policy, was abuse of discretion U C A
1953, 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)
3. Taxation <^1245
Steel manufacturer was liable for sales
and use taxes on lance pipes, stirring lane
es, and mill rolls used in steel manufacturing process, where these items were purchased primarily as equipment in manufacturing process and only mcidently for use
as ingredients U C A 1953, 59-12-104(28)
(now 59-12-104(27))
4. Taxation <s=>204(l)
Tax statutes are to be narrowly construed against one seeking exemption

No. 900328.
Supreme Court of Utah
May 18, 1992
The Tax Commission upheld deficiency
assessment against steel manufacturer,
and denied its request for sales and use tax
exemptions for purchases of lance pipes,
stirring lances, and mill rolls used in steel
production Steel manufacturer petitioned
for review of order The Supreme Court,
Hall, C.J , held that the Commission properly found manufacturer liable for sales and
use taxes on items used primarily as equipment in manufacturing process
Affirmed

Mark K Buchi, Gary R Thorup, Richard
G Wilkins, Salt Lake City, Murray Ogborn,
Tim O'Neill, Denver, Colo, for petitioner
R Paul Van Dam, Bnan Tarbet, Salt
Lake City, for respondent
HALL, Chief Justice
Petitioner Nucor Corporation, Nucor
Steel—Utah Division ("Nucor") seeks review of the order of the Utah State Tax
Commission upholding a deficiency assess
ment against Nucor for sales and use taxes
for the period October 1, 1984, through
September 30, 1987, and denying its request for sales and use tax exemptions for
its purchases of lance pipes, stirring lances,
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Debra S. RETHERFORD, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
AT & T COMMUNICATIONS OF the
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; Cathy
Bateson; Louise Johnson; Vickie
Randall; and Doe I through Doe X,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 890464.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 9, 1992.
Former employee brought suit against
employer, supervisors, and co-workers arising from alleged sexual harassment and
retaliation for complaining about sexual
harassment by co-workers.
Summary
judgment was granted in favor of defendants on all claims by the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., and former employee appealed. The
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that:
(1) tort action for discharge in violation of
Utah public policy is not limited to employees at-will; (2) exclusive remedy for discharge in violation of public policy was the
Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act; (3) Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA)
preempted former employee's claims for
breach of implied contract and malicious
interference with contractual relations, and
preempted some of claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and (4) employee stated cause of action against coworkers for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Howe, Associate C.J., filed opinion concurring with reservations.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>934(1)
Although failure of trial court to issue
statement of grounds for granting summary judgment is not reversible error absent unusual circumstances, presumption
of correctness ordinarily afforded trial

court rulings on appeal has little operative
effect when members of Supreme Court
cannot define trial court's reasoning because of cryptic nature of its ruling. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rules 52(a), 56(c).
2. Appeal and Error <s=*863
Because summary judgment resolves
only questions of law, Supreme Court gives
no deference to trial court's determinations, and affirms only if decision before it
is correct. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
3. Master and Servant <s=>34
Tort of discharge in violation of public
policy is available to all employees, even
those with employment contract protecting
them from discharge without just cause.
4. Master and Servant <£=>30(1.10)
Not every discharge in violation of contractual just-cause provision rises to level
of violation of public policy; only those
policies that are clear and substantial and
arise from statutes or Constitutions qualify
for vindication through tort of discharge in
violation of public policy.
5. Master and Servant <s=>30(1.10)
While any employer violating contractual just-cause standard of dismissal is liable for breaking its promise to its employee, employer who violates clear and substantial public policies, so as to give rise to
tort of discharge in violation of public policy, should be liable for more expensive
penalties of tort, a potentially harsher liability commensurate with greater wrong
against society; when employer's act violates both its own contractual just-cause
standard and clear and substantial public
policy, employer is liable for two breaches,
one in contract and one in tort, and must
bear consequences of both.
6. Master and Servant <s=»35
Under Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act in
effect at time of employee's firing in 1986,
Act was exclusive remedy for employer
retaliation against employee who complained of sexual harassment, preempting
common-law causes of action for retaliation
for complaints of employment discrimination. U.C.A.1953, 34-35-6(l)(a)(i), 34-35-
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7.1(15); U.C.A.1953, 34-35-2(7), 24-257.1(11) (1989).
7. Statutes e=>l90
Where statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, Supreme Court will not look
beyond it to define legislative intent.
8. Statutes <&=205
Statute is interpreted as a whole, not
piecemeal.
l

9. Master and Servant <©=>10/2
Amendment to Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act to prohibit retaliation was not
change in substantive law, so as to indicate
that prior law did not prohibit retaliation,
but, rather, was only clarification. U.C.A.
1953, 34-35-6(l)(a)(i), 34-35-7.1(15); U.C.A.
1953, 34-35-2(7), 34-35-7.1(11) (1989).
10. Action <s=>35
"Indispensable element test/' under
which exclusive statutory cause of action
preempts common-law claim based on same
facts when statutory scheme supplies indispensable element of tort claim, is correct
analytical model for determining whether
statutory cause of action forecloses common-law remedy.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
11. Action <3=»35
"Indispensable element test" for determining when legislative enactment supplies
exclusive remedy relies on neither timing
nor conduct to determine preemption; instead, under such test, preemption depends
on nature of injury for which plaintiff
makes claim, not nature of defendant's act
which plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that injury.

ee, who was discharged after she complained about sexual harassment, for discharge in violation of public policy, but did
not preempt other claims for breach of
implied contract, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, malicious interference
with contractual relations, and negligent
employment of harassers. U.C.A.1953, 3435-1 to 34-35-7.1.
14. Master and Servant <s=>30(1.10)
In determining whether public policy is
sufficiently "clear and substantial" to support cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy, one must examine
strength of policy as well as extent to
which it affects public as whole; words
"clear and substantial" require lack of ambiguity on both points, and all statements
made in statute are not expressions of public policy.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
15. Master and Servant <e=>30(1.10)
Questions relevant to determining
whether statute embodies "clear and substantial public policy," so as to support tort
of discharge in violation of public policy,
include: whether policy in question is one
of overarching importance to public, as opposed to parties only; and whether public
interest is so strong and policy so clear and
weighty that we should place policy beyond
reach of contract, thereby constituting bar
to discharge that parties cannot modify,
even when freely willing and with equal
bargaining power.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

12. Workers' Compensation <s=>2093
Tort suit by employee against fellow
employee for injury caused by intentional
tort is not barred by exclusivity provision
of workers' compensation law.

16. Master and Servant <s=*40(3)
For employee to prevail on claim of
breach of implied contract, employee must
prove existence of implied contract, created
by mutual assent, and employer's failure to
comply with its terms.

13. Damages <s=>50.10
Master and Servant <3='35
Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act preempted state law tort claims by former employ-

17. Damages <s=*50.10
To prevail on claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from sexual harassment by co-workers, former em-
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ployee was required to prove that her coworkers either intentionally or recklessly
engaged in intolerable and outrageous conduct that caused her severe emotional distress.
18. Master and Servant <s=»341
To prevail on claim of malicious interference with contractual relations, former
employee was required to prove that her
co-workers, whether separately or in conspiracy, intentionally and improperly persuaded employer to breach its employment
contract with employee.
19. Master and Servant <s=>303
To prevail on claim of negligent employment against employer, employee was
required to prove that employer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining
its employees proximately caused her
harm.
20. Labor Relations <s=*45
States <s=*18.45
Preemption provision of the LMRA
preempts any common-law claim that is
substantially dependent on analysis of collective bargaining agreement. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §§ 301,
301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a).
21. Labor Relations 0=45
States <3=*18.45
Even if dispute resolution pursuant to
collective bargaining agreement, on one
hand, and state law, on other, would require addressing precisely same set of
facts, state law claim is "independent" of
agreement, and not preempted by LMRA,
as long as state law claim can be resolved
without interpreting agreement itself. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
§§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
22. Master and Servant ©=34
Claims by former employee, who alleged that she was discharged in retaliation
for complaining about sexual harassment,
that discharge breached obligation under

implied contract and that co-workers maliciously interfered with contractual relation,
resulting in breach of implied contract,
were based on implied contract that was
unenforceable as inconsistent with collective bargaining agreement; providing any
remedy under implied contract where no
remedy was available under collective bargaining agreement, because time for arbitration has passed, would put former employee in more advantageous position than
other employees bound by collective bargaining agreement. Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 185; National Labor Relations Act,
§ 9(a), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a).
23. Torts <S=>12
Plaintiff may not maintain cause of
action for malicious interference with contract if contract was illegal or contrary to
public policy.
24. Damages <e=*50.10
States <3=*18.15
Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against co-workers and supervisors by former employee, who alleged
that she was sexually harassed and that
when she complained other harassment intensified, were preempted by LMRA to extent that claims were against supervisors
for reprimanding her, ordering her to report to another city to work within ten
days, and assigning heir certain tasks, raising questions about authority under collective bargaining agreement, but other allegations that co-workers, followed her
around office and attempted to frighten
her as she crossed street involved purely
personal misconduct, and were not
preempted. Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, §§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 185, 185(a).
25. Damages <s=>50.10
To sustain her claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff
must show that defendant's conduct was
outrageous and intolerable and that it offended against generally accepted standards of decency and morality, that defen-
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dants intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of likelihood of causing,
emotional distress, that plaintiff suffered
severe emotional distress, and that defendants5 conduct proximately caused emotional distress.

employer's negYigence in Wiring, supervising, or retaining employees proximately
caused injury.

26. Damages <s=>50.10
States <£»18.15
In determining whether LMRA
preempts tort claims alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress by supervisor or fellow employee, distinction is made
between situations in which defendant has
misused his or her authority under collective bargaining agreement to torment
plaintiff and situations in which defendant
has inflicted distress through conduct that
is purely personal and does not implicate
exercise of supervisory authority; the former is preempted, while the latter is not.
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
§§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a).

29. Master and Servant <s=>300
Employer's duty toward people whom
its employees place in position of reasonably foreseeable risk or injury does not
stem from its private employment contract,
but rather stems from duty imposed by
state common law.

27. Master and Servant e=>325
States <s*18.45
Tort claim of negligent employment asserted by former employee, who claimed
that she was sexually harassed by co-workers, against employer was not shown by
employee to have been preempted by the
LMRA, despite employer's claim that court
would have to consider collective bargaining agreement's termination and discipline
provisions; source of obligation by employer and supervisors was public law and public policy, not private agreements, and employer failed to show that trial court would
be required to resort to bargaining agreement to determine whether employer dealt
appropriately with co-workers. Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, §§ 301,
301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a).
28. Master and Servant <s=»330(3)
To prevail on claim of "negligent employment," employee, who claimed that employer was negligent in hiring co-workers
who sexually harassed her, and then retaliated when she complained, was required to
show that employer knew or should have
known that co-workers posed foreseeable
risk of retaliatory harassment to third parties, including fellow employees, that coworkers did inflict such harm, and that

See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

30. Limitation of Actions @=>55(1)
Tort cause of action accrues for limitation purposes when all its elements come
into being and claim is actionable.
31. Limitation of Actions ®=a55(4)
Claim by former employee against coworkers for intentional infliction of emotional distress as result of alleged harassment and retaliation for complaining about
sexual harassment "accrued" for limitations purposes when employee, after almost 18 months of allegedly retaliatory
abuse by co-workers, took medical disability leave at insistence of her psychiatrist,
from which she never returned to job.
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-1, 78-12-25(3).
32. Limitation of Actions <5=»55(4)
Statute of limitations for intentional
infliction of emotional distress does not begin to run until distress is "actually inflicted," i.e., when plaintiff suffers severe emotional disturbance. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-1,
78-12-25(3).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

33. Damages <s=*50.10
While standard for determining whether plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of
emotional distress has experienced emotional stress is subjective, standard for determining outrageousness of alleged conduct is objective; consequently, plaintiff
must show both that reasonable person
would consider alleged conduct to be outrageous and that plaintiff actually experienced subjective severe emotional anguish
because of objectively outrageous conduct.
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34. Limitation of Actions <s=»55(2)
Generally, statute of limitations on
negligent employment claim will not begin
to run until all elements of employer's tort
are present.
35. Damages <e=>50.10
Allegations by former employee that,
after she complained about sexual harassment, co-workers shadowed her movements, intimidated her with threatening
looks and remarks, and manipulated circumstances at her work in ways that made
her job more stressful were sufficient to
satisfy objective conduct requirement of
tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress that conduct was "outrageous and
intolerable."
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

36. Damages <S=>50.10
Standard for determining whether conduct of defendant is sufficiently offensive
to permit recovery for intentional infliction
of emotional distress is whether defendant's actions offend against generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
37. Damages <s=>50.10
Conduct generally labeled as sexual
harassment on job satisfies "outrageous
and intolerable" requirement for tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and therefore, retaliation for complaining
of sexual harassment must also be considered "outrageous and intolerable."

Richard W. Perkins, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Richard M. Hymas, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellees.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
This case is before us on appeal from a
grant of summary judgment dismissing
plaintiffs complaint. Debra S. Retherford
sued her former employer, AT & T Commu-

nications, under several theories for harms
arising from alleged sexual harassment by
her co-employees. Specifically, she alleged
that AT & T fired her in retaliation for
complaining of being sexually harassed by
her AT & T co-workers. She argued that
such a discharge violated Utah public policy barring reprisals for reports of sexual
harassment. She also contended that the
discharge breached a term of her implied
contract with AT & T, which prohibited
reprisal for reports of sexual harassment
and was entirely separate from the agreement between her union's collective bargaining unit and AT & T. Retherford further asserted that AT & T was liable for
negligently employing her harassers. Finally, Retherford sued former co-workers
Cathy Bateson (aka Cathy BatesonHough), Louise Johnson, and Vickie
Randall, claiming that their retaliatory conduct constituted intentional infliction of
emotional distress and malicious interference with her contractual relations with AT
& T.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming, inter alia, that workers
covered by employment contracts that prohibit discharge other than for just cause
should not be able to maintain a tort action
for discharge in violation of public policy;
that the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act
("UADA") preempted Retherford's common law causes of action, see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1988) (amended
1989, 1990 & 1991); that federal labor law
preempted Retherford's common law
causes of action, see 29 U.S.C. § 185(a);
and that Retherford had failed to state tort
claims against her former co-workers or to
bring those claims within the period fixed
by the relevant statute of limitations.
The district judge considered affidavits
in support of and in opposition to the motion to dismiss and granted defendants
summary judgment on all claims. Retherford appeals.
To summarize our ruling today, we hold
as follows: first, that both employees covered by employment contracts that limit
the bases for discharge and employees who
are at-will can maintain a tort action for
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discharge in violation of Utah public policy;
second, that the UADA provides the exclusive remedy for Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of public policy but does
not bar her other causes of action; third,
that federal labor law preempts Retherford's claims for breach of implied contract
and malicious interference with contractual
relations and partially preempts Retherford's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and fourth, that Retherford brought her claims for emotional
distress and negligent employment in a
timely manner and has stated a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against her former co-workers.
We therefore reverse the order granting
summary judgment and remand this case
for further proceedings on Retherford's
claim of negligent employment and the
nonpreempted portion of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith
v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992);
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158
(Utah 1991); Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). We state
the facts of the instant case—which we
draw primarily from Retherford's affidavit
submitted in opposition to AT & T's motion
to dismiss—accordingly. See Sandy City
v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 215
(Utah 1992).

("CWA"). Independent of the collective
bargaining agreement, AT & T also had
promulgated a code of conduct that outlined employees' rights and responsibilities
and was specifically brought to the attention of and acknowledged in writing by all
employees. Retherford argues that the
code of conduct created an implied employment contract between AT & T and its
employees.
Both the collective bargaining agreement
and the code of conduct prohibited sexual
harassment and outlined procedures for aggrieved employees to press any complaints.
The collective bargaining agreement stated, "[N]either the Company nor the Union
shall unlawfully discriminate against any
employee because of such employee's race,
color, religion, sex, age or national origin
or because he or she is handicapped, a
disabled veteran or a veteran of the Vietnam era." The collective bargaining agreement required resort to arbitration to resolve "[grievances arising out of or resulting from the application or interpretation
of the provisions of this Agreement" and
"[grievances arising out of or resulting
from the dismissal, suspension, or demotion
of a regular employee
"
The code of conduct's provision on sexual
harassment was more detailed than that in
the collective bargaining agreement. The
code of conduct read in relevant part:

In 1976, Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company hired Retherford to
work as a telephone operator in Grand
Junction, Colorado. In 1983, due to the
nationwide restructuring of AT & T and its
subsidiary companies, Retherford was
transferred to AT & T's Wasatch office,
located in Salt Lake City, where she continued working as a telephone operator.

Any sexually harassing conduct in the
workplace, whether physical or verbal,
committed by any employee is also prohibited. This includes: repeated offensive sexual flirtations, advances, propositions; continued or repeated verbal
abuse of a sexual nature; graphic verbal
commentaries about an individual's body;
sexually degrading words used to describe an individual; and the display in
the workplace of sexually suggestive objects, pictures or posters.

Retherford alleges that two separate
agreements governed her employment with
AT & T. As an AT & T employee, Retherford was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement between AT & T and her union,
the Communications Workers of America

Employees who have complaints of
sexual harassment should report such
conduct to their supervisors. If this is
not appropriate, employees are urged to
seek the assistance of their EEO coordinator. Where the investigation confirms
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the allegations, prompt corrective action
should be taken.
Any reprisal against an employee because the employee, in good faith, reported a violation or suspected violation is
strictly forbidden.
Soon after Rutherford transferred to
Salt Lake City, manager Fayonne Johanneson required Retherford meet with her to
discuss the provisions of the conduct code
and to sign a statement saying that she
had read and understood them. This procedure was repeated every year during Retherford's tenure at the Wasatch office. In
an affidavit submitted in opposition to defendants* motion to dismiss, Retherford
termed this annual procedure "a condition
of her continued employment" with AT &
T.
Among Retherford's co-workers at the
Wasatch office were Cathy BatesonHough, an AT & T manager, Louise Johnson, a supervisor, Vickie Randall, a fellow
employee and union steward, and Jolene
Gailey,1 a fellow telephone operator. Upon
her arrival in Salt Lake City, she noticed
the sexually uninhibited atmosphere of the
Wasatch office. In her affidavit, Retherford testified that during her first day at
work, Bateson-Hough showed her an obscene Valentine's Day card. Soon Retherford became aware that obscene jokes and
foul language were commonplace among
her co-workers.
After approximately six months, Retherford switched to the night shift. At this
time, she encountered a more sexually suggestive work environment, one she found
threatening. As before, she noted that sex
was a common topic of discussion. For
example, in her affidavit she described
Johnson's loud accounts of an alleged sexual relationship with another AT & T employee.
For the first time, however, Retherford
found herself a target of the sexually sug1. Retherford originally named Gailey as a defendant in this suit, but dismissed her when
Gailey declared bankruptcy.

gestive commentary. Specifically, she alleges that Jolene Gailey subjected her to
unwelcome sexual advances. Retherford's
affidavit describes these advances as follows:
Retherford
complains that Gailey
touched her, made numerous comments regarding her appearance, and regularly suggested that Retherford join her "in various
activities." Gailey's friends, including defendant Johnson, also began to congregate
around Retherford, conversing frequently
and explicitly about subjects of a sexual
nature. As time passed, Gailey became
more aggressive. When "visibly intoxicated," Gailey sat next to Retherford, touched
her affectionately on the arm, and said,
"I'm going to save you from Dave Todd," a
male AT & T employee with whom Retherford had been sitting at meals. Gailey
subsequently asked Retherford to pose
nude while Gailey painted or sculpted her
likeness, told Retherford that she was looking for a roommate, and informed Retherford that she hated men and even the
sound of men's voices on the telephone.
Retherford also believes that Gailey passed
a note around the office stating that Retherford was having an affair with a male AT
& T employee.
After approximately ten months of such
treatment, Gailey telephoned Retherford at
home and asked her if she intended to file
an EEOC complaint about Gailey's conduct.2 Retherford testified in her affidavit
that she replied that she would file a complaint if Gailey continued to bother her.
According to Retherford's affidavit, Gailey
responded, "I'm sorry if I offended you,
but I feel I shouldn't have to apologize for
my sexuality."
Retherford testified in her affidavit that
after she informed Gailey that she was
considering filing a complaint of sexual
harassment, Gailey and other AT & T employees began to retaliate by staring at
her, making "threatening facial expressions" at her, walking extremely close to
2. The EEOC, or Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, is a federal agency charged with
administering complaints under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(b).
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her, and following her around the office.
During March of 1984, Retherford twice
complained to her supervisor and manager
of the retaliatory harassment from Gailey
and other co-workers. Two months later,
she wrote manager Bateson-Hough a letter complaining that Gailey continued to
harass her despite her requests that Gailey
leave her alone. The next day, May 10,
1984, Retherford submitted a written complaint to AT & T's Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") coordinator.
About five days later, Richard Salazar,
an AT & T employee and a CWA union
steward, called Retherford at home to discuss the complaint she had submitted.
Retherford testified that Salazar told her,
"You're the new kid on the block—you're
not going to win this. We don't know you
very well, but we do know Jolene [Gailey],
she is a respectable person in the community and an artist." He added, "Somebody
could get fired over this." Darlene
Anderson, a first-level manager of the
Wasatch office, also cautioned Retherford,
saying, "Just be careful what you say and
do; this is a strong and big group that you
are dealing with." Several weeks after
Retherford complained to the AT & T EEO
coordinator, she was attempting to cross
the street at 1:15 a.m. when Gailey sped
past her. When Retherford reached her
own car and drove away, Gailey followed
her for a few miles.
During June of 1984, Linda Johnston, an
AT & T employee who Retherford says is a
personal friend of Bateson-Hough's, investigated Retherford's complaint. Retherford said that Johnston's investigation consisted solely of personal interviews with
and submission of written statements by
Retherford and Gailey. About one month
later, Johnston submitted the EEO coordinator's report, which recommended that
Retherford and Gailey have as little contact
with each other as possible. Subsequently,
Retherford received a telephone call from
Reta Pehrson, an AT & T supervisor and
CWA vice president, who told her, "You
have to be satisfied with the [EEO coordinator's] decision
If anybody asks you
about it, don't tell them and don't say anything." Pehrson added, "Cathy [Bateson-

Hough] wanted me to also tell you that if
you would like a transfer, she will transfer
you to the Sundance Office."
Retherford stated in her affidavit that
the harassment in the Wasatch office did
not abate following the issuance of the
EEO coordinator's report and recommendations. At one point, Retherford overheard
an AT & T employee say to a group of coworkers, including defendant Johnson,
"Debi [Retherford] would make a good
stripper—she has big boobs." Looking directly at Retherford, Johnson replied, "My
bra size is 34B." Retherford said that
Gailey and other co-workers continued to
stare at her, walk close to her, follow her,
and make faces at her. She also said that
on at least one occasion, Gailey and Johnson accused Retherford of staring at them.
In late August of 1984, Retherford filed
a charge letter with the EEOC, alleging
that some of her co-workers had sexually
harassed her for a year and that AT & T
had done nothing to remedy the situation.
Several months later, Alfred Aros, an
EEOC investigator, called Retherford at
home to tell her that of the four witnesses
he had interviewed while investigating her
complaint, three had told him there was a
"lesbian problem" at the Wasatch office.
He said he intended to issue a warning to
AT & T management about this situation.
Around the same time, the AT & T EEO
coordinator surveyed the workers in the
Wasatch office about sexual harassment
and eventually issued a report concluding
that employees at the Wasatch office engaged in a great deal of sexually oriented
discussion, including many obscene jokes.
This report failed to curb the sexual atmosphere in the Wasatch office. Indeed,
Retherford testified in her affidavit that
after its issuance, the obscene jokes and
explicit sexual conversations increased in
frequency and offensiveness.
In late December of 1984, Retherford
again delivered a written complaint to
Bateson-Hough. Retherford says that
Bateson-Hough summoned her and told
her that the AT & T EEO coordinator had
issued a letter chastising both Retherford
and Gailey for their continued quarreling.
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She refused to show Retherford the letter.
Bateson-Hough also informed Retherford
that Retherford was on warning of dismissal and told her that AT & T would fire her
if she continued to complain about Gailey.
Retherford testified in her affidavit that
the abuse by her co-workers continued, exacerbated by the perception that she was
an informant. In Retherford's presence,
Johnson and others made various comments lamenting the fact that someone was
watching them and would report them if
they broke company rules. Following one
such comment, Johnson looked at Retherford and said, "Isn't that right, Debi?"
Retherford also said that Bateson-Hough
made no effort to protect her from this
retaliation. In fact, she said, BatesonHough rearranged the seating in the Wasatch office, placing Retherford next to
some of her harassers and assigning her to
"slow" work stations, which hampered her
productivity.
To cope with the stress of her work
place, Retherford began visiting a psychiatrist and a physician in the summer of
1985. In September of 1985, Retherford
says, she took medical disability leave to
recover from the stress and anxiety caused
by the harassment. Following her psychiatrist's instructions that she must not work
in proximity to "the people who started the
panic in her," she never returned to the
Wasatch office.
Retherford testified in her affidavit that
on or about March 12, 1986, Douglas Erickson, group manager of the Wasatch office,
and Vickie Randall, an AT & T employee
and union steward, called Retherford to tell
her that because she was medically incapable of returning to the Wasatch office, AT
& T was transferring her to its office in
Boise, Idaho. Erickson ordered her to report to her new assignment within ten
days. When Retherford protested that her
family obligations and medical treatment in
Salt Lake City prevented her from moving
to Boise on such short notice, Randall responded, "What do you expect us to do,
build you a new building?" Erickson then
advised Retherford that if she failed to

report to the Boise office within ten days,
AT & T would fire her.
Retherford did not report to Boise by the
deadline, and AT & T fired her on March
26, 1986. She filed a written grievance
with the CWA, Local 7704, on April 9th.
On September 29th, the vice president of
Local 7704 told Retherford that due to an
oversight on the part of the CWA, the
union had not submitted her grievance for
arbitration and that the time for processing
her grievance, as established by the bargaining agreement, had expired.
On July 21, 1988, two years and four
months after she was fired, Retherford
filed suit in United States District Court
for the District of Utah, alleging federal
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, - 3 , and
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and pendent
state UADA and common law claims. On
March 21, 1989, the court dismissed the
federal claims with prejudice as being untimely and dismissed the state claims without prejudice for lack of pendent jurisdiction. Retherford v. AT & T, No. C-88648W, slip op. (D.Utah Mar. 16, 1989) (unpublished).
On April 7, 1989, Retherford filed suit in
the Third Judicial District Court, alleging
the following: first, that AT & T fired her
in violation of Utah public policy, which
bars reprisals for reporting sexual harassment; second, that AT & T's discharging
her in retaliation for complaining of sexual
harassment violated a term of an employment contract implied from AT & T's code
of conduct; third, that AT & T was liable
for negligently employing Retherford's
sexual harassers; fourth, that BatesonHough, Johnson, and Randall intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on Retherford;
and fifth, that Bateson-Hough, Johnson,
and Randall maliciously interfered with
Retherford's contractual relations.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing
first, that Utah does not recognize a common law cause of action for discharge in
violation of public policy; second, that even
if Utah did recognize such a cause of action, federal and state anti-discrimination
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laws would preempt any such claim; third,
that as a matter of federal labor law, the
AT & T-CWA collective bargaining agreement barred Retherford's state claims;
fourth, that Retherford had failed to timely
assert her state law claims for negligent
employment, breach of implied contract,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and fifth, that Retherford had failed
to state a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress because the conduct she
alleged did not "offend against the generally accepted standards of indecency and immorality," as required by Utah case law.3
[1] Relying on affidavits in reaching its
decision, the trial court treated defendants'
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment. See Utah R.Civ.P. 12(c), 56(c).
The court entered judgment in favor of AT
& T, Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and
Randall, offering the following explanation
for the ruling:
[T]he Court having found that there are
no genuine issues of material fact; and
the Court having further determined that
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law . . . [,] Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, which is being treated as a
motion for summary judgment, is hereby
granted.4
Retherford appeals.
[2] Before addressing the merits, we
note the applicable standard of review.
Summary judgment is appropriate only
when no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, Utah
R.Civ.P. 56(c); Sandy City, 827 P.2d at
217-18; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; Landes
v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129
3. AT & T also argued that Bateson-Hough could
not be liable for interference with contractual
relations between Retherford and AT & T because she was an agent of one of the contracting
parties and that Retherford's pleadings failed to
state a claim that Johnson and Randall had
interfered with contractual relations. Because
of the result we reach in this case, we have no
cause to address these issues.
4. Such a blanket statement provides us with no
guidance as to the trial court's reasoning. It
therefore does not comply with rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires

(Utah 1990). Because a summary judgment resolves only questions of law, we
give no deference to the trial court's determinations. We affirm only if the decision
before us was correct. Sandy City, 827
P.2d at 218; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159;
Landes, 795 P.2d at 1129.
The present appeal requires that we examine the interplay between statutory
causes of action and common law tort and
contract causes of action for discharge in
retaliation for complaining of sexual
harassment. We first address the common
law. In the last decade, state courts have
shown a growing willingness to increase
employer exposure to suit for claims relating to the discharge of employees, a trend
that has taken a number of different
forms. James N. Dertouzos & Lynn A.
Karoly, Labor-Market Responses to Employer Liability viii (The RAND Institute
for Civil Justice 1992). In Utah, this court
has joined the national trend by converting
into a rebuttable presumption the common
law rule that absent an express agreement,
employment was at-will, see Berube v.
Fashion Centre, Ltd,, 111 P.2d 1033, 1044
(Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart,
J.); id, at 1051-52 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), by recognizing implied
employment contracts, see id. at 1044-46,
1049 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.);
id. at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring
in the result), and by adopting the tort of
discharge in violation of public policy, see
Peterson v. Brovming, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282
(Utah 1992) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart,
J.); id. at 1285 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring).
See generally Janet Hugie Smith & Lisa A.
Yerkovich, Utah Employment Law Since
Berube, Utah Bar J., Oct. 1992, at 15.
trial judges to issue brief written statements of
their grounds for granting summary judgment
when multiple grounds are presented. See Utah
R.Civ.P. 52(a). Although failure to issue a statement of grounds is not reversible error absent
unusual circumstances, we take this opportunity
to remind trial judges that the presumption of
correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings "has little operative effect when members
of this court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of the cryptic nature of its ruling." Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992).
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In making these changes to Utah's common law, we did not address the extent to
which the availability of preexisting statutory and contractual remedies for employers' malfeasance against employees would
affect the availability of these new common
law contract and tort causes of action.
Retherford puts this question squarely before us. She asserts only common law tort
and contract claims, apparently because the
statute of limitations has run on any claims
for relief she might have had under federal
and state antidiscrimination statutes, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Utah Code Ann. § 3435-7.1; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817,
1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and federal
labor law, see DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72,
103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983).
Her appeal presents the following novel
questions: First, when an employee has a
contractual right to be fired only for just
cause and therefore has a breach of contract claim if he or she can demonstrate
discharge on some other ground, such as
retaliation for exercising a legal right,
should we allow a common law tort action
for discharge in violation of public policy
that is based on the same facts that underlie the claim for breach of contract? Second, does the Utah Anti-Discriminatory
Act's exclusive remedy provision preempt
common law causes of action based on the
same facts necessary to prove a cause of
action under the statute, including common
law causes of action for discharge in violation of public policy, breach of implied contract, negligent employment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or malicious
interference with contract? Third, does
federal labor law preempt these same
claims? Fourth, if neither state nor federal statute preempts her claims against her
co-workers, is Retherford's assertion of
these claims timely? Fifth, if neither state
nor federal statute preempts Retherford's
claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, is the conduct Retherford alleges
sufficiently severe to satisfy the standard
we have set for this tort? We will discuss
each issue in turn.

[3] We begin with defendants' contention that we should not allow an employee
with an employment contract that protects
him or her from discharge without just
cause—a contract that would prohibit discharge in violation of public policy—to
maintain a common law tort action for discharge in violation of public policy. Defendants argue that because the facts Retherford alleges constitute a cause of action for
breach of her collective bargaining agreement's just-cause provision, she is precluded from seeking tort damages for the same
conduct.
The AT & T-CWA collective bargaining
agreement provides the premise for defendants' argument. It requires arbitration
for "[grievances arising out of or resulting
from the dismissal . . . of a regular employee," and it states that a dismissal "shall
stand unless it is established that the dismissal . . . was effected without just
cause"
(Emphasis added.) Defendants
contend that the concept of "just cause"
should exclude all reasons for discharge
that are inconsistent with public policy.
They argue that because the contractual
provision protecting an employee from all
but a just-cause dismissal protects the
same interests as a tort cause of action for
discharge in violation of public policy, no
purpose is served by permitting a discharged employee to proceed on the tort
claim when he or she has a contractual
cause of action. Defendants contend that
the contractual provision adequately vindicates the public policy underlying the tort
claim.
We disagree. Our recent decision in Peterson, which adopted a tort action for
discharges in violation of public policy and
was decided after the briefing and argument of the present case, requires rejection
of defendants' argument. As adopted in
Peterson, the tort of discharge in violation
of public policy differs in both scope and
sanction from any contractual provision
that might limit an employer's power to
discharge an employee for other than just
cause. See Peterson 832 P.2d at 1282-83,
1285 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.);
id. at 1285-86 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring).
Both respect for precedent and sound pub-
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lie policy compel the conclusion that the
tort of discharge in violation of public policy should be available to all employees,
regardless of their contractual status.
Our reasoning is as follows: First, the
logic of Peterson and of the earlier Berube
decision indicates that the cause of action
for discharge in violation of public policy
limits the power of all employers to discharge employees, without regard to
whether the employee is at-will or protected by an express or implied employment
contract. See id. at 1287 n. 2 (Zimmerman,
J., concurring and dissenting, joined by
Hall, C.J.); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043 n. 10
(Utah 1989) (opinion of Durham, J., joined
by Stewart, J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result). A primary purpose behind giving employees a right to
sue for discharges in violation of public
policy is to protect the vital state interests
embodied in such policies. We cannot fulfill such a purpose if we hinge this cause of
action on employees' contractual status and
thus limit its availability to any one class of
employees. See Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1287
n. 2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local
396, VIA Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 27
(1959).
[4] Second, not every discharge in violation of a contractual just-cause provision
rises to the level of a violation of public
policy. As Justice Durham pointed out in
Peterson, only those public policies that are
"clear" and ''substantial'' and arise from
statutes or constitutions qualify for vindication through the tort of discharge in violation of public policy. 832 P.2d at 1282.
Consequently, the overlap of a contractual
just-cause cause of action and a public policy tort cause of action is not as great as
defendants would have us believe.
[5] Finally, the vindication of public policy worked by the tort cause of action
cannot be accomplished by a contractual
provision that prohibits discharges for any
but just cause. Even when a contract prohibits conduct that also would violate public policy, the remedies for breach of that

contract would satisfy only the private interests of the parties to the agreement, i.e.,
by restoring a wrongfully discharged employee to his or her position and making
him or her whole. There is no reason to
expect that these remedies would be as
draconian as those that might be available
under the tort cause of action, remedies
that are designed not only to remedy the
breach and make the employee whole, but
to deter and punish violations of vital state
interests. While any employer violating a
contractual just-cause standard of dismissal should be liable for breaking its promise
to its employee, Peterson dictates that an
employer who violates clear and substantial
public policies should be liable for the more
expansive penalties of tort, a potentially
harsher liability commensurate with the
greater wrong against society. When an
employer's act violates both its own contractual just-cause standard and a clear
and substantial public policy, we see no
reason to dilute the force of the double
sanction. In such an instance, the employer is liable for two breaches, one in contract and one in tort. It therefore must
bear the consequences of both.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendants' argument. We hold that the tort
of discharge in violation of public policy is
a limitation on all discharges, not merely
an exception to the at-will doctrine. See
Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1287 n. 2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting, joined
by Hall, C.J.); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043 n.
10 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); see also Midgett v.
Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 I11.2d 143, 85
Ill.Dec. 475, 478-79, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 128384 (1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 909, 106
S.Ct. 278, 88 L.Ed.2d 243 (1985); Ewing v.
Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173,
1175 (1988); Lepore v. National Tool &
Mfg. Co., 224 NJ.Super. 463, 540 A.2d
1296, 1301 (1988), affd, 115 N.J. 226, 557
A.2d 1371, cert denied, 493 U.S. 954, 110
S.Ct. 366, 107 L.Ed.2d 353 (1989); cf Johnson v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 149 Cal.
App.3d 518, 196 Cal.Rptr. 896, 899 (1983);
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KMart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732
P.2d 1364, 1369-70 (1987).
We next turn to the UADA to determine
whether it preempts Retherford's common
law claims for discharge in violation of
public policy, breach of implied contract,
malicious interference with contract, negligent employment, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Retherford argues
that the UADA has no preemptive effect
because she hopes to avoid its provisions
and pursue her common law remedies.
[6] Our analysis of this question breaks
down into two subsidiary issues. First,
does the UADA preempt common law
causes of action for retaliation against an
employee for complaints of sexual harassment? Second, if the UADA does have this
preemptive effect, do the causes of action
Retherford alleges fall within the UADA's
preemptive scope? We discuss these questions in turn.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(11) (1988)
(amended 1990 & 1991) (current version at
§ 34-35-7.1(15)).* The 1985 exclusivity
provision, while listing specific grounds
that had been theretofore prohibited, did
not mention expressly the newly added prohibited action: employer retaliation against
employees who opposed prohibited employment practices. See 1985 Utah Laws ch.
189, § 4. In 1990, the legislature added
retaliation to the listed grounds covered by
the exclusivity provision. See 1990 Utah
Laws ch. 63, § 2.
In arguing that the UADA is not the
exclusive remedy for employer retaliation
against employees who oppose prohibited
discrimination, Retherford seizes upon the
fact that the exclusivity provision in effect
in 1986, when she was fired, did not expressly mention retaliation. She claims
that this omission excepts her common )aw
claims from the UADA's exclusivity provision. We disagree. We find that taken as
a whok, the plain text of the statute then
in effect preempts common law causes of
action for retaliation for complaints of employment discrimination. Furthermore, the
circumstances surrounding the 1990
amendment of the statute bolster this construction. We discuss our construction of
the statute below.

The starting place for a determination of
the preemptive effect of the UADA is the
statute itself. The legislature enacted the
UADA in 1969 as part of a comprehensive
state labor law scheme. See 1969 Utah
Laws ch. 85, §§ 160-67. As passed, the
statute neither prohibited employer retaliation against employees complaining of discrimination nor provided that the UADA
supplied the exclusive remedy for discriminatory or prohibited employment practices.
In 1985, the legislature added both a provision barring employer retaliation against
employees opposing any employment practices prohibited by the chapter, 1985 Utah
Laws ch. 189, § 3, and a provision making
the UADA's remedies exclusive, id. § 4.
The 1985 exclusivity provision read as foh
lows:
The procedures contained in this section
and Section 34-35-8 are the exclusive
remedy under state law for employment
discrimination because of race, color, sex,
age, religion, national origin, or handicap.

[7,8] As Retherford correctly notes,
the word "retaliation" does not appear in
the exclusivity provision in effect at the
time she was fired. She also correctly
notes that where statutory language is
plain and unambiguous, this court will not
look beyond it to divine legislative intent.
See Schurtz v. BMW of North Am., Inc.,
814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Allisen v.
American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d
806, 809 (Utah 1988). However, she neglects to mention that we interpret a statute as a whole, not piecemeal. See
Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112; Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah
1991); Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794
P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990); Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah

5. The exclusivity provision now reads, 'The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, re-

taliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancyrelated conditions, age, relation, national origin,
or handicap." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15)
(Supp.1992).
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1988); Peay v. Board of Ed. o/Provo City
School Dist, 14 Utah 2d 63, 66, 377 P.2d
490, 492 (1962). Consequently, we begin
by examining the statute as a whole.
Although the exclusivity provision itself
specifies only "discrimination," the statute
as a whole defines retaliation as "discrimination," thereby implicitly including retaliation within the exclusivity provision. Section 34-35-6(l)(a)(i) defines retaliation as a
"discriminatory or prohibited" employment
practice.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-356(l)(a)(i). One could argue that interpreting this provision as defining retaliation as
discrimination would slight the importance
of the words "or prohibited" in section 3435-6(l)(a)(i). However, this argument fails
in light of the fact that another section of
the statute defines "prohibited" employment practices as nothing more than those
"specified as discriminatory, and therefore
unlawful, in Section 34-35-6." Id. § 3435-2(7). Because sections 34-35-6(l)(a)(i)
and 34-35-2(7) together define retaliation
as nothing more than a form of prohibited
employment discrimination, retaliation
must fall within the section 34-35-7.1(11)
direction that the UADA's procedures "are
the exclusive remedy under state law for
employment discrimination." Id. § 34-357.1(11) (1988) (amended 1990 & 1991) (current version at § 34-35-7.1(15)). Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction,
we find that the version of the UADA in
effect at the time of Retherford's firing
was the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against an employee who complained of sexual harassment. We hold
that the UADA preempts common law
causes of action for discharge in retaliation
for complaints of employment discrimination. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735
F.Supp. 381, 386 (D.Utah 1990); cf. Wolk v.
Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 223-24
(3d Cir.1984); Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co.,
144 Cal.App.3d 514, 194 Cal.Rptr. 520, 523
(1983).
[9] As a final matter, we recognize that
the legislature's later amendment of the
exclusivity provision to prohibit retaliation
explicitly might indicate that the earlier
exclusivity provision had not included retal-

iation within its scope. However, Retherford has produced no evidence that the
legislature intended this amendment to
change the substantive law rather than
merely to clarify it. Our own research into
the history of this amendment has been
similarly unavailing. Absent some evidence to the contrary, we conclude that
taken as a whole, the version of the UADA
in effect at the time of Retherford's firing
defined retaliation as discrimination and
provided the exclusive remedy for this type
of discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of our statutory mandate to construe liberally statutes in derogation of the common law. See Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-2.
[10] Having determined that the UADA
is the exclusive remedy for a claim of employer retaliation for complaints of employment discrimination, we turn to the question of whether Retherford's tort and contract claims come within the scope of the
UADA's preemptive effect. This question
presents us with an apparently novel question in Utah: What analytical model should
determine when an exclusive statutory
cause of action preempts a common law
claim based on the same facts? Although
the Code provides that courts are to construe liberally statutes that are in derogation of the common law, see id. § 68-3-2,
and although we have considered that statute when examining the scope of statutorily created causes of action or duties, see,
e.g., Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135,113637 (Utah 1988); AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 29091 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Niblock v.
Salt Lake County, 100 Utah 573, 581-82,
111 P.2d 800, 804 (1941), we have yet to
propound a generic test for determining
when a statutory cause of action functions
as the exclusive remedy for the wrong,
thereby foreclosing enforcement of either a
preexisting common law remedy or a common law remedy recognized after the enactment of the statute.
Because we lack an analytical model to
answer this question, we have looked to
law outside our jurisdiction. Our research
has revealed a diversity of approaches.
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Courts have described at least three separate tests for determining the preemptive
effect of statutes on the common law.
First, in examining the very issue that confronts us now, the United States District
Court for the District of Utah decided that
the relevant inquiry was whether the common law cause of action was "based upon
the very conduct which is necessary to
prove sexual harassment or sex discrimination under the [UADA], namely, conduct
expressly prohibited by the Act
"
Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., No. 87C-0659G, slip op. at 12, 1988 WL 217350
{D.Utah Nov. 23, 1988) (unpublished).
Second, in similar contexts, other courts
have articulated a test grounded on what
can be termed "antecedent existence."
These courts hold that the statutory action
is the exclusive remedy if the common law
cause of action did not exist before the
statutory cause of action was created. See
Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 843
F.2d 359, 365 (9th Cir.1988); Froyd v.
Cook, 681 F.Supp. 669, 674 (E.D.Cal.1988);
Guevara v. K-Mart Corp., 629 F.Supp.
1189, 1191 (S.D.W.Va.1986); Mahoney v.
Crocker Natl Bank, 571 F.Supp. 287, 293
(N.D.Cal.1983); Register v. Coleman, 130
Ariz. 9, 633 P.2d 418, 423 (1981); Valley
Drive-In Theatre Corp. v. Superior
Court, 79 Ariz. 396, 291 P.2d 213, 215
(1955); cf Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels
Corp., 634 F.Supp. 684, 688 (D.Haw.1986).
Finally, in determining the preemptive
scope of workers' compensation statutes,
courts have established a test that inquires
whether the statutory scheme supplies an
indispensable element of the tort claim.
See Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass.
545, 413 N.E.2d 711, 716 (1980); Gambrell
v. Ka?zsas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.,
562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo.Ct.App.1978). We
have adopted this test in determining
whether the Utah workers' compensation
statute supplants common law causes of
6. In fact, we have employed a similar analysis
in the area of governmental immunities. See
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Insts., 782 P.2d
506, 511-12 (Utah 1989).
7. The Davis court's analysis of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by
sexual harassment highlights this uncertainty.

action for injuries on the job. See Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d
1055, 1058 (Utah 1991).
Because we see no reason why the indispensable element test should not apply to
the area before us as well as to workers'
compensation6 and because the other two
approaches appear to be cumbersome and
indeterminate, we hold that the indispensable element test is the correct analytical
model for determining whether a statutory
cause of action forecloses a common law
remedy. To explain this choice, we briefly
outline our objections to the other two models courts have followed in this area.
We begin with the federal district court's
test in Davis, under which the UADA
would preempt only "those common law
causes of action which are based upon the
very conduct which is necessary to prove [a
claim under the act]." Slip op. at 12. We
think that this test is simply too ambiguous. First, the Davis court itself seems
uncertain as to precisely how the test
should be applied. In considering whether
the UADA preempted several different
claims, the court articulated the standard
in varying and not wholly consistent ways.
At one point, the court found that the
UADA did not preempt a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress "because the theoretical basis [sic]
for the two claims are separate and distinct," id. at 21, while at another, the court
found that the UADA did not preempt a
claim for negligent supervision because it
"may encompass more than acts defined to
be 'discriminatory or prohibited employment practices' under the Utah Act," id, at
22. Second, we are unconvinced that inquiring whether a common Jaw cause of
action is broader than a statutory cause of
action will result in defensible distinctions
between those causes of action that are
preempted and those that are not.7 ConseThe court found that the UADA did not preempt
the claim because it went "beyond the discriminatory conduct prohibited by the Utah Act."
Davis, slip op. at 17. Apparently, the court
believed that the extra element of outrage made
the tort broader than the statutory claim. However, it could just as well be argued that the
c*tra element makes the tort narrower than the
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quently, we decline to adopt the Davis test
as the standard for determining preemption
in this state.
Similarly flawed is the test of antecedent
existence, which appears most developed in
California. This test focuses on timing.
The general rule is that if the common law
cause of action did not exist before the
statutory cause of action was created, the
statutory cause of action preempts the
common law. See Bernstein, 843 F.2d at
365; Froyd, 681 F.Supp. at 674; Guevara,
629 F.Supp. at 1191; Mahoney, 571 F.Supp.
at 293; Register, 633 P.2d at 423; Valley
Drive-in Theatre Corp., 291 P.2d at 215;
Strauss, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 522-23; Gay Law
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel & Tel. Co.,
24 Cal.3d 458, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 34, 595
P.2d 592, 612 (1979); Palo Alto-Menlo
Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara
County Transit Dist, 65 Cal.App.3d 121,
135 Cal.Rptr. 192, 197 (1976).
We reject the test of antecedent existence for two reasons. First, we are unsure of its scope. Despite the apparently
general statement of the rule, we cannot
tell whether, in fact, the rule applies to
anything other than a common law claim
for discharge in violation of public policy,
which is the usual context in which the rule
has been applied. See, e.g., Bernstein, 843
F.2d at 362-64; Froyd, 681 F.Supp. at 673
& n. 10; Mahoney, 571 F.Supp. at 292-93;
Strauss, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 522. The few
cases in which courts have addressed other
common law causes of action, ostensibly
under the antecedent existence test, are so
cryptic as to appear conclusory. See, e.g.,
Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 627
F.Supp. 434, 445 (N.D.Cal.1986); Diem v.
City & County of San Francisco, $8&
F.Supp. 806, 811-12 (N.D.Cal.1988). Although it is at least arguable that the rule
should not apply to such common law
claims as breach of contract, which generally predate state antidiscrimination statstatutory claim, i.e., that the UADA covers all
sexual harassment, whether or not it is inflicted
in a particularly egregious manner. Furthermore, recent critical commentary suggests that
sexual harassment on the job always constitutes
an intentional infliction of emotional distress.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the

utes, we have found no reasoned analysis
of this question.
This uncertainty contributes to our second reason for declining to adopt the test
of antecedent existence. At its logical extremes, the theory of antecedent existence
could infringe upon constitutional and statutory mandates. The United States Constitution protects against state interference
with contracts, see U.S. Const, art. I, § 10,
ch 1, and the Utah Constitution's open
courts provision restricts the extent to
which the state can limit common law remedies, see Utah Const, art. I, § 11. If the
test of antecedent existence applies to venerable common law remedies such as
breach of contract or malicious interference
with contract, it might trench upon these
constitutional provisions. Conversely, if
the test of antecedent existence is limited
to claims for discharge in violation of public policy, as suggested by a case in which
the court applied the test to a claim of
discharge in violation of public policy but
failed to consider the test's possible application to the plaintiff's other common law
claims, see Bernstein, 843 F.2d at 364-66,
we cannot reconcile it with Utah's statutory mandate to construe liberally statutes in
derogation of the common law, see Utah
Code Ann. § 68-3-2. In sum, we are reluctant to adopt a test of uncertain scope
when it may pose constitutional questions
git one extreme and statutory questions at
the other.
[11] We now turn to what we term the
indispensable element test, which we adopt
as the analytical model for determining
when a legislative enactment supplies the
exclusive remedy for a certain wrong. We
will avoid much of the vagueness and uncertainty that plague the Davis test and
the test of antecedent existence. The indispensable element test relies on neither timing nor conduct to determine preemption.
Law of Torts § 12, at 18 (Supp.1988). If sexual
harassment is per se outrageous and intolerable,
it is difficult to see how the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress can survive the
Davis test. As this example illustrates, the Davis
test is not a model of predictability or exactitude.
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Instead, under this test, preemption depends on " 'the nature of the injury for
which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not
the nature of the defendant's act which the
plaintiff alleges to have been responsible
for that injury.' " Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716
(quoting Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 168).
[12] An illustration is in order. In
Mounteer, 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991), in
which we adopted the indispensable element test in the context of workers' compensation, we applied the test as follows:
Initially, we identified the injury that the
workers' compensation statute is designed
to address, i.e., only physical and mental
injuries on the job. Id. at 1057. Then we
examined the elements of the plaintiffs
tort claims against his employer to determine whether physical or mental injury
was a necessary element of each cause of
action. Id. at 1058-59. This inquiry led us
to the following conclusions. First, we determined that the plaintiff's claim for slander did not require that the plaintiff prove
physical or mental injury; it required defamation, or injury to reputation, which was
not an injury the statute addressed. Consequently, we held that the nature of the
injury was not among those injuries protected by the statute and therefore the
8. Defendants have not argued that workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy for Retherford's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent employment.
However, we realize that the preceding discussion may raise questions about the application
of the Workers' Compensation Act to the present
case on remand. Therefore, we take this opportunity to clarify some potential areas of confusion. See Utah R.App.P. 30(a); State v. James,
819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991); Reeves v. Gentile,
813 P.2d 111, 119 (Utah 1991); Hiltsley v. Ryder,
738 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman,
J., concurring).
Regarding Retherford's claim against her fellow employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress, we have long held that an employee injured by the intentional tort of a fellow
employee may sue the fellow employee personally. See Bryan v. Utah Intl, 533 P.2d 892, 894
(Utah 1975). Therefore, the Workers' Compensation Act poses no bar to Retherford's suing
her fellow employees for intentional torts.
However, the Act's applicability to Retherford's claim against AT & T for negligent employment is less clear. We have yet to address
directly whether a plaintiff who is mentally or

Workers'Compensation Act did not provide
the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs
slander claim. Id. at 1058. Second, we
determined that the plaintiffs claims for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress did require that the plaintiff
prove mental injury because " 'mental
harm is the essence' of [those] tort[s]." Id.
(quoting Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716); see id.
at 1059. Because mental injury was
among those injuries addressed by the statute and because the plaintiff could not
prove intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress without proving mental
injury, we held that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy
for the plaintiffs mental distress.8
[13] Applying this analysis to the case
at hand, we begin with the task of determining what injuries the UADA is designed
to address. This purpose is revealed on the
face of the Act itself, which provides that it
is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
for an employer to refuse to hire, or
promote, or to discharge, demote, terminate any person, or to retaliate against,
or discriminate in matters of compensation or in terms, privileges, and condiphysically injured by the intentional torts of a
fellow employee can sue his or her employer for
negligent employment or whether workers'
compensation provides the exclusive remedy for
the employer's negligence. Neither the Act itself nor judicial interpretations of it in Utah or
elsewhere supply an explicit exception for the
tort of negligent employment in such an instance. Our ruling in Mounteer, based as it is
on an injury-oriented analysis rather than on an
analysis centered on the legal theory of the
claim, would suggest that workers' compensation would be an exclusive remedy. However,
because the parties have neither raised nor
briefed this issue, we decline to determine
whether there is nonetheless some reason to
allow the tort claim to go forward. In the event
that this issue develops on remand, we do note
that if Mounteer does not govern and workers'
compensation does not supply an exclusive remedy, our previous case law may provide some
guidance in determining AT & Ts liability for
Bateson-Hough's alleged intentionally tortious
conduct. We have already determined that a
managerial employee's tortious intent can be
imputed to his or her employer under certain
circumstances. See Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co.,
811 P.2d 151, 157 (Utah 1991).
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tions of employment against any person
otherwise qualified, because of race, color, sex, age, if the individual is 40 years
of age or older, religion, national origin,
or handicap.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(l)(a)(i) (amended
1989). From this language, we infer that
the legislature intended the UADA to address all manner of employment discrimination against any member of the specified
protected groups. As discussed above, the
legislature included employer retaliation
for complaining of employment discrimination within its definition of discrimination.
Thus, the next step in our analysis requires
us to determine whether employment discrimination, including employer retaliation,
supplies an indispensable element of any of
Retherford's causes of action.
[14,15] We begin with Retherford's
claim for discharge in violation of public
policy. In order to prove this tort, Retherford must show that AT & T discharged
her in a manner or for a reason that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy" of the State of Utah, a public policy
rooted in Utah's constitution or statutes.9
Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281; see also Berube, 111 P.2d at 1051 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result). The only possible source in Utah's statutes or constitution for a clear and substantial public policy allegedly violated by Retherford's dis9. In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear and substantial" to support a
cause of action for discharge in violation of
public policy, one must examine the strength of
the policy as well as the extent to which it
affects the public as a whole. The very words
"clear and substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As the majority of this court
recognized in Peterson, all statements made in a
statute are not expressions of public policy.
Many statutes merely regulate conduct between
private individuals or "'impose requirements
whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.'" Id. at 1282 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d
654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 217, 765 P.2d 373, 379
(1988)).
The following questions are relevant to determining whether a statute embodies a clear and
substantial public policy. First, one must ask
whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed to
the parties only. Second, one must inquire

charge is the UADA's prohibition of retaliation for good faith complaints of employment discrimination.10 See Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-35-2(15). Without deciding that the
statute at issue rises to the level of a clear
and substantial public policy, we find that
in the absence of this public policy declaration, Retherford would be unable even to
allege an action for this tort. Simply put,
if there were no UADA policy against retaliation, there could be no tort for discharge in violation of this public policy.
Applying the Mounteer test, it is plain that
the harm the UADA addresses is an indispensable element in Retherford's tort cause
of action; therefore, the UADA must
preempt this claim.
Moving to Retherford's other common
law causes of action, the Mounteer analytical model leads to the conclusion that the
UADA does not preempt these other
causes of action because discrimination is
not an indispensable element of these
claims. A more detailed discussion of the
elements of each of these claims is included
in the analysis of the federal labor law
preemption issue discussed below; however, for the purposes of determining the
state law preemption question, it is enough
to lay out the indispensable elements of
Retherford's remaining claims and to note
that none of them comprehends an injury
that is the target of the UADA.
whether the public interest is so strong and the
policy so clear and weighty that we should place
the policy beyond the reach of contract, thereby
constituting a bar to discharge that parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of
equal bargaining power. Since these are the
consequences of qualifying a policy as a basis
for the tort action, these considerations should
inform the evaluation of the policy itself. See
id. at 1288 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and
dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.); see also Foley,
765 P.2d at 379-80 & n. 12.
10. The UADA defines retaliatory conduct as follows:
"Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action
by an employer . . . against one of its employees . . . because he [or she] has opposed any
employment practice prohibited under this
chapter or because he [or she] has filed
charges, testified, assisted, or participated in
any way in any proceeding, investigation, or
hearing under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15).
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[16-19] The elements of Retherford's
claims are as follows: To prevail on a claim
of breach of implied contract, Retherford
must prove the existence of an implied
contract, created by mutual assent, and AT
& T's failure to comply with its terms."
See Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779
P.2d 668, 670 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v.
Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d
483, 485-86 (Utah 1989); Berube, 771 P.2d
at 1044-45; Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area
Community Action Program, 775 P.2d
940, 942-43 (Utah Ct.App.1989), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). To prevail
on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Retherford must prove that
her co-workers either intentionally or recklessly engaged in intolerable and outrageous conduct that caused her severe emotional distress. See Samms v. Eccles, 11
Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47
(1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315,
1317 (Utah CtApp. 1990). To prevail on her
claim of malicious interference with contractual relations, Retherford must prove
that her co-workers, whether separately or
in conspiracy, intentionally and improperly
persuaded AT & T to breach its implied
employment contract with Retherford.12
See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v.
Jsom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d
597, 602 (1962). And to prevail on her

claim of negligent employment, Retherford
must prove that AT & T's negligence in
hiring, supervising, or retaining its employees proximately caused her harm. See
Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49,
51-52, 386 P.2d 910, 911-12 (1963).
Noticeably absent from this list of the
indispensable elements of the four claims is
an injury that is a target of the UADA:
retaliation for complaints of sexual harassment. While it is true that all four claims
arise out of defendants' retaliatory conduct, preemption depends on the nature of
the injury, not on the nature of the conduct
allegedly responsible for that harm. See
Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716. The injuries
Retherford alleges—the broken promise,
the mental anguish, the wrongful interference with her contract, and the unchecked
misconduct of her fellow employees—are
distinct from the injury of retaliation. Because Retherford would be able to maintain
these claims without alleging retaliatory
harassment, we hold that under the Mounteer test, the UADA does not preempt
Retherford's claims for breach of implied
contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, tortious interference with contract
> an<* negligent employment.
Having determined that the UADA
preempts only Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of public policy, we next
address whether federal labor law

11. As discussed more fully above, the UADA
does not preempt Retherford's cause of action
for breach of implied contract because none of
the indispensable elements of this claim implicates an injury targeted by the UADA. However, even if there were an overlap between the
indispensable elements of the contract claim
and the injury addressed by the statute, that
overlap would not dispose of the question of
preemption. When dealing with the realm of
contracts, we must add another step to our
preemption analysis. First, we must examine,
as we do with all common law causes of action,
whether the statute at issue supplies an indispensable element of the breach of contract
claim. If not, our analysis is at an end. If so,
we must proceed to the second step, applicable
only to contract claims. This step is premised
on the unique nature of contracts. Tort law
embodies statements of public policy, and therefore it is appropriate for a statutory policy to
preempt a judicially declared policy. Contracts,
by contrast, involve voluntary private agreements that our society endows with the force of

law. Before we can interfere with the enforcement of this private agreement, we must find
that the private agreement offends the public
policy embodied in the statute, offends it so
severely that it requires striking the term or
clause as unenforceable. Consequently, the second step for determining preemption of a contract claim is whether public policy forbids parties to contract on such a subject, for such a
remedy, or in such a manner.
12. Retherford's complaint does not specify
whether she is alleging interference with her
collective bargaining agreement or with her
contract implied from the code of conduct. Because the federal Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), would preempt any
claim that defendants interfered with Retherford's collective bargaining agreement, see
Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild
of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372. 377-78
(3d Cir.1981), we interpret her complaint as
alleging interference with her implied contract
of employment.
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preempts any of Retherford's remaining
causes of action. We recap the substance
of these remaining claims. Retherford alleges that, first, AT & T's failure to prevent retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment breached a contract implied
from AT & T's code of conduct; second,
Gailey, Randall, Johnson, and BatesonHough maliciously interfered with her contractual relations, resulting in AT & T's
breach of its implied contract prohibiting
reprisal for good-faith complaints of sexual
harassment; third, Gailey, Randall, Johnson, and Bateson-Hough intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her through
their retaliatory conduct; and fourth, AT &
T negligently employed Retherford's harassers, thereby allowing them to inflict emotional distress on her.
The legislative enactment that determines the federal preemption question is
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), which reads as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) [hereinafter section 301].
On its face, it is not apparent that section
301 preempts state law. Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct.
1904, 1909, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (19851 However, the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted section 301 as not only providing federal jurisdiction over controversies
involving collective bargaining agreements,
but also as vesting exclusive power in "federal courts to fashion a body of federal law
for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements/' Textile Workers
Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, 915,
1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); accord Allis-Chal-

mers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210, 105 S.Ct. at
1910; Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04, 82 S.Ct.
571, 577, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962); see also
Sperver v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d
1025, 1027 (Utah 1987).
The policy underlying this expansive interpretation of section 301 is well-founded.
If the terms of collective bargaining agreements were subject to differing interpretations by state and federal courts, it could
severely disrupt both the negotiation and
the administration of collective bargaining
agreements. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at
103, 82 S.Ct. at 576. To avoid this possibility, the Court held that the meaning to be
given to the terms of collective bargaining
agreements must be determined exclusively by uniform federal law. Id. at 103-04,
82 S.Ct. at 577; see Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
471 U.S. at 210, 105 S.Ct. at 1910.
[20] An elaboration on this doctrine of
federal exclusivity in the interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements is the Supreme Court's conclusion that section 301
preempts any common law cause of action
where the trial court, in adjudicating that
cause of action, must interpret the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement. See
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881,
100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). In essence, the
Supreme Court has held that section 301
preempts any common law claim that is
" 'substantially dependent on analysis of a
collective bargaining agreement,'" Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395,
107 S.Ct. 2425, 2431, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987)
(quoting International Bhd. of Electric
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S.
851, 859 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 2167 n. 3, 95
L.Ed.2d 791 (1987)), lest the common law
provide a vehicle for state courts to intrude
into the exclusive federal preserve that is
the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements. The justification for this expansive view of section 301 preemption is
the ease with which an aggrieved employee
otherwise could turn a suit for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement into a
state tort or contract claim, thereby obtain-
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ng a state law holding that might result in
i inconsistent interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. As the Court
has explained:
The interests in interpretive uniformity
and predictability that require that laborcontract disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require that the
meaning given a contract phrase or term
be subject to uniform federal interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what
the parties to a labor agreement agreed,
and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that
agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether
such questions arise in the context of a
suit for breach of contract or in a suit
alleging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate form over substance
and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach
of contract.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 211, 105
S.Ct. at 1911.
[21] The question before us, then, is
whether resolution of the state law claim
depends upon the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. If it does,
section 301 preempts the state law cause of
action. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06, 108
S.Ct. at 1881. However, "even if dispute
resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state
law, on the other, would require addressing
precisely the same set of facts, as long as
the state-law claim can be resolved without
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim
is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301
pre-emption purposes." Id. at 409-10, 108
S.Ct. at 1883. Under such circumstances,
there is no section 301 preemption.

ford's claims indeed depends upon the
meaning of the collective bargaining agreement, we must examine the discrete elements of each claim. See Douglas v.
American Info. Technologies Corp., 877
F.2d 565, 570 (7th Cir.1989).
We first address Retherford's claim for
breach of implied contract. Defendants argue that section 301 bars Retherford's implied contract claim because the state court
must interpret the collective bargaining
agreement in order to determine whether
the AT & T code of conduct upon which the
claim is based is separate from or subsumed into the collective bargaining agreement. We hold that Retherford's implied
contract claim is inactionable, but on somewhat different grounds. See Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246
(Utah 1992).
Under federal labor law, only duly authorized union representatives can bargain for
the terms and conditions of employment
for those within the bargaining unit. See
29 U.S.C. § 159(a); cf. Caterpillar Inc.,
482 U.S. at 397, 107 S.Ct. at 2432. The
Supreme Court has held that although any
employee or group of employees can reach
a separate agreement with the employer,
that separate contract must be consistent
with the collective bargaining agreement
negotiated by the union. J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339, 64 S.Ct. 576, 581,
88 L.Ed. 762 (1944); see also NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,
180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2006, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123,
reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 892, 88 S.Ct. 13, 19
L.Ed.2d 202 (1967). Thus, inconsistent separate agreements are not enforceable. See
Eitmann v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.,
730 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
469 U.S. 1018,105 S.Ct. 433, 83 L.Ed.2d 359
(1984).

[22] Defendants argue that the Lingle
test bars Retherford's claims of breach of
implied contract, tortious interference with
contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligent employment because evaluation of the state claims is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of
the terms of the labor contract." In order
to determine whether resolution of Rether-

In applying this rule, at least two federal
circuits have found unenforceable separate
agreements that were more favorable to
the individual employees than the collective
bargaining agreement. See Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283,
1285-86 (9th Cir.1989); Eitmann, 730 F.2d
at 362-63. For example, the Ninth Circuit
has held that an employee whose collective
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bargaining agreement defined his tenure as
at-will could not enforce an implied contract for just-cause dismissal because the
extra protections would contradict the collective bargaining
agreement.
See
Chmiel, 873 F.2d at 1285.
We think that the policy underlying these
decisions is sound. Nothing could undermine the authority of the collective bargaining unit more thoroughly than allowing individuals or cohorts of employees to
enforce separate contracts that were more
advantageous to those employees than was
the collective bargaining agreement itself.
Although the interests of individual employees may be slighted in the process,
Congress apparently is of the view that
such sacrifices are necessary in order to
match the power of the employer with the
aggregate power of unionized employees.
Cf Lodge 76, InVl Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 146, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 2556, 49
L.Ed.2d 396 (1976); Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. at 2006; /./.
Case, 321 U.S. at 338-39, 64 S.Ct. at 581.
See generally Annotation, Collective Bargaining Under Labor Relations Act as
Related to Freedom of Contract Between
Employer and Individual Employees, 88
L.Ed. 770 (1944). Accordingly, we decline
to upset this balance by allowing individual
agreements to undercut the union as the
bargaining agent. In the instant case, providing any remedy under an implied contract when no remedy is available under
the collective bargaining agreement—because the time for arbitration has passed—
obviously would put Retherford in a more
advantageous position than AT & T employees bound by the collective bargaining
agreement, thereby undermining the collective bargaining unit. Consequently, Retherford's alleged implied contract is unenforceable.
13. Although Retherford stipulated to Gailey's
dismissal upon Gailey's declaration of bankruptcy, Gailey's absence from this suit does not
affect Retherford's ability to prove Gailey's tortious conduct in order to find AT & T liable for
negligent employment. It merely prevents

[23] Our holding that Retherford's implied contract is invalid requires us to find
that her claim for malicious interference
with contract is similarly defective. Although some courts have held that the
contract at issue in a case for malicious
interference need not be enforceable,
courts generally agree that the contract
must not be illegal or contrary to public
policy. See generally 45 Am.Jur.2d Interference §§ 8-9 (1969 & Supp.1992). Allowing a plaintiff to sue for malicious interference with a contract that is invalid would
gut the federal policy of consolidating bargaining power in union representatives.
Consequently, we affirm the summary
judgment on Retherford's claim for malicious interference with contract, albeit on
grounds different from those relied upon
by the trial court.
[24] Having determined that the LMRA
bars Retherford's claims stemming from
her implied contract, we next consider her
tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent employment.
We begin with her claim for emotional distress because AT & T can be held liable for
negligent employment only if its employees
Randall, Johnson, Gailey,13 and BatesonHough are liable for an independent tort.
See Focke v. United States, 597 F.Supp.
1325, 1344 (D.Kan.1982); Mulhern v. City
of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 799 P.2d 15,18
(Ct.App.1990). See generally Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 213 (1958). Here,
Retherford alleges that AT & T's employees committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[25] To sustain her claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, Retherford
must show that (i) Gailey's, Randall's,
Johnson's, and Bateson-Hough's conduct
was outrageous and intolerable in that it
offended against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality; (ii) they
intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emoRetherford from seeking damages from Gailey^
personally. Any finding that Gailey engaged in}]
tortious conduct would, of course, have no pre-J
elusive effect in a subsequent suit against Gailey J
herself.
'"*•
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tional distress; (iii) Retherford suffered severe emotional distress; and (iv) their conduct proximately caused Retherford's emotional distress. See Samms v. Eccles, 11
Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47
(1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315,
1317 (Utah Ct.App.1990). To decide whether this tort claim is preempted, we must
determine whether, on the record before
us, there is any basis for concluding that
defendants' conduct alleged to provide a
basis for the tort claim might reasonably
implicate any of the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. See Lingle, 486
U.S. at 405-06, 108 S.Ct. at 1881.
A necessary element of Retherford's
claim is that Bateson-Hough's, Gailey's,
Randall's, and Johnson's behavior was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended
against the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality. See Samms, 11
Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347. Before
analyzing this tort under the test for section 301 preemption, it is helpful to identify
the conduct that Retherford alleges, Retherford details the conduct of each co-worker as follows: With respect to BatesonHough, Retherford contends that BatesonHough responded to her complaining of
sexual harassment by requiring her to sit
next to Gailey, telling her she had a letter
sanctioning her and Gailey, assigning her
to certain "slow" work stations that hampered her productivity, reprimanding and
criticizing her, and threatening to fire her
if she continued to complain about Gailey.

ing her around the office Finally, Johnson
also may have been among the group of
Gailey's friends who discomfited Retherford by their staring and their threatening
facial expressions. The record shows that
on at least one occasion, Johnson accused
Retherford of staring at her. Retherford
also alleges that in her presence, Johnson
and others lamented the fact that someone
was watching them and would report them
if they broke company rules. After one
such comment, Johnson looked at Retherford and said, "Isn't that right, Debi?"
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Retherford, as we must, see Rollins
v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah
1991), we accept for the purposes of this
appeal that Retherford has alleged at least
that Randall and Johnson made a habit of
following her and mocking her after she
complained of Gailey's sexual harassment.
Defendants argue that section 301
preempts Retherford's claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress because a
court deciding whether this conduct was
intolerable and outrageous must interpret
the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether Bateson-Hough exceeded
her supervisory authority and whether Gailey's, Randall's, and Johnson's work-place
conduct was improper. We agree in part.

As for Gailey, Retherford alleges that
Gailey avenged Retherford's complaint to
the AT & T EEO coordinator by following
her, making threatening faces at her, and
speeding by her late at night when she was
trying to cross the street.14 As for
Randall, Retherford charges that Randall
told her she must report to Boise within ten
days or lose her job. In addition, although
the record is ambiguous, Randall may have
been among Gailey's friends who retaliated
against Retherford by staring at her, making "threatening facial expressions" at her,
walking extremely close to her, and follow-

[26] In considering section 301 preemption of tort claims alleging infliction of
emotional distress by a supervisor or fellow
employee, courts seem to have distinguished between situations in which the
defendant has misused his or her authority
under a collective bargaining agreement to
torment the plaintiff and situations in
which the defendant has inflicted the distress through conduct that is purely personal and does not implicate the exercise of
supervisory authority. See Paradis v.
United Technologies Pratt & Whitney
Div., 672 F.Supp. 67, 71 (D.Conn.1987).
Compare Douglas, 877 F.2d at 571-72 and
Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854
F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir.1988) and
Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784
F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (9th Cir.1985) with

14. Because Retherford claims only retaliatory
harassment, not sexual harassment, we will not

consider evidence of Gailey's unwelcome sexual
advances.
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Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways of Delaware, Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 136-38 (7th
Cir.1987) and Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 817 F.2d 536, 539-40 (9th Cir.), cert,
denied, 484 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 251, 98
L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) and Garibaldi v. Lucky
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1369 n. 4
(9th Cir.1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1099,
105 S.Ct. 2319, 85 L.Ed.2d 839 (1985).
The Douglas and Keehr cases, both from
the Seventh Circuit, illustrate this distinction. In Douglas, the plaintiff charged her
employer with "extreme and outrageous"
treatment because of the employer's allegedly arbitrary denials of her requests for
days off, an "unjustified" final warning,
and "unwarranted and excessive" scrutiny
of her work. 877 F.2d at 572. The Seventh Circuit concluded that a state court
would have to interpret the collective bargaining agreement's provisions regulating
the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's
employment to determine whether the employer's actions were indeed arbitrary, unjustified, unwarranted, and excessive. It
therefore held that section 301 barred
Douglas's state tort claim. Id. at 572-73.
In contrast, the Keehr court found that
section 301 did not preempt a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
There, Keehr complained that a company
supervisor had engaged him in an altercation during which the supervisor allegedly
made outrageous comments about the sexual activities of Keehr's wife, and the verbal abuse escalated into a fist fight. 825
F.2d at 135. The court reasoned that there
was no section 301 preemption because the
supervisor's abuse of the employee could
not reasonably be seen as implicating the
supervisor's authority under the collective
bargaining agreement, even though it
would have been possible for Keehr to file
a grievance against his supervisor for using abusive language. Id. at 137-38.
We find that this distinction has merit
and apply it to Retherford's emotional distress claim. Retherford's allegations that
Randall ordered her to report to Boise
within ten days or lose her job and that
Bateson-Hough reprimanded Retherford,
warned her to stop complaining, told her

where to sit, and assigned her certain tasks
raise questions about their respective authority under the collective bargaining
agreement. Therefore, to the extent that
this conduct constitutes a ground for the
claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, section 301 preempts Retherford's
cause of action.
However, other allegations regarding the
conduct of Gailey, Randall, and Johnson
can withstand the section 301 preemption
analysis. Specifically, Retherford alleges
that Gailey responded to Retherford's complaint to the AT & T EEO coordinator with
conduct ranging from following her around
the office to attempting to frighten her as
she crossed the street. She alleges that
Randall and Johnson retaliated by following her and making threatening faces at
her. Such alleged behavior raises issues of
purely personal misconduct. Evaluating
the severity and the consequences of this
conduct in order to adjudicate Retherford's
claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress should require no interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement.
These allegations are analogous to those in
Keehr, not to those in Douglas. To the
extent that Retherford's tort claim is premised upon allegations of purely personal
misconduct, as opposed to misconduct under color of possible contractual authority,
section 301 does not preempt the cause of
action.
[27] Having determined that Gailey,
Johnson, and Randall may be held liable for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without implicating the collective bargaining agreement, we turn to the
question of whether Retherford can hold
AT & T liable for Gailey's, Johnson's, and
Randall's behavior under a theory of negligent employment without running afoul of
section 301 preemption. The issue is
whether, in determining AT & T's liability
under this claim, a court could avoid determining any issue that would implicate the
collective bargaining agreement.
[28] Negligent employment is a tort of
some novelty in Utah. Although we have
recognized this cause of action, see Clover
v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,

RETHERFORD v. AT&T COMMUNICATIONS

Utah

973

Cite as 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992)

1048 (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989),
Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49,
51, 386 P.2d 910, 911-12 (1963), our cases
do not describe its elements in detail. Consequently, we look to other jurisdictions to
provide a detailed description of this tort.
To prevail on her claim of negligent employment against AT & T, Retherford must
show that (i) AT & T knew or should have
known that its employees posed a foreseeable risk of retaliatory harassment to third
parties, including fellow employees; (ii) the
employees did indeed inflict such harm;
and (iii) the employer's negligence in hiring,
supervising, or retaining the employees
proximately caused the injury.15 See, e.g.,
Pruitt v. Pavelin, 141 Ariz. 195, 685 P.2d
1347, 1354-55 (CtApp. 1984); Kassman v.
Busfield Enters., Inc., 131 Ariz. 163, 639
P.2d 353, 356-57 (Ct.App.1981); Najera v.
Southern Pac. Co., 191 Cal.App.2d 634, 13
Cal.Rptr. 146, 149 & n. 3 (1961); Destefano
v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287-88 (Colo.
1988); Tatham v. Wabash R.R., 412 111.
568, 107 N.E.2d 735, 739 (1952); Plains
Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 682
P.2d 653, 662 (1984); LaBonte v. National
Gypsum Co., 113 N.H. 678, 313 A.2d 403,
405 (1973); F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M.
697, 594 P.2d 745, 746-49 (1979); Valdez v.
Warner, 106 N.M. 305, 742 P.2d 517, 51920 (CtApp.), cert, quashed sub nom. Z &
E, Inc. v. Valdez, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d
1058 (1987); Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 688 P.2d 333,
339-41 (CtApp.), writ quashed, 101 N.M.
555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984); Kelley v. Oregon
Shipbuilding Corp., 183 Or. 1, 189 P.2d
105, 106-07 (1948); Chesterman v. Barmon, 82 Or.App. 1, 727 P.2d 130, 131-32,

affd and remanded, 305 Or. 439, 753 P.2d
404 (1988); Dempsey v. Walso Bureau,
Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 246 A.2d 418, 419-22
(1968); Banks v. Nordstrom, Inc., 57
Wash.App. 251, 787 P.2d 953, 960 (1990).
See generally Kenneth R. Wallentine, Negligent Hiring: The Dual Sting of PreEmployment Investigation, Utah Bar
Journal, October 1989, at 15; Donald K.
Armstrong, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: The Case Against Exclusion, 52 Or.LRev. 296, 298-300 (1973);
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213
(1958); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 317 (1965).
For the purposes of this discussion, we
will assume that Retherford can prove that
Gailey, Randall, and Johnson intentionally
inflicted emotional distress upon her. Also
we note that because the tort of negligent
employment can impose liability on the employer even when the employer would not
otherwise be liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, we have no need to
consult the collective bargaining agreement
to determine whether Gailey, Randall, and
Johnson were acting in the scope of their
employment. See Clover, 808 P.2d at 1048;
Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1059.

15. Because the tort of negligent employment
has received little explication in our cases, we
take this opportunity to provide some background. The causes of action variously termed
"negligent hiring." "negligent supervision," and
"negligent retention" are all basically subsets of
the general tort of negligent employment. See
generally 53 AmJur.2d Master and Servant
§§ 212, 422 (1970 & Supp.1992). These variants
differ only in that they arise at different points
in the employment relationship. By way of
. illustration only, we offer the following: a daycare provider who knowingly or negligently
hires a convicted child molester might be liable

for negligent hiring, see Broderick v. King's Way
Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1221
(Alaska 1991), while a day-care provider who
unwittingly hires a convicted child molester but
retains him or her once his or her record and
proclivities become apparent might risk liability
for negligent retention. In both instances, once
the day-care provider knows of the child molester's background, it might be liable for negligent
supervision if it: allows him or her unsupervised
interaction with the children in its care. See
generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213
(1958).

Defendants argue that a state court cannot determine the elements of the tort—
i.e., that AT & T knew or reasonably
should have known that Gailey, Randall,
and Johnson posed a hazard of such tortious conduct and could have taken steps to
avoid this hazard—without referring to any
provision of the collective bargaining
agreement. Defendants insist that the
court will have to resort to the collective
bargaining agreement's termination and
discipline provisions to determine whether
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AT & T acted "appropriately'' in dealing
with Gailey, Johnson, and Randall. We
cannot agree that the record before us
makes clear that the trial court must resort
to the collective bargaining agreement to
adjudicate this claim.
[29] In analyzing this issue, we first
note that AT & T misunderstands the
source of its duty to control the conduct of
its employees. AT & T suggests that this
obligation arises from the collective bargaining agreement. This is incorrect. The
employer's duty toward those people whom
its employees place in a position of reasonably foreseeable risk or injury does not
stem from its private employment contract.
Cf. Valdez, 742 P.2d at 519. Instead, it is a
duty imposed by the common law of the
state. The common law of tort expresses
public policy, the scope of which is not
generally determined by reference to privately contracted obligations. Certainly,
we may vindicate some public policies by
implying them as covenants to private contracts. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985).
However, such covenants are judicial creations that express public policy and constitute public law; they are not private agreements between private parties, and they
are not avoidable by contract. See id. at
801 n. 4.
In the present case, the duty that Retherford relies upon arises from the public law
of tort, not from the private collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the existence of the duty and the determination of
its scope do not require resort to any term
of the collective bargaining agreement.
Other duties might be due to Retherford
and other employees by reason of the collective bargaining agreement, but their existence is not relevant to the duty inquiry
for purposes of the tort of negligent employment.
It is true, however, that in an action for
negligent employment, the plaintiff must
show that the employer's failure to fulfill
16. As this case develops on remand, it may
become apparent that the trial court may have
to resort to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. If this occurs, defendants are
free to raise the question of preemption with the
trial court, which should determine the issue.

the duty owed the injured party in hiring,
supervising, or retaining the malfeasing
employee proximately caused the injury of
which the plaintiff complains. In making
this factual determination, a court might
have to resort to the collective bargaining
agreement to discover whether contractual
limitations on the power of the employer to
deal with the employee precluded it from
taking steps to prevent the harm. Although such an eventuality might raise
questions of section 301 preemption, the
defendants in the present case have made
no showing that the trial court, in adjudicating this particular matter, would have to
refer to the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether AT & T could
have prevented Gailey's, Johnson's, and
Randall's allegedly tortious acts. It is not
enough that we might imagine a situation
where a court might have to make such a
reference. There must be a realistic possibility that it may occur. Because defendants have not shown any such realistic
possibility, we hold that there is no section
301 preemption of the claim for negligent
employment.16
To summarize the preemptive effects of
state and federal statutes on Retherford's
claims, the UADA preempts only Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of
public policy, while the LMRA preempts
Retherford's claims for breach of implied
contract and malicious interference with
contract and partially preempts her claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We therefore affirm the trial
court's summary judgment against Retherford on those preempted claims. The only
claims to survive state and federal preemption are Retherford's claim for negligent
employment and the part of her emotional
distress claim that alleges purely personal
misconduct on the part of Gailey, Johnson,
and Randall.
We now examine defendants' objections
to Retherford's nonpreempted causes of acIf the court finds section 301 preemption, the
preempted portion of the claim must be dismissed. Today, we hold only that it is improper
to find preemption on the basis of unsupported
speculation as to how a case may evolve.

RETHERFORD v. AT&T COMMUNICATIONS

Utah

975

Cite aj 844 P J d 949 (Utah 1992)

tion for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and negligent employment. First,
defendants argue that Retherford's claims
of negligent employment and intentional
infliction of emotional distress are untimely. Second, they argue that the conduct
alleged is insufficient as a matter of law to
support a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. We discuss
these arguments in turn.
Defendants base their untimeliness contention on section 78-12-25(3)'s four-year
period of limitations. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25(3). Defendants argue that the
four years began to run May 10, 1984,
when Retherford's submission of a written
complaint to the AT & T EEO coordinator
first indicated that she thought she was
being harassed. Because more than four
years had elapsed by April 7, 1989, when
Retherford filed her state action, defendants claim that she failed to file her
claims of negligent employment and intentional infliction of emotional distress in a
timely manner. We disagree.
[30] The question presented is whether,
taking the facts in a light most favorable to
Retherford, the statute of limitations ran
before April 7, 1989. Defendants contend
that as a matter of law, the statute began
to run at the time of the first complaint.
Under Utah law, the statute of limitations
begins to run when the cause of action
accrues. See id. § 78-12-1; Davidson
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv.,
Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). A tort
cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and the claim is
actionable. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc.,
794 P.2d at 19; see State Tax Comm'n v.
Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 181, 100 P.2d
575, 577 (1940). In order to determine
when the limitations period began to run,
then, we must determine when each of the
causes of action became actionable in the
courts.
[31] We begin with Retherford's claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because of the nature of this cause
of action, it can be difficult to determine
when all its elements—intentional, outrageous conduct proximately causing ex-

treme distress—have come into being. Of
particular difficulty is the element of injury—extreme emotional distress. Sometimes, to be sure, a single outrageous incident, such as an egregiously vicious practical joke, see Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1965), results in
immediate and easily identifiable emotional
distress. Often, however, emotional distress does not so much occur as unfold—
for example, where a defendant subjects a
plaintiff, not to a single outrageous act, but
to a pattern or practice of acts tolerable by
themselves though clearly intolerable in
the aggregate.
[32] Here, Retherford alleges a pattern
of retaliatory harassment. Such patterns
present courts with the difficult task of
identifying when during a series of related
acts the element of emotional distress "occurred." We have been unable to locate
authority that is directly on point concerning the application of statutes of limitation
to a pattern of conduct that constitutes, in
the aggregate, intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, we find the
treatment of claims of alienation of affections instructive in this regard. In adjudicating such claims, which often allege a
series of wrongful acts over a substantial
period of time, courts have determined that
the statute of limitations begins to run
when the alienation is accomplished, i.e.,
when love and affection are finally lost.
See e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 244 Ark. 327,
424 S.W.2d 871, 874 (1968); Dobrient v.
Ciskowski, 54 Wis.2d 419, 195 N.W.2d 449,
451 (1972); see also Flink v. Simpson, 49
Wash.2d 639, 305 P.2d 803, 804 (1957);
Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wash.App. 13, 510
P.2d 250, 254 (1973). Applying this standard by analogy, we hold that the statute
of limitations for intentional infliction of
emotional distress does not begin to run
until the distress is actually inflicted, i.e.,
when the plaintiff suffers severe emotional
disturbance.
[33] Although easy to describe, this
standard is difficult to apply, particularly
because the element of emotional distress
is specific to the plaintiff in each case.
Because the tort of intentional infliction of
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emotional distress requires actual emotional distress, see Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46(1) (1965), this element is to be
gauged subjectively.17 A particularly hardy or calloused plaintiff may never accrue
a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, even though he or
she is subjected to outrageous conduct that
no reasonable person could be expected to
bear. Consequently, our task is to determine when, given these allegations, Retherford experienced severe emotional distress,
not when an ordinarily sensitive person
would have experienced such suffering.
The record before us identifies this moment.18 In September of 1985, after almost eighteen months of retaliatory abuse
by her co-workers, during which she re17. For the guidance of the bench and bar, we
make clear that while the standard for determining whether a plaintiff has experienced
emotional distress is subjective, the standard for
determining the outrageousness of the alleged
conduct is objective. Consequently, a plaintiff
claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must show both that a reasonable person
would consider the alleged conduct to be outrageous and that the plaintiff actually experienced
subjective severe emotional anguish because of
this objectively outrageous conduct.
18. We realize that not all cases will reveal so
clearly the point at which the plaintiffs actually
experienced emotional distress. Although we
do not at this time adopt their analysis, we note
that courts facing similar difficulties in adjudicating Title VII claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2,
have enunciated a theory of continuing violation in order to allow plaintiffs to recover for
patterns of employment discrimination. Like
intentional infliction of emotional distress, employment discrimination often manifests itself
as a series of small wrongful acts instead of one
dramatic injustice. Indeed, changing attitudes
toward minorities and women in the work place
may have contributed to the incidence of longterm patterns of employment discrimination because as social opprobrium of racial and sexual
harassment has increased, people may have become more subtle in acting on or expressing
their prejudices. While a defendant may be
able to dismiss separate acts of subtle discrimination as merely coincidences or attempts at
humor, an examination of these acts as a whole
often will reveal their underlying pattern of
malignity. To address these patterns, courts
adjudicating Title VII claims allow recovery for
an entire pattern of employment discrimination
so long as one act of the continuing violation
occurs within the statute of limitations period.
See, e.g., Berry v. Board of Supervisors of LS.U.,
715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir.1983); Nelson v.

peatedly sought assistance from her immediate supervisors, the AT & T EEO coordinator, and the EEOC, Retherford took medical disability leave at the instance of her
psychiatrist. She never returned to her job
because, physically and emotionally, she
could not work in proximity to "the people
who started the panic in her." Retherford's dramatic steps of taking leave from
her job, seeking medical and psychiatric
attention to heal the stresses of her work
place, and remaining on leave for approximately six months because she could not
bring herself to face her harassers all support a factual inference that the element of
extreme emotional distress did not come
into existence before September of 1985.
Williams, 25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1214,
1215 (D.D.C.1981); Williams v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 627 F.Supp. 752, 756-57
(W.D.Mo.1986); Tarvesian v. Can Div. of TRW,
Inc., 407 F.Supp. 336, 339 (D.Mass.1976); Loo v.
Gerarge, 374 F.Supp. 1338, 1340 (D.Haw.1974);
Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F.Supp. 891,
896 (D.Me.1970); Johnson v. Ramsey County,
424 N.W.2d 800, 810 (Minn.Ct.App.1988). At
least one state has adopted the Title VII continuing violation theory for causes of action brought
under the state's antidiscrimination act, see
Sumner v. Goodyear Tire <£ Rubber Co., 427
Mich. 505, 398 N.W.2d 368, 380-81 (1986), and
at least two states have codified the Title VII
continuing violation theory in their administrative regulations governing employment, see HyVee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights
Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 527 (Iowa 1990);
Rock v. Massachusetts Comm 'n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 424 N.E.2d 244, 248 &
nn. 12-13 (1981).
In determining the existence of a continuing
violation, courts focus on the following factors,
which are relevant to, but not dispositive of the
existence of, a continuing violation:
The first is subject matter. Do the alleged
acts involve the same type of discrimination,
tending to connect them in a continuing violation? The second is frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring (e.g., a biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated
work assignment or employment decision?
The third factor, perhaps of most importance,
is degree of permanence. Does the act have
the degree of permanence which should trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to
assert his or her rights, or which should indicate to the employee that the continued existence of the adverse consequences of the act is
to be expected without being dependent on a
continuing intent to discriminate?
Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.
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This is sufficient to support the conclusion
that the statute had not run by April of
1989, when the action was filed.
Of course, at trial defendants will have
the opportunity to prove to the satisfaction
of the finder of fact that the element of
extreme emotional distress accrued some
time before Retherford's leave of absence.
However, on the facts before us, we cannot
say as a matter of law that it accrued
before April of 1985. Consequently, the
four-year statute of limitations poses no
bar to Retherford's recovery for defendants' entire course of conduct. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).

to correct it, even before the victim has
fully accrued a cause of action. As a consequence, one might argue that the statute
of limitations against the employer for negligent employment should begin to run before the statute begins to run on the tort
by the employee. Such a situation might
exist where, as here, the victim alleges
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We need not decide today whether such
an argument has merit or whether it applies to the facts of this case. Defendants
did not advance the argument before this
court or the trial court, we have found no
legal authority that speaks to the issue,
and most important, the record provides no
basis for our concluding as a matter of law
that if the cause of action against AT & T
for negligent supervision did accrue before
the cause of action against the employees,
all this occurred before April of 1985.
There is therefore no basis for sustaining a
summary judgment on the ground that the
four-year statute of limitations bars the
negligent employment claim. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).

[34] The next question is whether Retherford's claim for negligent employment
also was filed within the four-year statute
of limitations. Before an employer can be
found liable for negligent employment, one
of its employees must have committed a
tort. See Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale,
165 Ariz. 395, 799 R2d 15, 18 (Ct.App.
1990); Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 213 cmt. a (1958). Thus, as a general
matter, the statute of limitations will not
begin to run on a cause of action for negligent employment until all elements of the
employee's tort are present. However, although the tort of negligent employment
requires the employee's tort as a condition
precedent, we note that in situations where
the victim does not accrue a cause of action
until she or he suffers a subjective harm, it
may be contended that the employer's
breach of duty has become evident long
before that point, i.e., that the conduct element of the tort, the employee malfeasance, has become sufficiently apparent
that the employer should have taken steps

[35,36] As a final objection to Retherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Randall and Johnson, defendants argue that the conduct alleged is insufficiently outrageous and intolerable to support such a claim. We disagree. The standard Utah has adopted for
determining whether the conduct of a defendant is sufficiently offensive to permit
recovery is whether the defendant's actions
"offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality." ,9

19. Although Samms v. Eccles cites the second
Restatement of Torts in support of this standard, see 11 Utah 2d 289, 293 n. 14, 358 P.2d
344, 347 n. 14 (1961), we note that Samms states
a somewhat different threshold for outrageousness than does the Restatement. The Restatement requires that the conduct at issue be "extreme and outrageous," which it describes as "so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46,
cmt. d (1965). On the other hand, Samms holds
that conduct is considered "outrageous and intolerable" if it offends against "the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality."

11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347 (emphasis
added).
We have reviewed Samms and our subsequent
cases dealing with intentional infliction of emotional distress and have found no evidence
whatsoever that the court intended to weaken
the Restatement's standard by this formulation.
Cf. Pentecost v. Harward, 699 R2d 696, 700
(Utah 1985) (citing both Samms and the Restatement without mentioning distinction).
Moreover, although we recognize a theoretical
difference between conduct that transgresses
"all possible bounds of decency" and conduct
that transgresses only "generally accepted standards of decency," we believe that in appiica-
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Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358
P.2d 344, 347 (1961).
Applying this standard to the facts at
bar and viewing those facts in a light most
favorable to plaintiff, we can say as a
matter of law that Retherford has alleged
outrageous and intolerable conduct sufficient to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Certainly, as defendants claim, merely following or making faces at someone, without
more, does not constitute conduct of such
objective offensiveness that it can give rise
to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, Retherford alleges more than simple insult or annoyance. She alleges months of persecution
by her co-workers, during which Gailey,
Johnson, and Randall shadowed her movements, intimidated her with threatening
looks and remarks, and manipulated circumstances at her work in ways that made
her job markedly more stressful all in retaliation for her good-faith complaint of
sexual harassment. Indulging all inferences in favor of Retherford, as we must,
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158
(Utah 1991), such allegations are sufficient
to satisfy the objective conduct requirement of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
It is worth stating forcefully that any
other conclusion would amount to an intolerable refusal to recognize that our society
has ceased seeing sexual harassment in the
work place as a playful inevitability that
should be taken in good spirits and has
awakened to the fact that sexual harassment has a corrosive effect on those who
engage in it as well as those who are
subjected to it and that such harassment
has far more to do with the abusive exercise of one person's power over another
tion, the distinction will be irrelevant, particularly in light of the Restatement's explanation
that "[generally, the case [of intentional infliction of emotional distress] is one in which the
recitation of the facts to an average member of
the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' " Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46,
cmt. d (1965) (emphasis added). We retain
Samms' formulation of outrageousness to prevent any apprehension that we limit the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress to

than it does with sex. See, e.g., Louise F.
Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure
of Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1399, 1399 (1992);
Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman
and the Ordinary Man, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev.
1411, 1415 (1992). This consensus extends
into all sectors of our society. Indeed,
although Utah Senator Orrin Hatch never
wavered from his conviction that law professor Anita Hill had fabricated her allegations that Supreme Court nominee Clarence
Thomas had sexually harassed her, he reportedly condemned the alleged conduct in
the strongest terms. Someone who would
make such vulgar and degrading comments
"would not be a normal person," Senator
Hatch said. "That person . . . would be a
psychopathic sex fiend or a pervert." Fitzgerald at 1405.
[37] As Senator Hatch recognized, sexual harassment is simply unacceptable in
today's society. To refuse to label the
retaliatory conduct alleged here as outrageous and intolerable would be a travesty.
Prosser and Keeton quite properly call sexual harassment on the job "undoubtedly an
intentional infliction of emotional distress."
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 12, at 18 (Supp.
1988). By this, we take them to mean that
the conduct generally labeled sexual
harassment is outrageous and intolerable
and, when performed with the requisite
intent, satisfies the elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
If the conduct that constitutes sexual
harassment is per se outrageous and intolerable, it stands to reason that retaliation
for complaining of sexual harassment must
also be considered outrageous and intolerable. Retherford has stated a claim for
conduct that offends "all possible bounds of
decency," an unrealistic and impossible standard. However, we stress that although our
formulation differs slightly from the Restatement's, this difference is only a concession to
the reality that no court would or could establish that certain conduct exceeds "all possible
bounds of decency." We have in no way softened the Restatement's requirement of extraordinarily vile conduct, conduct that is "atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress
through retaliatory harassment, thereby
meriting the opportunity to establish all the
elements of this tort before the finder of
fact. The trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on the nonpreempted
portion of that claim.
In sum, we hold as follows: First, both
employees covered by just-cause employment contracts and employees who are atwill can assert a claim in tort for discharge
in violation of public policy; second, the
UADA preempts only Retherford's claim
for discharge in violation of public policy;
third, the LMRA preempts Retherford's
claims for breach of implied contract and
malicious interference with contract, and
partially preempts her claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress; fourth, the
statute of limitations does not bar Retherford's claim for negligent employment and
the nonpreempted portion of her claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and fifth, Retherford has stated a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Consequently, we affirm the summary
judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for disposition consistent with this
opinion.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
(concurring with reservation).
I concur in the majority opinion with the
following reservation:
I would not reach the question whether
Retherford can pursue a tort action for
discharge in violation of public policy and
also a claim for breach of her collective
bargaining agreement's just-cause provision. It is not necessary to resolve this
issue because assuming such tort cause of
action exists, it is preempted by UADA, as
explained in the majority opinion.
The majority holds that Retherford could
pursue both a tort action and a contract
claim, except for the preemption. Not only
would this be duplicative, at least in part,
but it possibly may violate the collective
bargaining agreement, which requires that
all grievances arising out of or resulting
from the dismissal of a regular employee
Utah Rep. 842-646 R2d—11

must be arbitrated. I therefore prefer to
reserve judgment on this issue.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
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